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The negotiations for the Mid-Term Review of the 
Fourth Lomé Convention marked the introduction of 
multiple conditionality - economic adjustment and good 
governance - into the Lomé relationship. It placed 
additional demands on the two parties, giving rise to 
the essential concern of this thesis: do the two sides 
possess the requisite institutional capacity to meet 
those demands?
The introduction was not a sudden development. 
The origins of multiple conditionality lay in the 
Pisani Memorandum and its proposal of policy dialogue. 
The path from the proposal to multiple conditionality 
was assisted by developments within the Lomé 
relationship, including the unintended effects of AGP 
initiatives. This thesis is thus, in one sense, the 
history of the Memorandum's legacy of inverted 
conditionality through policy dialogue.
It is also an analysis of the capacities 
generated by the Convention and their applicability to 
multiple conditionality. My analysis of bargaining, 
operational and instrumental capacities demonstrates 
a weak AGP capacity and an asymmetrically greater EU 
capacity. My initial conclusion is that the EU is much 
more capable of meeting the demands of multiple 
conditionality. However, it too faces limits on its 
capacity, especially in dealing with the 
sociopolitical aspects of governance.
This recognition highlights an ignored factor: 
there is a second legacy of the Pisani Memorandum. In 
addition to the instrument of policy dialogue, the 
Memorandum identified institutional capacity as the
2
means to help overcome the problems of development. 
The new tale of two legacies illustrates an EU 
emphasis on policy control at the expense of capacity 
building. It has failed to perceive the importance of 
the link, in the Pisani Memorandum, between the 
instrument and the means. It forces me to amend my 
initial conclusion: neither side is adequately
prepared for the demands of multiple conditionality.
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INTRODUCTION
The negotiations on the Mid-Term Review of the 
Fourth Lomé Convention (Lomé IV), between the fifteen 
member states of the European Union (EU)^  and the 
seventy African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) 
Group of states^ were concluded in June, 1995. The 
negotiations were notable for two features. First, 
they were the first negotiations in mid-Convention as 
the duration of the Convention had been extended to 
ten years from its traditional five years. Secondly, 
and of more relevance to this study, the agreed 
provisions introduced a series of conditional elements 
into the Convention for the first time.
NATURE OF CONCERN
The new provisions, emanating from the Mid-Term 
Review, were explicit in their conditions. They 
identified, first, the basic link between development 
cooperation and good governance:
"... development policy and co-operation shall be
' With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1st 
November, 1993, the common terminology for the Europe of the 
Fifteen is the European Union of which the European Community 
remains one of three pillars. The Lomé Conventions pre-date the 
European Union and were all signed with the European Communities 
(EC). The Conventions themselves were titled the ACP-EEC 
Conventions and the European Economic Community (EEC) was therein 
referred to as the Community. There thus exists a number of
references to the EEC, EC and EU in dealings with the ACP. I
will, perforce, have to use all these terms but, in the name of
continuity, I will refer to the Community most often. See
Appendix 2 for a list of member states.
- See Appendix 1 for a list of the members of the ACP Group.
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closely linked to respect for, and enjoyment of, 
fundamental human rights and to the recognition 
and application of democratic principies, the 
consolidation of the rule of law and good 
governance.
They highlighted the need for economic liberalisation:
" They (The two Parties) recognize the importance 
of promoting, in ACP States, an environment 
favourable to the development of the market 
economy and of the private sector.
Finally, the provisions called for the imposition of
sanctions should the conditions not be honoured:
" If one Party considers that another Party has 
failed to fulfil an obligation in respect of one 
of the essential elements referred to in Article 
5, it shall invite the Party concerned ... to 
hold consultations with a view to assessing the 
situation in detail and, if necessary, remedying 
it. 5
... if in spite of all efforts no solution has 
been found, or immediately in the case of urgency 
or refusal of consultations, the Party which 
invoked the failure to fulfil an obligation may 
take appropriate steps, including, where 
necessary, the partial or full suspension of 
application of the Convention to the Party 
concerned.
The inclusion of such multiple conditionality^ in
 ^ Article 5.1, Lomé IV Convention as revised by the 
agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995, the Courier No. 
1, January-February 1996.
 ^Article 6,2, Lomé IV Convention as revised..., op. cit. 
The parenthesis is mine.
 ^ Ibid., Article 366a.2.
 ^Ibid., Article 366a.3.
' The term "multiple conditionality" is borrowed. See Joan 
M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, Global Goals^ Contentious 
Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality (Washington, D.C.:
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the Lomé Convention represented a definitive change in 
the nature of the Convention from two perspectives. 
First, the insertion of political conditions in the 
new provisions signalled a deviation from the basic 
tenets of the Convention which have dated from the 
inception of Lomé in 1975. Secondly, the conclusions 
of the Review added, to the customary issues of trade 
and aid cooperation, several new areas of concern 
relating to reform.
The basic tenets of Lomé might have varied in 
their written form in the different texts of the 
Conventions but they had been the underlying, 
constitutive principles of the relationship. I refer 
to the following: equal partnership; mutual interest; 
sovereignty; and above all, the right to determine 
one's own political, social, cultural and economic 
policy options.
In Lomé I, the preamble to the document spoke of 
the parties being "anxious to establish, on the basis 
of complete equality between partners, close and 
continuing cooperation...".® Article 40, paragraph 3 
of Title IV on Financial and technical cooperation in 
the same Convention noted that the cooperation "shall 
complement the efforts of the ACP States and shall be 
adapted to the characteristics of each of the said 
States".
Lomé II reiterated the commitment in its
Overseas Development Council, 1993). 1 return to the concept in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.1.1.
® The text of Lomé 1 is contained in The Courier, No. 31 - 
Special Issue - March, 1975.
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preamble to equal partnership in order to "reinforce" 
the continuing cooperation. In the provisions 
governing Financial and technical cooperation in Title 
VII, there was a similar paragraph to that in Lomé I. 
Lomé II went further in its commitment. Article 91, 
paragraph 1 stated that the objective should be to 
"promote the economic and social development of the 
ACP States on the basis of the priorities laid down by 
those States...".9
The two subsequent Conventions, Lomé III and IV, 
were even more explicit in their espousal of those 
principles. They were located in Chapter 1 on the 
Objectives and Principles of Cooperation. Article 2 of 
that Chapter noted that the ACP-EEC cooperation shall 
be exercised on the basis of the following fundamental 
principles :
- equality between partners, respect for 
their sovereignty, mutual interest and 
interdependence;
- the right of each state to determine its 
own political, social, cultural and economic 
policy options;
- security of their relations based on the 
"acguis"^° of their system of cooperation.
Article 3 also asserted that the ACP states "shall 
determine the developmental principles, strategies and
 ^The text of Lomé II is contained in The Courier ACP-EEC 
No. 58 - Special Issue - November, 1979, p. 23.
In the context of the Lomé Convention, the "acquis" 
refers to the benefits acquired by the ACP in the relationship. 
These are considered by the ACP as the basic elements of the 
Convention which are to be maintained, or improved, in future 
Conventions.
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models for their economies and societies in aii 
sovereignty" .
The conditional provisions of the Review not only 
proposed the addition of new areas of reform but those 
areas covered several spheres. These spheres included 
the economic (privatisation and stabilisation); social 
(distributive justice and decentralisation); political 
(démocratisation and good governance); and 
constitutional (rule of law).
These changes in the nature of Lomé demanded a 
series of appropriate responses from both parties to 
the Convention. They also raised the intriguing 
question of how well would the two sides manage the 
new tasks which conditionality had imposed on them. It 
is this second implication of conditionality which 
generates the central concern of this study: do the
two sides possess the requisite institutional capacity 
to meet the additional demands of cooperation as posed 
by multiple conditionality?
ORGANISATION
I have divided the study into three distinct but 
interrelated sections. In the first, I examine the two 
main concepts - institutional capacity and multiple 
conditionality - which are the main concerns of this 
thesis. I identify the process and nature of the 
changes which characterise the introduction of 
multiple conditionality into the Lomé relationship. I
“ See The Courier, Africa-Caribbean-Pacific - European 
Community, No. 89, January-February, 1985 for the text of Lomé 
III and The Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990 for that of Lomé 
IV.
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describe the series of steps which marked the EU's 
progress from a "dialogue of reason" to the stage of 
conditionality. I also explore the unwitting 
contributions of the ACP to the process.
My treatment of the process thus concentrates on 
four areas of Community policy: the struggle for
"policy dialogue" in the period before the re­
negotiations for Lomé III; the inclusion of structural 
adjustment provisions in Lomé IV; the application of 
stringent criteria in the use of Stabex provisions in 
Lomé IV; and the emergence of multiple conditionality. 
The ACP contributions to the process consisted of 
several efforts at expanding the Convention to include 
sociocultural and sociopolitical issues. They served, 
first, to weaken the identification of the Convention 
as a "trade and aid" package. Secondly, when the 
interpretation of the inclusions took on unintended 
forms, they also helped impose new measures of
potential conditionality on the ACP. The origins of 
conditionality are explored as a process through the 
use of two contrasting but parallel perspectives on 
their development.
In the second section of the research, I assess 
the capacity generated during the relationship to 
determine whether it would assist the ACP states or 
the EU to meet the new demands required by the 
introduction of multiple conditionality. I look, 
therefore, at two general areas of capacity, the
residual and the instrumental. Residual capacity
refers to the capacity generated during the Lomé 
relationship and preceding the introduction of
multiple conditionality. It is an assessment of the 
capabilities acquired from the experiences of the
20
relationship. It comprises two specific elements which 
I term bargaining and operational.
Based on the experience of similar exercises at 
structural adjustment, the nature and scope of 
conditionality depend upon the terms which have been 
agreed by the two sides through bargaining. The 
ability of either party to obtain preferred objectives 
is a function of their relative bargaining capacities. 
Those capacities are not reflective of the relative 
power of the two sides. Clearly, that of the EU would 
be disproportionately greater in financial and 
technical resources as well as in other measures of 
power. Thus far, those elements of power have not been 
a common feature of the Conventions and they are 
likely to be no more evident on the issue of 
conditionality. Thus, I am not discussing relative 
capacity per se but, rather, the respective 
negotiating capacity which has been developed during 
the relationship.
The second aspect of residual capacity, the 
operational, is that generated by the specific 
institutional development evident in the 
implementation of the four Lomé Conventions so far. I 
examine any evaluations which may have been made of 
those programmes to determine if areas of deficiency 
or possible improvement were identified and addressed. 
I also look at the role of certain institutional 
arrangements, created to help execute the programmes, 
to determine whether and how they may have contributed
See, for example, Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John 
Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank in Policy-based Lending
(London & New York: Routledge, 1991).
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to the generation of capacity.
Instrumental capacity which is the third aspect 
of capacity, but the second general area, covers the 
measures which have been elaborated to help implement 
the conditionality programme. They are the measures 
intended to help build the capacity required to 
achieve the reforms sought by the programme. The third 
and final section consists of the analysis and 
conclusions which I draw from the research.
STRUCTURE
Part One of the study consists of Chapters 1 and
2. Chapter 1 deals with the main concepts and existing 
literature while Chapter 2 traces the origins of 
multiple conditionality in Lomé. Part Two covers the 
analysis of capacity generation and comprises Chapters 
3 to 6. Chapter 7 makes up Part Three and contains the 
analysis and conclusions of this thesis.
Chapter 1 lays out the analytical framework of 
the thesis. It examines the concepts of institutional 
capacity and multiple conditionality. It looks at 
several relevant areas of the literature. It notes 
that, while the main concern of this thesis has not 
been addressed, there does exist a body of literature 
which offers some assistance.
In Chapter 2, I look at the origins of 
conditionality and draw a distinction between the 
widely varying perceptions of events which the two 
sides had. In so doing, I examine the evolutionary 
path towards conditionality which the EU set in train
22
with its quest for "policy dialogue". I also show that 
the same path, for the ACP, took on less sombre tones 
and, as a consequence, its premonitions were either 
ignored or misinterpreted. J also highlight a series 
of initiatives made by the ACP which, unwittingly, 
accentuated the move towards conditionality by 
weakening irreparably the constitutive principles on 
which Lomé was founded.
Chapter 3, the first in Part Two, introduces the 
first of the two aspects of residual capacity i.e., 
bargaining capacity. It offers a look at the 
respective negotiating strengths of the two Groups as 
those strengths have developed during the 
relationship. It is out of the bargaining process that 
the parameters for conditionality and its agreed form 
will arise. The Groups are analysed in terms of what 
countervailing power they may have acquired or 
foregone i.e., any increase in external profile or 
influence which, in turn, might have helped augment 
their relational capacity.
In Chapter 4, the analysis of bargaining capacity 
is tested briefly against the results of the initial 
negotiations on conditionality during the Mid-Term 
Review. The analysis also allows me to examine one 
aspect of bargaining capacity i.e., expectations, 
which can only be examined in the context of a 
specific set of negotiations.
Chapter 5 discusses operational capacity, the 
second aspect of residual capacity. I examine the 
record of capacity building during the Lomé 
Conventions to see what has been the contribution of 
the relationship to the existing capacity of the ACP
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participants. I assess the effect of Convention 
arrangements. I also explore the impact of Lomé 
operations on the functioning of the major AGP and EU 
agents of cooperation. Chapter 6 covers instrumental 
capacity. It identifies the elements built into the 
proposed regime of conditionality which are intended 
to enhance the existing capabilities of the recipient 
states.
Chapter 1, which makes up Part Three, provides 
the analysis and conclusions of the study. It looks at 
the fundamental questions to which the research 
initially gave rise and determines how those questions 
have been answered. I also address such issues as 
whether either side is equipped to handle the 
management of the new programme and what are the 
implications of the new tasks on capacity for Lomé 
generally.
SOURCES
I drew on three main sources for research 
purposes: a combination of primary sources in the form 
of published material; interviews with figures 
involved on both the AGP and EU sides; and secondary 
sources. The primary sources consisted of published 
documentation available on policy formulation as well 
as any unpublished but available documentation which 
can be consulted by researchers. Lomé and EU policies 
have been analysed in great detail over the years so 
there does exist a base of secondary material, in the 
form of previous analytical work on many areas. Given 
my own institutional focus, I drew on those sources 
for analytical purposes.
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I interviewed several officials on both sides as 
part of my research. In the case of the EU, I spoke to 
the substantive Director-General during the period 
relevant to my work, the negotiations and 
implementation of Lomé III and IV. I spoke to one of 
his two Deputy Directors-General who later served as 
the acting Director-General during the Mid-Term 
Review. I also interviewed several other senior 
officials involved in the operational aspects of the 
Convention and in the formulation and pursuit of 
conditionality. On the AGP side, I interviewed senior 
officials of the AGP Secretariat, including the Deputy 
Secretary-General who was then functioning as Officer- 
in-Charge. I also spoke to several diplomatic 
representatives of the AGP states. Both the 
representatives and officials offered valuable 
insights into the working of the AGP Group over the 
years. It is they who were the sources of my frequent 
observations on the positions held by groupings of AGP 
states during the Lomé relationship.
25
PART ONE
26
CHAPTER 1 
CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE
This Chapter looks at the analytical framework 
which guides this thesis. First, I define the two 
principal concepts - institutional capacity and 
multiple conditionality - which are the focus of my 
research. I then look at some general issues which 
arise in the course of my work. In attempting to 
develop an analytical framework, it is readily 
apparent that existing theory does not adequately 
address my concerns. However, there are bodies of 
existing literature which cover areas of relevance and 
thus offer some useful assistance.
1.1 THE TWO CONCEPTS
This thesis concentrates on two main concepts, 
institutional capacity and multiple conditionality. 
They are not generally familiar concepts. I need, 
therefore, to clarify the concepts as they are used in 
the thesis. They will be dealt with in reverse order 
as the second, multiple conditionality, is less 
difficult to define.
1.1.1 Multiple Conditionality
Conditionality, in its economic variant, is not 
a new or unusual phenomenon. Structural adjustment or 
macro-economic stabilisation has been termed first- 
generation conditionality. It emerged in the 1980s as 
a staple of most forms of development assistance. It 
was common to both the programmes of multilateral
27
financial institutions (MFIs) and bilateral donors. 
Nor were the sociopolitical elements of good 
governance novel features in such assistance. They 
have been categorised as second-generation or 
political conditionality.1 They were a more recent 
addition to structural adjustment programmes but they 
had long been an aspect of foreign aid. The Marshall 
Plan and its commitment to ideological, economic and 
security interests have been cited as one example of 
aid given on political terms.^
The characteristic feature of conditionality has 
been its emergence in two stages, the economic 
followed by the political. The Lomé experience has 
been different for two reasons. The first is that 
there was never a first-generation, or economic, 
conditionality in ACP-EEC cooperation. Structural 
adjustment was an unknown factor until Lomé IV in 
1990. When it was raised at that point, it was cast as 
a programme which was supportive of, not conditional 
on, AGP efforts. It was a programme designed to 
support the social elements of programmes being 
undertaken by AGP states with the MFIs.
 ^ A comprehensive treatment of both first- and 
second-generation conditionality is offered by Olav 
Stokke, "Aid and Political conditionality: Gore Issues 
and State of the Art" in Stokke (ed.). Aid and 
Political Conditionality (London: Frank Gass, 1995), 
EADI Book Series 16. Two other useful perspectives on 
conditionality are offered by Jane Harrigan, 
"Alternative Goncepts of Gonditionality", Manchester 
Papers on Development: Vol.IV No.4, Oct. 1988, pp.
451-471 and by "Aid and Political Reform", GDI 
Briefing Paper, January 1992.
 ^ See Edward Glay, "Gonditionality and Programme 
Food Aid: From the Marshall Plan to Structural
Adjustment", cited in Stokke, Aid and Political 
Conditionality., op. cit., pp. 4-6.
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The second difference follows from the first. The 
introduction of conditionality, during the Mid-Term 
Review, saw the amalgam of both stages of 
conditionality in one series of concurrent provisions- 
The comprehensive nature of the Lomé provisions^ calls 
for the simultaneous application of economic, social 
and political conditionalities which are aimed at 
systemic reform in recipient countries. It is for this 
reason that I prefer the term "multiple 
conditionality" in this thesis. Conditionality in the 
Lomé context is not divided by generation or stage. It 
also encompasses more than mere political conditions.
1.1.2 Institutional Capacity
It is generally recognised that strengthening the 
capacity of developing countries is an important 
component of development programmes and of structural 
adjustment. This fact has been emphasised by the 
multilateral financial institutions (MFIs).^ It has 
also been recognised by the Community as a critical 
element of its own conditionality programme for the 
ACP states.5 The need for reflection arises from the
 ^ See the Introduction for a description of the 
conditions.
 ^ See World Bank, A Framework for Capacity 
Building in Policy Analysis and Economic Management in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,
1990). See also Edward V.K. Jaycox, "Capacity 
building: the missing link in African development".
The Courier no. 141, September-October, 1993. Mr.
Jaycox was the Vice-President, Africa Region in the 
World Bank.
 ^ See, for example, European Commission, The 
Design of Economic Reform in the Context of Political
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nature of the capacity which needs to be built or 
strengthened. In both instances mentioned above, the 
focus has been on strengthening organisations through 
public sector reform.
The extension of adjustment programmes to 
encompass sociopolitical reform suggests that the 
tasks demanded by such reform are more complex. They 
must go beyond the traditional institution-building or 
capacity-building of MFI programmes to include the 
wider issue of how to build the institutions which 
support social and political reform. Institutional 
capacity, as a concept, thus signifies more than the 
capacity of organisations which pursue certain roles 
or practices. It also covers the capacity of 
institutions which are based on principles which often 
underpin the organisations. The latter set of 
institutions are based on an appreciation of social 
structure and include the institutions of political
life.G
One example of the later type of institution is 
provided by the quest for démocratisation which is an 
essential element of sociopolitical conditionality. 
Its importance to this study of EU-ACP relations is
Liberalization : Findings and Conclusions from Case
Studies (December, 1994: Paper presented for the
Meeting of the Special Programme for Africa in
January, 1995). I cover the Community's appreciation 
of capacity in greater detail in Chapter 6.
 ^This point is discussed in detail by John Toye. 
See Toye, Dilemmas of Development, Second Edition, 
(Oxford, UK & Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1993), pp.
146-150. He argues that structures - social, political 
and economic - have to be reintroduced into the
analysis of development.
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demonstrated by the case of Haiti. In that case, the 
holding of the first democratic exercise of the 
franchise signalled, to most observers, the 
enshrinement of the democratic process. That 
assumption was rapidly undermined by the re- 
introduction of authoritarian rule through a military 
coup. Haiti was subsequently suspended from the Lomé 
Convention until its lawful President was restored to 
office.
There is a valuable lesson to be gained from the 
Haitian experience. It is that the exercise of the 
franchise becomes an institution of democracy only 
after it has been established as continuous practice 
i.e., as a principle. The initial task is the 
scheduling of free and fair elections but there is a 
secondary, and probably more crucial, concern. It is 
whether the fundamental principle of electoral change, 
which goes beyond the initial exercise of the 
franchise, can be rapidly established. The principle 
is based on the institutionalisation of the tradition 
of free and fair elections, as demonstrated by a 
history of practice of such elections. 1 concede that 
it is clearly not easy to fashion indices of 
measurement for principles but time is obviously an 
important factor. However, the task cannot be evaded 
merely on the grounds of complexity.
The definition of institutional capacity rests on 
the question of what constitutes an institution. The 
study of institutions has long detained social 
scientists and has become more topical in recent 
years. The study has been variously titled in 
different disciplines and has been more developed in 
some than in others. It encompasses the new
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institutional economics;'' the positive theory of 
institutions in political science;® regime theory and 
institutionalism in international relations;^ and the 
new institutionalism in sociology.
 ^ See, for example, Douglass C. North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990) and Vincent Ostrom, David Feany and Harmut Picht 
(eds.). Rethinking Institutional Analysis and 
Development (San Francisco: International Centre for
Economic Growth, 1988).
® The work of Terry M. Moe and Kenneth A. Shepsle 
offers a useful guide. See Moe, "Political 
Institutions: the Neglected Side of the Story",
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 6, 
Special issue, 1990, pp. 213-253; Moe, "Politics and 
the Theory of Organization", Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue, 1991, pp. 
106-129; and Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some
Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach", Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, 1986, pp.131-147.
 ^The pioneering text on regime theory is Stephen 
D. Krasner(ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1983) . The work on
institutionalism is varied. See, for example, Robert
O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two
Approaches", International Studies Quarterly, Volume 
32(4), December 1988, pp.379-396; Keohane,
International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1989); Oran Young,
"Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the
Development of Institutions in International Society", 
International Organization, Volume 45, Number 3, 
Summer 1991, pp. 281-308; John Gerard Ruggie (ed.). 
Multilateralism Matters : the Theory and Praxis of an 
Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993); and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard 
Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the 
Art on an Art of the State", International 
Organization, Volume 40, Number 4 ;, Autumn 1986, pp. 
753-775.
A comprehensive treatment is given by Walter W. 
Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.). The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1991). It offers an
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Unlike the other disciplines, the study of 
institutions in international relations is much better 
developed theoretically than it is empirically. Given 
this lack of development, it is perhaps surprising 
that it is the field of international relations which 
has provided me with the most suitable definition of 
institutions. The working definition for the purposes 
of my analysis is drawn from Wendt and Duvall: 
"institutions are coherent sets of principles that 
structure and organise ensembles of practices
As was gained from the experience of Haiti and 
démocratisation, the institutionalisation process 
depend on practices being pursued constantly until 
they have become principles. Secondly, I also have to 
examine institutional capacity to meet sociopolitical 
reform. In other words, institutional capacity in this 
study goes beyond the strengthening of formal bodies 
or entities, whether public or private. It must also 
encompass the inculcation of the beliefs and 
principles which sustain those formal entities.
1.2 ISSUES ADDRESSED
The initial perception of the introduction of 
conditionality is that it represented an abrupt change
excellent overview of the study of institutions in the 
various disciplines in Powell and DiMaggio, 
"Introduction", pp. 1-38.
Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, 
"Institutions and International Order", p. 60 i.n Ernst- 
Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.). Global 
Changes and Theoretical Changes: Approaches to World 
Politics in the 1990s (Lexington, Mass. iLexington 
Books, 1989).
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in the traditional ACP-EU relationship. This 
perception is substantiated by the insertion of the 
sociopolitical elements of conditionality. Certainly, 
from an ACP perspective, the introduction was 
unexpected, even unilateral. Nonetheless, a closer 
observation of the relationship reveals clear 
differences in assessment between the two sides. They 
help to reveal divergences in perception which haunt 
the relationship. The divergences serve to explain 
both the emergence of multiple conditionality and the 
route along which it travelled.
My own contention is that the emergence of 
multiple conditionality was the outcome of a process 
of events, commencing with the EU ' s advocacy of 
"policy dialogue", in advance of the negotiations for 
Lomé III. The process was also inadvertently assisted 
by misdirected ACP initiatives. The origins of 
conditionality were not, initially, fully clear to the 
Community or its officials. The ACP Group, therefore, 
could possibly be forgiven its failure to detect the 
evolution of the process.
A series of questions, therefore, arise for my 
thesis :
(a) What were the origins of conditionality? 
Did they represent an abrupt change or an 
evolutionary process? If the latter, what 
was the nature of the process as exemplified 
by the stages?
(b) What are the demands of multiple 
conditionality? Are the recipients wholly 
captive of structural power or is there 
scope for manoeuvre? How do recipients 
mobilise for such manoeuvring and what
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capacity do they possess?
(c) What are the forms of capacity involved 
and what lessons as to their potential value 
can be gathered from the experiences of 
Lomé?
Each of these questions is addressed in the thesis as 
the elaboration of the structure has shown, with the 
primary focus on the forms and assessment of capacity.
1.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The issue of institutional capacity, in its wider 
sense^^ and in the context of multiple conditionality, 
has not been treated in the existing literature. This 
is possibly due to the novelty of the area and to the 
limited history of experience available for empirical 
study. The main theoretical approaches are also not 
directly applicable to the concerns of this thesis. 
However, there has been some treatment of related 
topics which does offer some assistance.
1.3.1 Limitations of Theory
My thesis is not an exercise in structural 
realism or in rational choice theory. Both approaches 
suffer from limitations in dealing with my chosen 
topic. A structural realist would seek to explain the 
emergence of multiple conditionality in Lomé as a
I am referring here to the inclusion of both 
the technical and administrative aspects of 
organisational capacity and the sociopolitical 
dimensions needed to address the demands of 
governance.
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reflection of the asymmetrical power^^ wielded by the 
Community in the relationship. Based on this 
perspective, conditionality would be an unavoidable 
imposition facing the ACP states.
The experience of countries pursuing structural 
adjustment indicates that there might well be limits 
to structural power, at least in the area of economic 
r e f o r m . The success of that reform depends greatly on 
the compliance of the state undergoing the programme, 
through its "internalisation" or "ownership" of the 
provisions. Reform thus requires both the donors, or 
those imposing conditions, and the recipients to come 
to a form of agreement on the conditions. This process 
of clarification allows the recipient state to enter 
into a bargaining process. It can do so at three 
stages of the conditionality programme: at the stage 
of initiation i.e., the design of the programme; at 
the stage of implementation; and on the renewal of the 
programme.
The state facing adjustment thus has some scope 
to negotiate a more suitable programme. It also 
possesses the ability to frustrate the programme
See Susan Strange, States and Markets, 2nd 
Edition (London & New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 
pp. 24-34 for a treatment of structural power in 
international political economy. .
I refer to studies on structural adjustment 
when I examine the existing literature. An indicative 
list of such studies is given at that point. See 
footnote 24 below.
See Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan & John Toye, Aid 
and Power: The World Bank & Policy-based Lending
(London & New York: Routledge, 1991), Vols. 1 and 2, 
especially Chapter 3 of Vo] . 1, for a treatment of
bargaining in the process of structural adjustment.
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through its willingness, or lack thereof, to pursue 
its policies as much depends on the state itself 
executing those p o l i c i e s . This point has been 
demonstrated by several studies of adjustment. The 
Philippines under Marcos and Zaire have often been 
cited as notorious examples of countries exhibiting 
little or no commitment to reform. An analysis based 
on structural power thus fails to allow for the 
options available to the recipients through 
bargaining.
Rational choice theory, in either variant of new 
political economy or of neo-liberal institutionalism, 
also does not suit my purpose. The new political 
economy has been criticised for its inadequate 
appreciation of politics in seeking to explain all 
policy-making as based on self-interest.^® While I
This routine of compliance or evasion in 
conditionality has been variously termed a "game", a 
"ritual" or a "dance".
These two examples are cited in Thomas 
Callaghy, "Towards State Capability and Embedded 
Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for Adjustment" 
in Joan M. Nelson (ed.). Fragile Coalitions: The
Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Books, 1989). For a more detailed 
treatment of commitment and slippage by implementing 
States, see Mosley, Harrigan & Toye, Aid and Power..., 
op. cit (both Volumes 1 and 2). The latter work covers 
the adjustment process in eleven countries.
Two such critiques are Merilee S. Grindle, "The 
New Political Economy: Positive Economics and Negative 
Politics" in Gerald M. Meier (ed.). Politics and 
Policy Making in Developing Countries : Perspectives on 
the New Political Economy (San Francisco: ICS Press,
1991) and Gerald Meier, "The New Political Economy and 
Policy Reform", Journal of International Development, 
1993, pp. 381-389. A further criticism is made by John 
Toye who cites the analytical deficiencies of the new 
political economy. He contends that, ultimately, the
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subscribe to some of that criticism, my difficulty 
with rational choice theory centres on two concerns 
fundamental to my thesis.
The first relates to multiple conditionality. 
Rational choice would suggest that countries choose to 
undertake structural adjustment, and multiple 
conditionality, as a conscious decision. In sum, they 
enter into partnership with the donors on a voluntary 
basis, given the realities of the international 
political e c o n o m y . 19 However, the conclusion does not 
stand up to an empirical test. They are very few, if 
any, instances of countries voluntarily seeking to 
undertake conditionality. They all seek to minimise or 
escape the conditional elements in programmes. 
Rational choice is thus too uncertain a match for 
multiple conditionality.
Its second variant, neo-liberal institutionalism, 
fails because, by definition, it does not allow for 
social forces. My working concept of institutional 
capacity explicitly covers the building of socio­
political capacity. Keohane noted that his
policies advocated must lead to choices being made as 
to which groups lose or gain from the policies 
pursued. Such decisions cannot be rational in nature. 
They thus expose an inherent fallacy in the concept of 
rational choice. See Toye, Dilemmas of 
D e v e l o p m e n t o p . cit., esp. Chapter Five.
9^ This relationship has been termed 
"reinforcement" i.e., the donors provide support for 
recipients to pursue policies to which the latter are 
already committed. See David F. Gordon, 
"Conditionality in Policy-based Lending in Africa: 
USAID Experience" in Paul Mosley (ed.), Development 
Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and 
Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed 
Countries(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
38
rationalistic approach to international institutions 
focused almost entirely on specific institutions.^ He 
stands in contrast to the reflexive approach which 
stresses the importance of impersonal social forces 
and the impact of cultural practices, norms and 
values.Although Keohane did call for a synthesis of 
the two approaches, he also emphasised that neo­
liberal institutionalism focused on the evolution and 
impact of international regimes. This concept of 
institutionalism is unsuited to an analysis of 
institutions which are not formal organisations but 
reflect social forces.
This thesis covers several areas e.g., 
conditionality, institutional capacity, bargaining and 
development management. There is no single theoretical 
approach which adequately analyses all of these areas. 
I am, therefore, guided by a cross-disciplinary 
approach. In that respect, I share the views of 
several who advocate the need for such an approach to
2° Robert 0. Keohane, "International Institutions: 
Two Approaches", International Studies Quarterly, 
Volume 32, Number 4, December 1988, p. 386. Keohane's 
neo-liberal institutionalism is a variant of rational 
choice theory, not least because he lays great stress 
on its rationality. It is an emphasis which is 
accentuated by its roots in microeconomic theory of 
exchange, costs and preferences.
2^ Ibid., p. 381. Among the reflexive school, 
Keohane identifies Friedrich Kratochwil and John 
Gerard Ruggie. See Kratochwil and Ruggie, 
"International Organization..." op. cit. He would also 
place my operating definition squarely in the 
reflexive school.
22 Keohane, "International Institutions...", p.
392.
39
the analysis of development issues.^
1.3.2 Relevant Literature
There is a growing literature on the study of the 
political economy of adjustment. This literature 
mainly focuses on the technical and operational 
aspects of such programmes. There have been a number 
of such studies on both MFI and bilateral experiences, 
with analysis devoted to the comprehensive treatment 
of several coun tri es. in  the case of multiple
Meier, Toye and Callaghy all call for a more 
inclusive approach to analysis. Meier calls on 
development economists to seek a synthesis of the old 
political economy (power, class, ideology, 
nationalism) and the new (rational choice) . He also 
urges that analysis be made of institutional change 
and its effect on development performance (new 
institutionalism) as well of the policy-making process 
in practice. Toye also calls for a cross-disciplinary 
approach to development issues. He urges the 
application of theories which, unlike the new 
political economy, permit reciprocal interaction 
between the individual and the social setting. 
Callaghy goes further than either in addressing the 
difficult case of Africa. What is needed, he states, 
is an analytic attack which takes simultaneous 
advantage of choice-theoretic, new institutionalist, 
and macrosociological and historical perspectives. See 
Gerald M. Meier, "The New Political Economy and Policy 
Reform", op. cit.; John Toye, Dilemmas of Development, 
op. cit., and Thomas M. Callaghy, "State, Choice, and 
Context: Comparative Reflections on Reform and
Intractability" in D. Apter & Carl Roseberg (eds.). 
Political Development and the New Realism in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (Charlottesville: the University of
Virginia Press, 1994).
There is a growing literature on the politics 
of stabilisation under the MFIs' programmes and, to a 
lesser extent, under the bilateral programmes of the 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and The Overseas Development Agency (ODA). A 
comprehensive coverage of the politics is offered by 
the three volumes of the research project on the
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conditionality, there has been a general exposition on 
its nature^^ but little exists on the national 
experience.
One of the gaps in the literature to which this 
thesis responds is the assessment of prevailing 
conditions i.e., the readiness of both donor and
politics of stabilisation and structural adjustment: 
Joan M. Nelson (ed.). Fragile Coalitions: The Politics 
of Economic Adjustment op. cit.; Joan M. Nelson (ed.). 
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of
Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990) ; and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman 
(eds.). The Politics of Economic Adjustment: 
International Constraints^ Distributive Conflicts^ and 
The State (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992). An equally extensive treatment has been made by 
the two-volume study: Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and 
John Toye, Aid and Power: The World Bank & Policy-
based Lending, Vols. 1 & 2, op. cit. Specific
treatment of the international aid agencies, the 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) is
provided by two articles. They are David F. Gordon,
"Conditionality in Policy-based Lending in Africa: 
USAID Experience" and Peter Sandersley, "Policy-based 
Lending: An ODA Perspective", both in Paul Mosley
(ed.). Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays 
in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality of Less 
Developed Countries (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1992). These are only a few, illustrative examples of 
the burgeoning literature on the issue.
Nelson and Eglington, Global Goals, Contentious 
Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality
(Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1993) 
covers several instances of the emerging phenomenon of 
the use of conditionality as a criterion in the
allocation of aid.
A recent addition has been a study of the 
linking of structural adjustment policy and governance 
conditionality in Guyana. See Tyrone Ferguson, 
Structural Adjustment and Good Governance : The Case of 
Guyana (Guyana: Public Affairs Consulting Enterprise, 
1995).
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recipient, before multiple conditionality is 
introduced. It does so through an evaluation of the 
suitability of the proposed programme and of the 
possible obstacles to successful implementation. Such 
an assessment underlines the importance of the central 
question - do the parties possess the requisite 
capacity for implementation of a conditionality 
programme?
There is a limited literature on bargaining as an 
aspect of capacity, in the case of multiple 
conditionality. This literature has focused primarily 
on the processes and lessons of structural adjustment, 
looking at conditionality in that context. More 
recently, the treatment has been of political forms of 
conditionality such as governance and démocratisation. 
Where it has touched on capacity, it has done so in 
terms of state capability at the implementation stage 
of adjustment.28
In the specific case of Lomé, the majority of 
studies have focused on the technical operations of 
the Convention or on the relationship as an exercise 
in diplomatic negotiations. Conditionality in Lomé is
2^ A short, indicative list of such work has been 
given in Footnote 24.
28 Two useful examinations of state capability are 
Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa ' s Economic 
Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
and Thomas Callaghy, "Towards State Capability and 
Embedded Liberalism in the Third World...", op. cit.
2^ A sample of the literature on Lomé is offered 
by the following: Carol Cosgrove-Twitchett, Europe and 
Africa: From Association to Partnership (Farnborough, 
UK: Saxon House, 1978); Ellen Frey-Wouters, The
European Community and the Third World: The Lomé
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a new phenomenon and, accordingly, suffers from a lack 
of analytical attention. Bargaining and negotiation 
have been treated infrequently in studies on ACP-EEC 
cooperation.30 I am, therefore, not offered much 
analytical guidance from the existing literature in my 
principal areas of focus: Lomé, multiple
conditionality and institutional capacity. I do, 
however, benefit from work in several related areas.
A recent study, commissioned by the EU, examined 
the structural adjustment process in various ACP 
states.31 It considered adjustment programmes under the
Convention and Its Impact (New York: Praeger, 1980); 
Carol Cosgrove-Twitchett, A Framework for Development : 
The EEC and the ACP (London: Allen & Unwin,, 1981); 
John Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism: The Lomé 
Conventions and North-South Relations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985); John Ravenhill, 
"Negotiating the Lomé Convention: A Little is
Preferable to Nothing" in I. William Zartman (ed.). 
Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations^ (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1987);
Marjorie Lister, The European Community and the 
Developing World (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1988); John 
Chinwi Mgbere, Cooperation between the European Union 
and the African^ Caribbean and Pacific Group: a study 
in group diplomacy (unpublished thesis submitted for 
the Ph.D degree. University of London, 1994).
3° Two such studies are Ravenhill, "Negotiating 
the Lomé Convention...", op. cit., and Mgbere, 
Cooperation between the European Union and the 
African^ Caribbean and Pacific Group..., op. cit. An 
earlier work, pre-dating Lomé and covering the EC 
States' relations with former African colonies, was 
that of I. William Zartman, The Politics of Trade 
Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic 
Community (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1971) .
33 Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont (eds.). 
Adjustment and Development: The Experience of the ACP 
Countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific), (Paris: 
Economica, 1994 (Translation by Buchanan international
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MFIs. It thus preceded the structural adjustment 
support (SAS) programme under Lomé IV. The study is 
helpful in that it characterises adjustment as ill- 
designed and not very successful. It thus accentuates 
the task facing the multiple conditionality programme. 
If the latter is to achieve more than adjustment did, 
the programme must be informed by the experience of 
the adjustment process. Its objectives must be clear 
as should be its potential to attain those objectives.
The literature on capacity, in the area of the 
political economy of adjustment, also offers some 
assistance.32 This assistance is augmented by the 
debate which its work provokes when cast alongside the 
contributions of the institutional development school. 
The work on the political economy of reform 
concentrates on the insertion of sociopolitical 
elements into the standard macroeconomic approaches to 
adjustment. It thus coincides with the traditional 
approach to capacity-building, institution development 
and reform.
The traditional approach has also sought to 
encompass sociopolitical elements within the design of 
standard development programmes and projects of 
reform. However, its primary, if not sole, focus has 
been on making systemic change or improvement in the
Traductions).
3^ This body of literature includes Haggard and 
Kaufman (eds.). The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment..., op. cit.; Callaghy, "State, Choice and 
Context...", op. cit.; Callaghy, "Towards State 
Capability and Embedded Liberalism...", op. cit.; and 
Merilee S. Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and 
Innovation in Latin America and Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) .
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functioning of existing organisations.^^ As outlined 
e a r l i e r , 3 4  a wider appreciation of the task suggests 
that capacity should be viewed as two-dimensional. It 
includes the generation of capability through the 
strengthening of systems in the ACP countries. 
However, it also needs to be measured in terms of its 
longer-term contribution i.e., the establishment of 
the principles and structures which underlie those 
systems.
The dual nature of the issue is not always fully 
reflected in the literature. This deficiency is 
visible in two principal ways. The first relates to 
the distinction in development administration between 
"role-oriented" (organisational) change and "rule- 
oriented" (institutional) change.^ it is important to 
note that it is to role-oriented organisations that 
development agencies are addressing themselves when 
they seek institutional reform, capacity building and 
institution building. Scant attention has been paid to 
the rule-oriented or social institutions which so 
often underpin those organisations.
33 A good example of the traditional approach 
which also offers a critical overview of the field is 
Arturo Israel, Institutional Development: Incentives 
to Performance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press (Published for the World Bank), 1987).
34 See Section 1.1.2 on institutional capacity.
33 These include the political and social 
structures to which Toye refers. See footnote 6 above.
3^ Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, 
"Promoting the Sustainability of Development 
Institutions: A Framework for Strategy", World
Development, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1992, p.369-383.
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An example of this deficiency was provided by the 
presentation of a Vice-President of the World Bank, 
Edward W. Jaycox, in 1993.^ The presentation 
emphasised the importance of capacity to African 
development. Its focus was on the training of 
nationals and the reform of the civil service. Jaycox 
did acknowledge, glancingly, the need to go into 
structural adjustment with an informed public. 
However, he did not elaborate on the next and obvious 
step of how to engage and inform the public of the
process. Such a linkage would have helped identify the
need to cater for popular participation and 
decentralised cooperation in development. It thus 
ignored the important task of building the rule-
oriented institutions. As I demonstrate later, EU
proposals are similarly geared to reform at the 
traditional, systemic level and, thus, to 
organisational change.
The second reflection of the deficiency stems 
from a recognition of the difficulty of encompassing 
social dimensions in economic reform. The difficulty 
has been evident in recent work, particularly by World 
Bank officials, on the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes in developing countries. They
See Edward W. Jaycox, "Capacity building: the 
missing link in African Development", The Courier, no. 
141, September-October 1993. He made the presentation 
to the African-American Institute.
38 This topic is discussed in Chapter 6.
The following serves as an indicative sample of 
such studies: Arturo Israel, Institutional
Development: Incentives to Performance, op. cit.;
Samuel Paul, Institutional Development in World bank 
Projects: A Cross-Sectoral Review (World Bank, April 
1990: WPS 392); and Lawrence Salmen, Institutional
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highlight the need to cater for sociopolitical 
elements from the initial phase of programme design 
and during the implementation of programmes.
Those efforts are, however, still focused on 
achieving systemic reform through organisational 
change. They do not take full account of the 
distinction between such reform and the building of 
social institutions for development. The latter demand 
a much longer time-frame of observation to measure 
their achievement. Their nature as "principles" 
require more than the mere initiation of "practices" 
sought by the reforms. They need the demonstration of 
consistent and regular application of those 
"practices". Consequently, their success is more 
difficult to measure and it is much more difficult to 
cater for them in the initial design of programmes.
The difficulty in ensuring the success of 
programmes of structural reform relates to another 
aspect of capacity, the complexity of the tasks. This 
aspect is reflected in two ways in the literature: in 
the nature of the tasks and by whom they are executed. 
The latter point has received greater attention 
through the treatment of state capability. Indeed, the 
major focus in the standard literature on 
institutional development has been on the enhancement 
of public sector resources. The focus on the official
Dimensions of Poverty Reduction (World Bank, May 1990: 
WPS 411) .
This was the message of the Haitian example. 
See Section 1.1.2 above.
See Israel, Institutional Development. . . op. 
cit., p.l.
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capacity suggests that the responsibility for 
implementation of reform programmes is a governmental 
duty. It is an appreciation which has given rise to a 
growing criticism in the literature.
The criticism is articulated in two ways. The 
first is in the "orthodox paradox" of donors using the 
state to achieve reforms, the principal objective of 
which is to minimise the state itself. The paradox is 
readily visible in the EU conditionality proposals. 
They are solely addressed to the ACP states, charging 
them with the execution of the various t as k s . T h e  
second criticism stems from the assessment of the 
capabilities existing in the recipient states. It is 
also based on the fact that so many of the objectives 
of reforms call on the States to exercise enhanced, 
not reduced, capabilities for promoting economic 
development through both public and private sectors.^
The nature of the tasks involved in the reforms 
of structural adjustment represents a less readily 
manageable problem and is less developed in the 
literature. As emphasised earlier, successful 
structural reform requires a longer-term perspective 
and the requisite qualities are not easily 
accommodated in programme design. There is thus little
Miles Kahler, "Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: 
Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and 
Adjustment", p. 55 in Joan M. Nelson (ed.). Economic 
Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment 
in the Third W o r l d . , op. cit.
The main proposals, as embodied by the 
amendments to the Convention, are outlined in the 
Introduction.
See Thomas Callaghy, "Towards State Capability 
and Embedded Liberalism...", op. cit.
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consensus in the literature on the features in a 
programme necessary to ensure successful reform. Two 
trends are emerging in the literature. The first is a 
recognition that the attainment of objectives can be 
assisted, not hindered, by greater cognisance of the 
social setting in which those objectives are pursued. 
The second is that one avenue worth further 
consideration might be the identification of the 
features, within that setting, which can provide an 
"enabling environment" for the achievement of those 
ob j ectives .
Further assistance from the literature comes from 
Thomas Callaghy who looks at capacity in bargaining, 
again in the context of structural adjustment. He 
underlines the value of a two-level negotiation 
approach, which is a metaphor for domestic- 
international relations. Callaghy argues that there 
are lessons to be learnt, by the developing world, 
from the manoeuvring of "embedded liberalism". It is 
a concept wherein the international obligations of 
liberalism are acknowledged but within the constraints
The concept of an "enabling environment" is 
well developed by Goran Hyden in his article "The 
Changing Context of Institutional development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa" in The Long-Term Perspective Study of 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Background papers, Vol. 3:
Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1990).
46 "Towards State Capability and Embedded 
Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for
Adjustment", op. cit.
The approach is developed in Robert D. Putnam, 
"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-
Level Games" International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 
3 (Summer,1988), pp. 491-517.
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of domestic political and economic realities. It is 
a concept which has been described as Keynes at home 
and Smith abroad.^
Callaghy uses the experiences of Mexico and Chile 
to illustrate the latitude wnich domestic manoeuvring 
offers a state to offset the social and political 
impositions of adjustment. However, the nature of EU 
multiple conditionality reduces the scope for such 
manoeuvring. Its inclusion, at the outset, of social 
and political dimensions reduces the leeway for 
offsetting the political costs of adjustment. Callaghy 
also posits the important contribution that there is 
scope for bargaining in the adjustment process.
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye also examine 
conditionality as a bargaining process within the 
structural adjustment programmes of the MFIs.^o They 
look at three stages of bargaining: programme design, 
implementation and refinancing. Callaghy, for his 
part, draws on the two-level analysis of negotiation 
which covers the stages of bargaining and 
ratification.
The process of negotiation on multiple 
conditionality is likely to be more complex than 
either a straight financial arrangement between MFI 
and recipient or an analysis of negotiations between
Callaghy, "Towards State Capability...", pp.
118-119.
The description was made by James Mayall, as 
cited in Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987).
Aid and Power, Vol. 1, op. cit.
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two parties. Both parties in the Lomé relationship 
comprise several separate states with varying 
interests. Indeed, it could be argued that there are 
two levels of negotiation in Lomé. The first 
negotiation is internal to each party as part of the 
process of forming a Group-wide negotiating position. 
The second is the more customary ACP-EU negotiation 
which is envisaged when one thinks of Lomé.
The perception of different layers of negotiation 
evokes the reality of internal trade-offs within each 
Group = It thus brings Lomé into the context of a 
multilateral negotiating process, a fact which is 
possibly hidden beneath the ACP-EU dichotomy. A recent 
study by Sjostedt, Specter and Zartman identifies six 
defining characteristics of multilateral negotiations: 
multiparty; multi-issue; coalition; consensus ; 
multirole and rule-making.^^
Multilateral negotiations are, by definition, 
multiparty but with multi-faceted interests in each 
party.52 The negotiations are multi-issue in nature, 
thus allowing for trade-offs in the outcome since all 
parties do not have the same level or sets of 
interests on any single issue. A common characteristic 
of multilateral negotiations is coalition formation. 
While the traditional manifestation is coalition among
5^ Gunnar Sjostedt, Bertram I. Spector and I. 
William Zartman, "The Dynamics of Regime-building 
Negotiations’" in Sjostedt, Spector and Zartman (eds.). 
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned
from the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) (London/Dordrecht/Boston: Graham 
& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994).
5- Ibid., pp. 6-11. This section offers a detailed 
treatment of the six characteristics.
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parties, there are often coalitions formed around 
issues, interests and positions. Agreement at 
multilateral negotiations are often reached by 
consensus when parties, not in agreement, car. abstain 
without blocking agreement. The negotiations give rise 
to multiroles whereby the initial distinction between 
leaders and followers give way to others such as 
orchestrators, defenders of single issues, etc. 
Individuals can often be assigned specific roles in 
working groups, thus deflecting inputs of powerful 
personalities. Finally, multilateral negotiations are 
occasions for rule-making, rather than for 
redistribution of resources.
The common perception of Lomé does not correspond 
exactly to that of a multilateral conference. 
Nonetheless, the defining characteristics of the 
latter are much more appropriate to an analysis of 
Lomé negotiations than are the two-party models. All 
of the characteristics, save that of rule-making, are 
readily apparent in the Lomé arrangements and 
particularly so in a wide-ranging area such as 
multiple conditionality. Even the characteristic of 
rule-making is relevant to the Lomé process. Sjostedt, 
Spector and Zartman describe the process of regime- 
formation in multilateral negotiations as incremental, 
taking place over an extended period. Negotiations 
move from "whether" (to pursue an issue or an 
objective) in the main round to "when", "what" and 
"how" in later meetings.
The incremental process is analogous to the Lomé 
process in two ways. First, the evolution of rules.
Ibid. , p.10.
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constraints and procedures over an extended period 
corresponds to the emergence of the constitutive 
principles^'^ in Lomé. These guiding principles were not 
initially explicit components of Lomé but emerged 
through incremental negotiations and interaction, 
especially between Lomé 1 and II. Secondly, as with 
multilateral negotiations, multiple conditionality in 
Lomé required, first, an agreement on whether to 
pursue a conditionality programme.^ It would then be 
followed by an evolving, incremental process of 
agreement and elaboration of elements such as scope, 
content, sanction, etc.
The combined contributions of the various 
approaches all help to clarify the issues to be 
addressed herein. The assistance of the literature on 
adjustment, institutional development and multilateral 
negotiation is valued but this study still has to 
chart a path largely on its own. First, it differs 
from the political economy approach to adjustment for 
it takes the issue beyond mere adjustment to multiple 
conditionality. It looks at the process as holistic 
i.e., the economic conditionalities of structural 
adjustment are to be satisfied contemporaneously with 
the social and political conditions. This process 
makes for a set of arrangements and trade-offs with an 
intricate matrix of possible cross-conditionalities, 
hence the term, multiple conditionality. The 
arrangements and cross-conditionalities are more
These principles are outlined in the 
Introduction above.
This step has, of course, been taken with the 
agreements contained in the conclusions of the Mid- 
Term Review.
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complex than those posed by the consideration of the 
sociopolitical implications of macroeconomic 
stabilisation. The complexity of the tasks helps throw 
into even greater relief the importance of 
institutional capacity of both donors and recipients 
and of their efforts to achieve them.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ORIGINS OF CONDITIONALITY
The general interpretation of multiple 
conditionality is that it represented a definitive 
shift in the prevailing policies of ACP-EU
cooperation. It thus constituted a drastic change in 
the constitutive principles of the Lomé Convention, 
the "acquis", and subjected the cooperation to 
hitherto excluded political considerations. Such was 
the fundamental view of most AC? states, irrespective 
of whether they considered conditionality inevitable 
or not. The AC? Group asserted that the existing 
Convention, Lomé IV, already contained principles, 
inserted primarily on its own initiative, which 
covered human rights and the promotion of democratic 
values.
While the Group proposed that those provisions 
could and should be improved, it saw little need for 
their imposition by the Community. The ACP's concern 
was with the unilateral policy applied by the EU 
during the first half of Lomé IV. The policy consisted 
of the EU withholding development assistance from ACP 
states when it decided that there had been violations 
of basic principles of human rights and democracy.^ The 
ACP Group was concerned that such a policy was applied 
by the Community without due consideration and 
agreement with itself. It thus constituted an ominous 
precedent for the future interpretation of
 ^ "The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Lomé 
Convention: ACP Memorandum to the European Union"
(ACP/27/003/94 Rev. 3), pp. 1-2.
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conditionality provisions.
Similarly, definitive change was at the heart of 
the Community's perceptions when the Commission 
argued, first, that development was a global process 
of transforming societies. The Commission also 
contended that, if the scope of cooperation policies 
was to encompass political and administrative areas, 
important changes would have to be made in the 
dialogue between the recipients and donors. If the 
latter wished to encourage démocratisation and 
encourage durable development progress in recipient 
countries, then they would have to state clearly their 
concerns and apply their "conditionality" 
deliberately.2 It would appear that, in both ACP and EU 
perceptions, multiple conditionality was a deviation 
from the existing policy of cooperation.
I contend, however, that the reality was both 
much different and more complicated. The concept of 
conditionality had long been considered by the 
Community, at least. A process had been set in train 
which, although not nominally conditional, did 
initially impinge on the central tenet of the acquis
i.e., the full recognition of, and the mutual respect 
for, the sovereignty of each partner and for its 
political, social, cultural and economic choices. That 
process began with the elaboration, in 1982, of the 
need for "policy dialogue" in what has come to be
 ^ "The Community's Relations with the Developing 
Countries Viewed in the Context Of Political Union", 
Annex to SEC(92)915 Final/ 2, Development Cooperation 
Policy in the Run-Up to 2000, Communication of the 
Commission to the Council and Parliament, p.57.
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known as the Pisani Memorandum.^ The process continued, 
over time, growing from the advocacy of policy 
dialogue in the negotiations for Lomé III through its 
acceptance in Lomé IV. It continued with the 
provisions for structural adjustment and the 
frameworks for mutual obligations (FMOs) in respect of 
the stabilisation of export earnings (Stabex) in Lomé 
IV. It finally concluded with the inclusion of 
multiple conditionality in the Mid-Term Review of Lomé 
IV.
The development of the process was not always 
recognised as the build-up to conditionality by its 
authors, the Community or by the ACP. The initial 
struggle for policy dialogue resulted in an 
unofficial, informal form of conditionality while none 
of the other phases leading to multiple conditionality 
was explicitly characterised as conditionality. It is 
even debatable if the Community consciously designed 
them as building blocks of conditional aid but they 
were, nonetheless, steps on the EU's path to multiple 
conditionality.
For the ACP Group, the perspective was totally 
different. The Group recognised, and resisted, the 
dangers of policy dialogue in the negotiations for 
Lomé 111. Having won that battle, the Group rested on 
its laurels and failed to recognise any of the 
subsequent steps on the path to multiple
 ^The Pisani Memorandum was actually a Memorandum 
on the Community's Development Policy prepared by the 
Commission and was so titled in honour of its 
architect, Edgard Pisani, the then-Commissioner for 
Development. See The Courier, No. 7 6 (November- 
December 1982), pp. 10-28 for the text of the 
Memorandum.
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conditionality for what they were. Indeed, as I show 
later, the ACP regarded each of the steps identified 
above as having a distinct value in itself and, in 
some cases, a positive value. The ACP states further 
compounded their dilemma by initiating some proposals 
of their own which served to undermine further the 
basic principle of the acquis. They did so by 
expanding the scope of the Convention beyond trade and 
aid to encompass sociopolitical dimensions. It was an 
expansion which allowed the Community entrée to 
discussions on wider areas of national policy.
2.1 BACKGROUND TO CONDITIONALITY:
INITIAL FEATURES
In 1982, there were a number of deveJopments, 
both global and internal to the ACP-EEC relationship, 
which militated in favour of a revaluation of
development assistance. The North-South dialogue had 
seemingly broken down irretrievably with the failure 
of efforts at global negotiations on development as 
symbolised by the impasse at the United Nations 
Special Session in 1980. The results of the Cancun 
Summit in Mexico in 1981 had been disappointing as 
well. The assessment of the achievements of the 
development decades of the 60's and 70's was
pessimistic in that the developing countries had not 
shown the desired or expected results from development 
assistance.
Additionally, both debt and spiralling energy 
costs posed new problems for developing countries even 
as the global economy was beset by recession. The 
Community itself was beset by high unemployment. With 
so many least-developed countries among the ACP, the
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issues besetting the global economy were just as, or 
even more, pressing to the Community's partners in the 
ACp4 than they were to developing countries in general. 
Internal to Lomé, the negotiations for Lomé III were 
set to begin in September, 1983 and the question of 
ACP development prospects was a valid concern in that 
context.
2.1.1 The Pisani Memorandum: Conceptual
Origins of Conditionality
The above picture gave rise, naturally, to an 
evaluation by the Community of the achievements and 
prospects for development policy. The conclusions of 
the Pisani Memorandum reflected the results of the 
evaluation. Underlying the conclusions was the 
conviction that improving development action required 
more than a mere increase in aid resources.^ A series 
of additional considerations in the formulation of the 
Memorandum have to be examined, among which were a few 
which are critical to this study. First, aid, and the 
transfer of technology which it involved, had to be 
adapted to local requirements of recipient countries. 
Secondly, developing countries, through their 
administrative limitations and emphasis on state 
machinery, were also partly responsible for the 
failure of development cooperation. The solution was 
to be found "between rigid conditionality imposed by
I am here recapturing the reasoning of the 
Commission as articulated by Commissioner Pisani. See 
"Interview: Edgard Pisani comments on the Memorandum 
on Community Development policy". The Courier, No. 7 6, 
pp. 3-9.
 ^ "Memorandum on the Community's Development 
Policy", The Courier, No. 76, p. 18.
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financing bodies and the irresponsibility of non­
conditionality" through a political dialogue between 
donors and local decision-makers.^
The political dialogue would concern the 
effectiveness of the policies which the recipient 
Governments asked the Community to support. The 
dialogue would lead to a form of "inverted 
c o n d i t i o n a l i t y " Community assistance would be 
predicated on Governments adhering to their own stated 
policies once those policies had been agreed, with the 
donor EEC, as coherent and consistent. The logic of 
inverted conditionality lay in the switch which was 
taking place in Community aid from project to 
programme assistance and to a sectoral emphasis in the 
latter. The sectoral approach was typified by an 
initial focus on food sector strategies. It was a 
strategy enunciated in the Pisani Memorandum but it 
was fully supported by the ACP Group. The ACP 
recognised the need to increase domestic food 
production. Its members, like the rest of the 
developing world, had suffered from dramatic rises in 
food imports in the early 1980s.^
The sectoral approach was well suited to policy 
dialogue. The demand for an overall perspective on 
sectoral policy meant that Governments had to design 
a framework for the sector. It had to be based on an
 ^ Ibid., op. cit., p. 19.
 ^ Ibid., p. 19.
® See ACP Group, Memorandum on the Position of the 
ACP Group in its Future Relations with the European 
Economic Communities (ACP/0023/83 NEG (Rev.4), pp.52- 
53. This was the ACP's negotiating brief for Lomé III.
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internal consistency in policy in the sector receiving 
aid. Its consistency had to be maintained in 
implementing the programmes in the sector. The 
implementation of sectoral aid thus entailed 
discussion, between donor and recipients, on the 
coherence of the strategies pursued in the sector.
Two important elements arose from the choice of 
an approach located between rigid conditionality and 
non-conditionality. The first of these elements was 
the concept of effectiveness implicit in inverted 
conditionality. The Community reaffirmed its respect 
for the sovereign right of recipient countries over 
the use of aid resources. It did insist, nonetheless, 
that it had "a right and a duty to engage in a 
dialogue" with recipient Governments concerning the 
effectiveness of the policies which it was supporting.^ 
This initial interpretation of effectiveness was
largely one-sided in that the onus of proving
effectiveness was on the recipients. It assumed that 
policy dialogue would enable the donor Community to 
ensure that the policies of the recipients were 
consistent and in accord with an acceptable overall 
design.
With the passage of time and as multiple 
conditionality approached, the concept was extended to 
encompass efficiency and accountability. They were 
applied not only to recipients but also to the
technical officials charged with the delivery of 
development aid. As I show later, development 
programmes were to be assessed for consistency of 
policy, cost-effectiveness and achievement, and
 ^ Ibid., p. 10.
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responsible use of resources.^ The concept assumed 
more of a two-way dimension as the implementation of 
cooperation was made subject to internal Community 
criteria on the use of funds for development. The 
criteria arose from political considerations. The 
political directorate of the Community had to satisfy 
the pressures of limited resources and growing numbers 
of claimants. They also faced a domestic populace 
which was increasingly sceptical of the use of 
resources for far-off and irrelevant projects.
The second important element, highlighted by the 
Memorandum, was the strengthening of administrative 
capacity in developing countries. A critical element 
in the solution of the problems of development was the 
requisite skills for the management of assistance. It 
is not certain that this element was as widely 
elaborated in Community policy as was effectiveness in 
later years. Nonetheless, the initial recognition of 
an important aspect of capacity, the administrative 
element, was there from the outset.
Equally important were two further nuances of 
capacity which emerged from the Pisani Memorandum. 
Pisani himself underlined an important difference 
between a developed and an underdeveloped country. It
This assessment is covered in Chapter 5 which 
deals with the operations of the Convention.
The importance of internal accountability in 
the Community as a contributory factor in the 
emergence of multiple conditionality was stressed by 
Peter Pooley, Deputy Director-General for Development 
(DG VIII) in the Commission, during my interview with 
him.
"Interview: Edgard Pisani comments...", op.
cit.
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was less the difference in industrial capacity than 
the lack of the "multiple network of economic, social, 
cultural, political and intellectual relations". 
Implicit in that analysis was the recognition that the 
capacity required for development went beyond the 
administrative i.e., the sets of functional 
arrangements. It also comprised other aspects such as 
social and cultural relations.
Pisani's networks thus consisted of both a range 
of functional arrangements and a more notional set of 
institutional interactions. It was the latter which 
would evolve over time into sets of dependable and 
predictable relations, akin to principles. This 
combination of elements is remarkably similar to my 
own working concept of institutional capacity. It 
covers both the establishment of practices and the 
more notional principles which would be fostered by 
those practices.
The second nuance of capacity was the need to 
ensure that the capabilities built up during the 
process of the policy dialogue were culturally 
adapted. They needed to be suited to local 
requirements and compatible with the national 
development priorities of the recipients. Aid was 
more likely to succeed if it was an integral part of 
policy and "not superimposed on an alien reality". 
This early phase of condibionality, as proposed in the 
Pisani Memorandum, was a benign form. It sought to 
establish, through policy dialogue, a logic and a
Ibid. , p. 6.
14 fii'Memorandum on the Community's Development 
policy", op. cit., p.19.
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rationale for the sectoral programmes of the 
recipients. It would use faithful observance of that 
agreed coherence as the conditional element of future 
cooperation.
The initial approach did not wholly succeed due 
to the firm opposition of the ACP but it had set in 
motion, within Community policy, a process which was 
to continue and result in multiple conditionality. The 
effort failed for the primary reason that the ACP 
feared that the inclusion of policy dialogue in the 
Convention might be used to undermine the sovereignty 
element in the acquis. Apart from the limited scope of 
the food sector strategies, the main effort to pursue 
policy dialogue and inverted conditionality was made 
during the negotiations for Lomé III.
Two subsidiary reasons for the failure were to be 
found in internal Community divergences.^^ One was an 
apparent problem of semantics centring on the 
rendition of the term "policy dialogue" in Community 
languages. The terms "policy" and "political" are 
indistinguishable when translated into French and 
German. Thus, both the French and German renditions of 
policy dialogue conveyed a wider interpretation of a 
"political" dialogue. Such a dialogue on overall 
national policy was not acceptable to some of the 
member states and, certainly, not to the ACP.
The two points of internal disagreement were 
initially raised in my interview on 8 September, 1995 
with Dieter Frisch, Director-General of DG VIII during 
most of this period. They were later corroborated by 
Edwin Carrington, Secretary-General of CARICOM, in my 
interview with him in Georgetown, Guyana on 5 January, 
1996. The latter served as ACP Secretary-General from 
1985-90 and as Deputy Secretary-General from 1975-85.
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The second disagreement was more conceptual: some 
Community states, and some Commission officials, were 
of the view that aid resources, once allocated to the 
ACP, were the responsibility of the ACP states for 
them to use as they saw fit. They opposed policy 
dialogue for that reason. For that group, a policy 
dialogue on the use of resources implied that the aid 
remained the Community's and threatened the exercise 
of ACP responsibility. It was a perspective which 
coincided with that of the ACP Group.
The combined effect of the ACP's opposition and 
the internal differences led to the failure of the 
Community to have policy dialogue included in Lomé 
III. The provisions of Lomé III reflected that fact. 
The text of the Convention only mentioned the term 
"dialogue" in Article 8 in a general sense^^. It made 
no allowance for any of the various conditional 
factors which were sought by the Community.
The initial Community approach of inverted 
conditionality was important for a number of reasons. 
First, it refutes the common wisdom that 
conditionality was an unknown element in ACP-EEC
Interview with Dieter Frisch. He mentioned the 
specific case of the two positions being championed 
respectively by Commissioner Pisani and his 
predecessor as Commissioner, Claude Cheysson, then the 
French Minister of Overseas Development. Commissioner 
Pisani favoured policy dialogue while Cheysson opposed 
it on the grounds that the funds were the ACP states' 
to use as they saw fit.
The Third ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, The 
Courier, No. 89 (January-February 1985). In Article 8, 
the two sides merely agree to pursue the dialogue "to 
seek ways and means of rendering" the instruments of 
the Convention more effective.
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relations. Macroeconomic conditionality, per se, might 
not have been explicitly introduced into the 
Conventions. Nor might a formal, restrictive version 
have been proposed. However, the concept was clearly 
mooted and considered by the Community, with the
important caveat that the conditionalities were to be 
based on policies of the recipients' design. In that 
sense, inverted conditionality differed decidedly from 
that of the MFIs in that it was not part of a 
doctrinaire set of formulae imposed from outside.
Secondly, while conditionality did not emerge as 
an initial strategic choice, it did raise a series of 
elements which were to assume a vitality of their own 
and play important roles in the later evolution of EU 
conditionality. Effectiveness was the motivating force 
of the thrust for policy dialogue. In its later 
incarnation which encompassed efficiency and 
accountability, it provided the rationale for a more
rigorous approach in both the provision and
disbursement of development assistance by the
Community.
Capacity was recognised as a sine qua non of the 
effective management of assistance by recipients. A 
great deal of the emphasis was on strengthening 
administrative capabilities. Pisani also underlined 
his assessment that those capabilities should, first, 
go beyond the political and economic to encompass 
social and cultural arrangements. Secondly, he 
stressed that they should be entrenched in the
The issue of increased rigour in Lomé 
programming is treated in chapter 5. See Section 5.4 
herein.
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recipient society as overarching networks.
A third characteristic of the initial proposal 
was the recognition that any form of dialogue must 
result in initiatives which were geared to the 
priorities and nature of the recipient society. In 
other words, the proposed measures would have to be 
adaptable. That insistence on a unique set of measures 
suitable to the recipients' conditions was a novel 
element of Community policy. It was to resurface 
during the discussions on structural adjustment. It 
also currently distinguishes EU positions on 
conditionality in policy sessions of the MFIs from the 
more general positions of the other donors.^
Policy dialogue, and the inverted conditionality 
which it proffered, remained an important feature of 
the ACP-EEC relationship. The ACP Group might have won 
the battle against its inclusion in Lomé III but the 
Community won the war over acceptance of the concept 
of policy dialogue. Its inclusion was finally agreed 
for Lomé IV. Its acceptance at that latter date was 
obviously conditioned by the earlier debate as it was 
not accompanied by the mention of any form of 
conditionality. More important was the fact that the 
Community managed, to a certain extent, to circumvent 
ACP opposition. It did so through the introduction of 
policy dialogue during the programming exercise 
preceding the implementation of Lomé III. The struggle
European Commission, The Design of Economic 
Reform in the Context of Political Liberalisation: 
Findings and Conclusions from Case Studies, Paper 
prepared for the Meeting of the Special Programme for 
Africa - Working Group on Economic Reform in the 
Context of Political Liberalisation (December, 1994), 
pp.22-23. This distinction is developed in Chapter 6.
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for policy dialogue was a critical reflection of the 
misperceptions which the ACP Group held of the 
conditionality process.
In sum, the Pisani Memorandum stressed three 
features important to the process leading to multiple 
conditionality. The first was the policy objective and 
motivation i.e., the genuine promotion of development 
through the effectiveness of aid programmes. The 
second was the choice of an instrument to achieve the 
objective: a benign form of inverted conditionality
through policy d i a l o g u e . The third was a 
complementary set of means, the networks of 
institutional capacity, to help with the execution of 
the policy.
2.1.2 Lomé III : Programming Exercise
As noted above, the Community did not succeed in 
persuading the ACP to accept policy dialogue in the 
negotiations for Lomé III. The Community was much more 
effective in the programming exercises which 
Commission officials undertook to discuss and agree 
indicative programmes with the ACP states. During 
those exercises, the Community did convince several 
individual ACP states to accept the dialogue as part 
of the agreed programme of assistance to be offered
Conditionality is not a policy but an 
instrument to pursue other objectives. In this case, 
the end was effective aid programmes and genuine 
progress to development. On the issue of 
conditionality as an instrument, see Olav Stokke, "Aid 
and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of 
the Art", pp. 2-3 in Stokke (ed.). Aid and Political 
Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995) EADI Book
Series 16.
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during Lomé III. It is doubtful that the discussions 
during the programming exercises directly mentioned 
the term "policy dialogue". However, the effect of the 
conclusions of the exercises was a series of 
variations in important sectoral policies, in the 
recipient state, in accord with the objective of 
policy dialogue.
A few examples will help to demonstrate how the 
goals of policy dialogue were achieved during the 
programming discussions. The examples centre, 
primarily, on the agricultural sector for, in both the 
Community's and the ACP's view, it was an area of the 
greatest import. That importance was reflected by the 
fact that food production strategies had been accorded 
priority status in the Convention.
The three individual examples are of Tanzania, 
Ethiopia and Kenya;^ the other is of the regional 
programming exercise in the Caribbean. In Tanzania, 
the Commission sought to have, and succeeded in 
having, the Government agree to an agricultural 
pricing policy based on incentives. The introduction 
of such a market-oriented feature had been anathema to 
the Tanzanian authorities up to that point. The 
Government had never accepted the inclusion of an 
incentive pricing policy in any formal agreement, not 
even with the World Bank.^ Kenya was also persuaded to 
re-examine the role of its central marketing boards as 
part of an examination of food production in the
The three country examples of Tanzania, 
Ethiopia and Kenya which follow are all drawn from my 
interview with Dieter Frisch who was personally 
involved in the programming exercises.
Interview with Dieter Frisch.
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sector.
Similarly, in Ethiopia, the Commission insisted 
that the funds which it was providing for agriculture 
justified its demand that the Government consider a 
varied approach to the sector. In this case, the 
Commission was concerned about the negative effects of 
the socialist-style centralised farming units under 
the Mengistu regime. Again, the Government was 
persuaded of the value of the Community's view of 
decentralisation as a more viable approach. It was 
clearly not an easy matter to persuade the Ethiopian 
Government of the Community's point of view. The 
subject Minister shared the Community's perspective 
but he had to obtain the seal of approval from the 
President. The latter was persuaded only after direct 
discussions with the Commission delegation. In the 
opinion of one senior Commission official, the success 
in Ethiopia was a model of policy dialogue, of 
"reciprocal and mutual commitments".^^
In the regional programming exercise in the 
Caribbean, the Commission's focus was less on a single 
sector and more on a rethinking of the scope of the 
programme. For the Community, the regional programme 
covered too many sectors e.g., agriculture, education, 
health, trade and tourism.^ The Commission officials
Ibid.
The reflections on the regional discussions are 
based on both the recollections of the author who was 
a participant in the discussions and those of regional 
officials of the Caribbean (CARICOM) Secretariat which 
coordinated Caribbean relations with the Community. 
There was no unit in CARICOM formally charged with the 
Lomé portfolio. My conversations were informal and 
consisted of informal discussions with two officials
70
tried to achieve two objectives. The first was to have 
one or two central themes identified, such as human 
resources development, which would serve as the basis 
for links to the various sectors; the second was to 
have the programme cover a smaller number of sectors. 
One of the main reasons offered for the change in the 
criteria for drawing up the programme was the
complexity of the programme. The management of so many 
sectors and the range of projects within each sector, 
supposedly, posed great difficulty for the technical 
services of the Commission. The Commission was thus 
raising the question of programme coherence which 
underlay the concept of policy dialogue without
directly mentioning the contentious issue.
The proposal represented a clear change in the 
format of the regional programme and presented the
Caribbean group with several major dilemmas. The first 
was how to choose between sectors, particularly in 
cases where the list of projects had been ratified by 
a Council of Ministers in the sector. Secondly, the 
group considering the regional programme and, indeed, 
present at the discussions with the Commission was a 
diverse collection of interests which were very hard 
to reconcile. They included not only the thirteen
regional states but also most regional organisations. 
The latter ranged from the Caribbean Development Bank 
through the Consultative Association of Industry and 
Commerce (an umbrella group of regional industry) to 
the University of the West Indies. Finally, the group
who regularly represented CARICOM on Lomé matters. The 
discussions took place during visits to Georgetown, 
Guyana in January and August, 1994 and January, 1995. 
As of Lomé IV, the Caribbean regional programme under 
Lomé is being handled by a formal unit, CARIFORUM.
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felt that the Commission was threatening the regional 
prerogative to fashion its own programme on the 
apparently spurious grounds that the programme 
demanded too much time. The reason advanced did not 
pay due regard to the considerable consultation and 
negotiation which the formulation of the programme had 
required.
The Caribbean response to the proposal was 
negative but the objections were all based on the 
specific issue of change in the criteria. At no time 
did the group raise the matter of policy dialogue or 
question the apparent attempt of the Commission 
delegation to recover ground lost during the Lomé III 
negotiations in Brussels. The Caribbean reactions 
focused on the merits of the proposal and on whether 
it was a feasible proposition. The Commission's 
proposal was not perceived for what it was, a subtle 
réintroduction of the policy dialogue debate. Only in 
the area of the region's right to design its own 
programme did the Caribbean venture close to the ACP 
objections in Brussels.
The example reveals that there was an obvious 
lack of communication between the officials in home 
states and the ACP representatives in Brussels. It 
highlights an important aspect of the Lomé 
relationship: the gap in perception which exists
between the representatives who are involved in the 
negotiating routine in Brussels and the officials who 
are responsible for Lomé matters in the capitals. A 
good indication of that gap was the fact that not one 
of the regional states had thought to include a 
representative, of any seniority, from its Brussels 
Mission, in its delegation to the programming
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exercise.
The Community might have failed in its attempt to 
include the concerns underlying policy dialogue in the 
Caribbean programme but the same could not be said for 
the individual country programming exercises, as has 
been shown. The principal achievement, in the latter 
instance, was that the Community managed to obtain a 
dialogue on the grounds of reason. It did so by 
pointing out that the major investments which it was 
making in the various sectors demanded that the 
sectoral policies each be made subject to internal 
logic and coherence. The state's priorities would 
still hold but they would be the subject of a reasoned 
dialogue to ensure that coherence was achieved. The 
Community was winning the war. By the time of Lomé IV, 
the issue of policy dialogue was a dead letter. The 
Community had been involved in so many discussions on 
the policy objectives of ACP states that the ACP had 
no grounds on which to resist its inclusion in the new 
Convention. The unvoiced debate on conditionality 
could turn to new issues.
2.1.3 Structural Adjustment
During the negotiations for Lomé IV, a critical 
issue was the state of ACP economies, with the 
treatment of debt burdens as the major concern. A 
parallel issue was the difficulties which the pursuit 
of structural adjustment programmes was posing for the 
ACP states. There existed a need for urgent action and 
provision for structural adjustment support was made
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in the new Convention. The adoption of a programme of 
structural adjustment support (SAS) within Lomé was 
not achieved without considerable contention. Several 
AGP states saw it as the thin edge of the
conditionality wedge which the MFIs were then forcing 
on all supplicants for assistance. It was further 
contended by some in the AGP that the Community was 
planning to integrate its own programme into that of 
the MFIs. The effect would thus be to reinforce, 
rather than alleviate, the problems which structural 
adjustment was causing.
Several forms of reassurance were offered, by the
Community, to the AGP to ensure that the motives of
the SAS were not misunderstood. It was mutually agreed 
that the process of economic rationalisation, as
Manuel Marin, the Commissioner for Development termed 
it, was unavoidable.2G The Community sought to defend 
its own approach against the charge, made during the 
negotiations, that its programme was a mere parody of 
the MFIs'. The EU argued that its own emphasis in the 
proposed SAS was markedly different. It would 
concentrate on the alleviation of the social 
dislocations which the pursuit of the traditional 
programmes was causing. Those dislocations were a 
neglected feature of existing policies oriented to 
macroeconomic reforms.
As the Commission itself stated:
" ... a number of structural adjustment
programmes were not successful or
See Article 243 of the Fourth ACP-EEC 
Convention, The Courier no. 120, March-April, 1990.
Manuel Marin, "Lomé IV - the scope of a new 
Convention", The Courier no. 120, p. 13.
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experienced serious difficulties due to 
political and social obstacles stemming from 
an approach which was too rigid and too 
focused on purely financial and economic 
considerations.
Thus, the stated objective was to avoid repeating the 
errors of the MFIs and to help relieve the negative 
social consequences.
The second reassurance lay in the pledge that SAS 
funds would be additional to the traditional 
development funding. Arising from these two earlier 
assurances was a third that the Community's SAS would 
be original and involve a specific Community 
orientation i.e., a pragmatic, realistic and 
differentiated a p p r o a c h . Lomé IV stated, further, 
that the ACP states would bear the primary 
responsibility for the preparation of reform 
programmes. It declared that those programmes would be 
adapted to different situations and social conditions 
in each state. They would be pursued within the 
political and economic model of the state concerned.^
Even the eligibility criteria outlined for the 
SAS were designed to allay any ACP fears of a possible 
emulation of the restrictive MFIs' programmes. Those 
ACP states eligible for the SAS would fall within one 
of three categories:
(a) those already pursuing a programme of
Speech of Manuel Marin at the signing of the 
Lomé IV Convention, Lomé, December, 1989.
Manuel Marin, "Lomé IV - the scope of a new 
Convention", op. cit., p. 13.
Article 244, Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, op.
cit.
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structural reform with the MFIs;
(b) those pursing an agreed programme 
preparatory to structural reform i.e., a 
shadow programme;
(c) those pursuing a programme of their own 
design and which they could satisfy the 
Community was the equivalent of a structural 
reform programme.
The scope of the criteria was such as to cover most of 
the ACP and reassure those which were most wary of 
being forced into MFI conditionality through the 
Convention.
The funds involved in the SAS were limited, thus 
constraining the likely impact of the support. The 
Community was not providing sufficient SAS funding to 
allow it to fashion a full-scale conditionality 
package as the MFIs were doing. The Community also 
downplayed the possibility of close coordination with 
the MFIs in the implementation of its own SAS. 
Commissioner Marin did signal that the SAS allowed for 
closer donor coordination but that would be in the 
context of the Community's pragmatic and realistic 
a p p r o a c h . Commission negotiators noted that the 
Community might have to liaise with the MFIs in the 
implementation of the SAS since the programme would
3° An amount of 1150 million ECUs was reserved for 
the SAS. While this could be supplemented by a limited 
portion of an individual state's IFF, the total looks 
much less impressive when it is considered that it 
covers a five-year span and could potentially benefit 
sixty-odd states. From the latter perspective, and 
assuming an even spread of benefit, the average SAS 
per country is less than 4 million ECUs per annum.
3^ Marin, "Lomé IV - the scope of a new 
Convention", op. cit., p.13.
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require an expertise in development economics which 
the Commission then lacked.
The initial impression of the SAS, as proposed 
and accepted in the negotiations, was of a measure 
largely supportive of the major burdens which the ACP 
countries were pursuing in their reforms. By late 
1994, the early image of the SAS had notably changed 
from that of an original, pragmatic and differentiated 
programme. The Community was now asserting that there 
should be no confusion: each country could have only 
one structural adjustment p r o g r a m m e . ^  The clear 
implication was that if that one programme happened to 
be with the MFIs, then the Community would follow the 
letter's lead. The potential for differentiation had 
vanished and the proximity of the SAS to 
conditionality à la MFI had increased.
2.1.4 Lome IV: Stabex
The progress to conditionality via the new image 
of the SAS took on concrete form with the treatment, 
in Lomé IV, of the system for the stabilisation of 
export earnings from agricultural commodities 
(Stabex). Prior to the Convention, transfers of funds 
to recipient ACP states were made with little overview 
of the final use of the funds. Criticisms had often 
been made that the ACP were utilising the funds for 
balance of payments support and not to help redress
European Commission, "Community support for 
structural adjustment in the ACP countries: towards
the consolidation and strengthening of a realistic and 
concerted approach", COM(94) 447 final. This point was 
subsequently underlined in my interview in Brussels 
with Peter Pooley, then Deputy Director-General for 
Development in the Commission, on 31 August, 1995.
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the problems in the affected area of production.
In Lomé IV, the latitude accorded to the ACP was 
firmly restricted through the adoption of frameworks 
of mutual obligations (FMOs). The FMOs were concluded 
by agreement between the state concerned and the 
Commission. They compelled the recipients to use the 
transfers either for the benefit of economic operators 
in the sector suffering the fall in earnings or for 
the purpose of diversification in the agricultural 
sector.
The net effect of the FMOs was to build upon the 
objectives of the policy dialogue. It did so by, 
first, ensuring that prospective recipients of STABEX 
came to an agreement with the Community, via the 
Commission officials, on their overall plans for 
ailing sectors. The conditionality is implicit but, 
nonetheless, real. The application of the provisions 
for the FMOs has demonstrated that fact. A number of 
ACP states have complained that the exercise of 
concluding an FMO is painful and comprehensive. It 
often involves discussions with officials, at the 
highest levels, in Ministries of Economic Development 
or Planning in ACP capitals on wide-ranging aspects of 
economic policy.
Lest the linkage between the tightening of the
Article 186(2) of the Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention, op. cit..
This point was made to me separately in 
interviews in Brussels. They were with the Edwin 
Laurent, Ambassador of St. Lucia to EEC on 1 
September, 1995 and Samuel Orgias, the Chargé
d ’Affaires of Mission of Grenada to EEC on 5
September, 1995.
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use of STABEX transfers and conditionality be
underestimated, the Community was much more explicit.
It placed emphasis, in its position for the Mid-Term
Review, on the conditional role of STABEX transfers:
"Lomé IVs new provisions regarding the use 
of Stabex transfers, particularly in the 
form of the frameworks of mutual 
obligations, broaden the scope of Stabex 
beyond financial compensation to encompass 
assistance for sectoral adjustment and even 
macroeconomic adjustment. . .
The Commission and the Community, for the
former's proposals were largely accepted by the
Council of Ministers, also made clear their desire to 
have a conditional bond between the SAS and Stabex 
transfers :
"As a result, it is vital that the 
implementation procedure for Stabex (use and 
conditions) be systematically coupled with, 
or failing that, operate in tandem with or 
back up structural adjustment support when 
both facilities are used in the same 
country.
This last proposal to tie STABEX transfers and 
structural adjustment together was not approved in the 
negotiations for the Review. However, it does need to 
be viewed in the context of the changed perspectives 
of the Community at the time of the Review. The 
Community, by that time, had consciously fashioned a 
programme of conditionality i.e., multiple 
conditionality. Thus, references to concepts such as 
structural and macroeconomic adjustment had to be 
viewed in a more traditional and rigorous nature.
"Explanatory Memorandum" to the Commission's 
Proposals for the Mid-Term Review, p.33.
Ibid. , p. 33.
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designed to fall more in line with the MFI model.
2.2 MULTIPLE CONDITIONALITY
The emergence of the specific programme of 
multiple conditionality in the Community's cooperation 
was an extension of progress made by the previous 
building-blocks. It built on the contributions of 
policy dialogue, structural adjustment support and 
FMOs within Stabex. They had all been steps towards a 
more conditional form of assistance. They were also 
aided by the changing international environment. 
Progress towards the specific proposal of multiple 
conditionality was marked by three identifiable 
signposts within the relationship. They were the 
Marin-Matutes paper; the Commission's paper on the 
Community's relations with the developing countries, 
"Development Cooperation to the year 2000"; and the 
Pons Grau Report in the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. I will 
deal with them in turn to show how each contributed to 
the progress towards multiple conditionality.
Developments in the international environment at 
the beginning of the 1990's served as an important 
backdrop to the process which led to multiple 
conditionality. I had earlier indicated that, at the 
time of the signing of Lomé IV in December, 1989, 
Commissioner Marin had emphasised the importance of 
economic reform in the ACP states. It was a position 
which corresponded to the global trend in the 1980s
See both Marin, "Lomé IV - the scope of a new 
Convention" op. cit. and the Commissioner's Speech on 
the occasion of the Signing.
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towards macroeconomic reform^® based on a "neo-liberal" 
approach to the management of economies. The approach 
was characterised by emphases on market deregulation 
and the promotion of the private sector, the 
individual and enterprise culture. Globally, the 
dissolution of the Socialist Commonwealth had changed 
the geopolitical map and removed the need for 
maintaining and rewarding unsavoury "allies". It was 
a major factor which influenced the trend towards a 
more strict application of criteria for development 
assistance.
These general features had concomitant effects 
within the EU and in the developing world. In the EU, 
there were growing calls for more accountability in 
the use of development assistance and for greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in the deployment of 
funds. Accompanying the calls were several public 
statements on the importance of political and social 
reform in recipient countries. The most significant of 
the calls, in the context of the Lomé relationship, 
was that of President Mitterand of France at the
It is also noteworthy that the introduction of 
structural reform and conditionality lags behind the 
international trends by a period of several years. 
While it is clear that the global development did 
influence the move to conditional policy in Lomé, it 
is also clear, from the significant time-lag, that 
internal factors were probably more influential in the 
move.
See Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, democracy and 
development in the Third World", Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1995. For a more
comprehensive treatment of the emergence and impact of
neo-liberalism, see John Toye, Dilemmas of 
Development : Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in 
Development Economics, Second edition (Oxford, UK &
Cambridge, USA: 1993).
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Franco-African Summit in January, 1990 40
In the developing world, the parallel effect had 
been in the growth of movements promoting the 
extension of democracy. As part of their advocacy of 
reform, these groups articulated the need for economic 
and social improvements in their own societies. Those 
proposals mirrored, and often coincided with, the 
demands for structural adjustment by the donors. The 
thrust for structural reform had acquired resonance 
and support in the domestic arena of many ACP states.
2.2.1 Marin-Matutes Paper
Largely in response to these prevailing trends, 
the Community bestirred itself in the search for a way 
of incorporating the new developments in its 
cooperation programme. In March, 1991, the Commission 
prepared a statement on "Human Rights, Democracy and 
Development",which was forwarded to the European 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament for 
consideration. The document had been prepared on the 
initiative of Commissioners Marin and Matutes (the 
latter responsible for North/South relations), hence 
the reference to the Marin-Matutes Paper.
The document based itself on Article 30(5) of the
4° Cited in Rolf Hofmeier, "Political Conditions 
attached to Development Aid for Africa", 
Intereconomics 26, No. 3 (May-June, 1991). See also 
"Aid and Political Reform", Overseas Development 
Institute (GDI) Briefing Paper, January 1992.
41 The Commission Statement on "Human Rights, 
Democracy and Development" was transmitted by the ACP 
Secretariat under cover of an ACP Note, ACP/42/011/91.
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Single Act.^ it reiterated the responsibility of the 
President and the Commission for ensuring consistency 
between the Community's external policies and those 
agreed in pursuit of Maastricht. On that basis, the 
paper saw the need for a more systematic approach to 
the various statements which had been made in 
promotion of human rights in developing countries. It 
also recommended that such pronouncements should be 
based on a more carefully thought-out doctrine and 
"should foster democracy, the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and promote economic development 
throughout the world.
The Paper made specific reference to the Lomé 
Convention and to Article 5 therein. The Marin-Matutes 
Paper acknowledged that there was no explicit call for 
sanctions within the provisions of the Article but 
contended that the spirit of the Convention allowed 
for certain consequences if Article 5 was breached. 
The Paper further outlined the need for support of 
démocratisation through the active promotion of 
democracy in its development partners. Such a model 
depended on the empowerment of non-state associations 
which, it argued, could mobilise human potential more 
successfully than could the centralising power of the 
state. The Paper stressed the importance of 
accountability and good governance in the conduct of 
recipient governments. It concluded by highlighting 
the involvement of the general populace in the process 
of development.
Single European Act in Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities, Abridged edition, p.566.
Commission Statement, circulated under cover of 
ACP/42/011/91, p. 2.
The Marin-Matutes Paper might have been only a 
discussion document and thus not agreed official 
policy. It did signal, nonetheless, a potentially new 
emphasis in the cooperation policy of the Community 
and, certainly, one with likely implications for the 
ACP. The Paper restated the principles of 
effectiveness and accountability which had been raised 
in the Pisani M e m o r a n d u m . More importantly, the Paper 
posited future development policy as being predicated 
on the observance of good governance. It linked 
adherence to human rights principles and the promotion 
of democracy to development and the provision of 
development assistance. The conditional elements were 
identifiable as was the element of sanction. The 
document might not have been official but the high- 
level nature of its sponsorship meant that it carried 
a stamp of authority and was being considered as a 
policy option. As it turned out, the policy proposed 
in the Paper was later ratified by the European 
C o u n c i l , 45 thus confirming the new emphases in 
development cooperation policy.
2.2.2 Development Cooperation to the Year
2000
The Marin-Matutes Paper had set the basis for a 
linkage between development and good governance. The 
linkage was confirmed by the Commission's overview on 
its development cooperation p o l i c y , ^  circulated in
44 See Section 2.1.1 above.
4^ European Council Resolution of 28 November,
1991.
4 ^ Commission of the European
Communities, Development Cooperation Policy in the Run-
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September, 1992. The overview was wide-ranging in its 
analysis. It outlined the changed nature of 
interdependence following the end of the Cold War: 
countries of the South no longer served as "relay 
stations" in the Cold War context and could no longer 
obtain the unconditional support which they might have 
come to expect.47 Aid donors would increasingly face 
efficiency criteria in the allocation of aid.
The overview laid out the basic premise of the 
Community's cooperation policy as encouraging the 
consolidation of democracy in the developing countries 
within the framework of political stability. It also 
drew on the development cooperation provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty^^ to identify certain basic 
objectives in pursuit of that basic premise.
The first objective, the consolidation of 
democracy in developing countries, would be achieved 
through the reform of the state and the political 
system. Such reform would include the administrative 
structures and resources; the strengthening of the 
private sector; and decentralised cooperation. The 
second objective, sustainable and economic 
development, would be pursued primarily through
Up to 2000, SEC(92) 915 final/2. This was one of the
overviews, periodically submitted by the Commission to 
the Council and Parliament, which serve as the basis 
for discussion and as a source for future policy.
47 Ibid. , p. 8. 
42 Ibid., p.11.
4^ See Title XVII of the Treaty on European Union, 
generally termed the Maastricht Treaty, for the 
development cooperation provisions.
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macroeconomic stabilisation, economic liberalisation 
and environmental sustainability. The third objective 
was the integration of the developing countries in the 
world economy through greater North-South technology 
transfer and industrial cooperation. Finally, the 
three objectives would contribute to a campaign 
against poverty.
The role of aid was explicitly expanded to serve 
as leverage, in bilateral relations, for the 
implementation of good economic and political reform. 
The concept of policy dialogue, reflective of the 
progress on the conditionality path since the Pisani 
Memorandum, was recast as a political dialogue. The 
objective of the dialogue was to have the necessary 
political and economic reforms adopted.
The document was, thus, quite explicit in its
endorsement of multiple conditionality but it also
introduced two important aspects into the
implementation process of such conditionality. First,
it emphasised the importance of ensuring that
recipients were held to the conditionality contract.^
It also recognised, concurrently, that there was a
critical need to have the recipients identify with,
and assume ownership of, the requisite reforms:
"Consequently, in its cooperation policy, 
the Community must ensure that the promises 
made by the recipient countries are really 
kept, for this will determine the
Development Cooperation Policy in the Run-Up to 
2000, pp.11-13.
Ibid., pp.16-17. The Community proposed that 
the reforms required by conditionality would form a 
long-term process in a "contract" of true partnership 
between sub-Saharan Africa and the Community.
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effectiveness of its aid...
... We must take care that the country in 
question carries out the necessary reforms, and 
that these are not merely imposed from without.
The second aspect introduced to the
implementation process related to donor coordination
which, the document affirmed, was vital:
"In every country receiving aid, it is the 
responsibility of the various donors to see 
that the set of conditions attached to their 
contributions is consistent with those of 
other donors...
The proposals within the overview, thus, 
highlighted two further developments in the evolution 
of the conditionality model. It first removed some of 
the earlier reassurances given to the ACP during the 
negotiation of the SAS. The Community's model would 
take on the more rigorous nature which characterised 
the MFI approach and contained a clear commitment to 
donor coordination. It would also be blended more into 
a global approach to help prevent ACP countries 
playing off one donor against another. It should, 
however, be noted that Community did retain its 
insistence on an individual and unique treatment of 
recipients. Secondly, the proposals recognised that 
recipient states were key to the success of the 
programmes as the proposed reforms had to gain their 
active support if they were to succeed. There was thus 
a dualism of rigorous enforcement of conditions and of
52 "The Community's Relations with Developing 
Countries in the Context of Political Union", Annex to 
The Development Cooperation Policy..., op. cit., p.56.
Ibid. , p. 56.
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the need to ensure recipient ownership of the 
programmes. It is in this interplay of enforcement and 
recipient ownership that scope arises for bargaining 
between donor and recipient.
2.2.3 Pons Grau Report
The third step on the path to multiple 
conditionality in Community policy took the form of 
action within the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. 1 need to 
dwell briefly on the role of the Assembly. It is not 
a decision-making body of the Convention but it serves 
as a consultative forum which has acquired an 
increasing importance in ACP-EU councils. The 
composition of the Assembly is a major contributory 
factor to its importance. It consists of ACP 
Parliamentarians i.e., politicians in the main, and 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on the 
Community side. The European Parliament, from which 
the European MEPs are drawn, has been acquiring 
greater influence and power in Community policy as 
European political cooperation has deepened. 
Consequently, the image of the Joint Assembly has 
grown and its deliberations have taken on added effect 
as the ACP has come to regard the MEPs as sources of 
some influence in the Community.
It should be noted, however, that neither the ACP 
nor the EU considers the Joint Assembly a bona fide 
organ of the Convention. Its origins were as a 
Consultative Assembly and that image of an advisory 
body has persisted. While many ACP states have 
cultivated MEPs over the years as possible sources of 
influence in the Community, any such influence derives
from their role as MEPs, not as members of the 
Assembly. The Community and the Commission take less 
account of the Assembly. There has been a long-running 
battle, between the Community and the Assembly, on the 
issue of accountability. The Assembly has claimed that 
the President of the Joint Council of Ministers is 
obligated to appear before the Assembly to answer 
questions on the workings of the Lomé Convention. The 
President has never appeared nor has the Commissioner 
for Development. A senior official of the Commission 
is usually assigned to deal with the questions which 
are submitted beforehand.
An annual feature of the Joint Assembly is the 
preparation of a Report, on an issue of major 
interest, by a Rapporteur-General appointed 
alternatively from the ACP and Community members. The 
Report for the meeting of 1992 focused on the topic. 
Democracy, human rights and development in the ACP 
countries. It was prepared by a Spanish socialist MEP, 
Josep Pons Grau, as Rapporteur-General. The Report is 
normally considered a personal document but it does 
generate lengthy consultation among members on the 
side of the Assembly in which it is drawn up. So, 
personal though the Pons Grau Report was, its 
submission was also reflective of commonly-shared 
views of the European members of the Joint Assembly.
The Reports are not consensus documents as they 
are subject to a vote on their contents. On 
controversial texts, the vote often breaks down into 
an ACP/MEP divide. One reason for the divide is that 
the tone of the Rapporteur-General's Reports does 
vary. Many are mere testament to the positions of the 
grouping of MEPs to which the particular Rapporteur-
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General belongs. In such cases, strident sections of 
the Report may so alienate some MEPs that they vote 
with the ACP in opposition. More generally, the 
Reports are usually identified with one or other side 
of the Joint Assembly. In cases of conflict, they thus 
attract the wide support of the Rapporteur-General ' s 
constituency, either MEPs or ACP. In a word, the 
Reports are viewed as partisan in such circumstances.
The Pons Grau Report itself sought to be even- 
handed in its treatment of the subject.it attempted 
to differentiate between democracy and mere political 
pluralism. It tried to avoid generalisations about the 
applicability of democratic models and the rule of 
law, given the heterogeneous nature of ACP states and 
societies.55 It argued in favour of a more equitable 
multilateral trading system. It also supported the 
contention that development could not be based on 
external assistance alone but must be complemented by 
homegrown efforts on the part of African countries.
However, the Report was unequivocal on the new 
reality arising from the need to adhere to human 
rights principles. It asserted that this realJ.ty meant 
the end of the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a state. The principle had yielded 
to the obligation to interfere actively and in favour 
of democracy. The Report stated explicitly that 
measures should be put in place to monitor respect for
See Working Document by the Rapporteur-General 
of ACP-EU Joint Assembly on Democracy, human rights 
and development in ACP States (AP/559).
Ibid. , pp. 5-6.
Ibid. , p . 9 .
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human rights and to punish those states which violate 
that principle. The Report also addressed the issue 
of Article 5 of Lomé IV, arguing that the Article 
constituted a legal provision which justified 
intervention in cases of the violation of human 
rights. It allowed for both positive measures in 
support of the promotion of human rights principles 
and negative measures as sanctions against violators.
The draft r e s o l u t i o n ,  which emanated from the 
report of the Rapporteur-General for the consideration 
of the Joint Assembly, was far less compromising. It 
developed a severe criticism of the ACP countries as 
a justification for strong action in several areas 
relating to multiple conditionality. It called for a 
series of measures designed to achieve specific 
objectives. Those objectives included the following: 
democratic participation; reduction of the state and 
Civil services; reduction of military expenditure and 
militarism; and the recognition of Article 5 as a 
contractual clause empowering action against countries 
which disregarded democratic criteria.
In pursuance of the proposals for action, the 
draft resolution called on the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers to play the decisive role. They 
were to identify the methods and criteria to be used 
in defining respect for democracy and human rights as 
well as the nature of the sanctions to be applied. It 
also called for the Joint Assembly to serve as a forum
57 Ibid., pp.10-11.
58 See Draft Report by the Rapporteur-General on 
Democracy, human rights and development in the ACP 
States, Part A: Motion for a Resolution (ACP/EC
687/92).
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for exerting pressure on ACP national governments to 
implement measures relating to human rights, democracy 
and sustainable development.
The draft provoked considerable opposition from 
the ACP Group which sought to moderate its provisions 
by tabling numerous amendments to it. It was also 
clear to the ACP that the draft resolution was both 
partisan and controversial. It thus divided the Joint 
Assembly along firm ACP/MEP lines. So contentious was 
the issue that it reached an impasse at the Luxembourg 
Meeting in September, 1992 when it was presented. No 
agreement could be reached and voting was postponed. 
A compromise draft, acceptable to both sides, was only 
approved the following year in Botswana in March, 
1993.^
Despite the failure of the original draft 
resolution to gain the approval of the Joint Assembly, 
the episode of the Pons Grau Report was of vital 
significance on the path to multiple conditionality. 
It was, first, a stark representation of the nature 
and demands of multiple conditionality in the Lomé 
relationship. The proposals brooked no compromise 
between ACP sovereignty and démocratisation or the 
observance of human rights. It sought direct 
intervention by the Community, upon the letter's 
determination, when principles were breached.
The Pons Grau Report also demonstrated the level 
of polarisation between the ACP and the Community, as 
reflected in the European Parliament, on the question 
of multiple conditionality and good governance. The
See ACP-EC 687/93/A/fin.
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Parliament had been a source of support, on a number 
of issues, to the ACP during the Lomé relationship and 
had often been an empathetic forum for ACP concerns. 
On the issue of democracy and human rights, the tenor 
of Community thinking was resolute. Even a potentially 
supportive body, as the Parliament, had followed the 
lead of perceived opinion and had assumed a firm and 
inflexible position on the issue.
2.2.4 Mid-Term Review
The three issues represented significant steps on 
the path to multiple conditionality. It came as no 
surprise that the Community consolidated the progress 
made by those steps, and by the earlier advances 
dating from the Pisani Memorandum, into its proposals 
for change in the Convention during the Mid-Term 
Review of Lomé IV. The proposals were made against the 
background of several factors: the international
political and economic developments in the late 1980s; 
the provisions, within Article 130u of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which made development cooperation a 
legitimate Community policy area; and the logic of the 
Commission’s overview of development cooperation to 
2000 which stressed good governance and conditionality 
as priority strategies.
Among the principal objectives of the changes 
proposed by the Community were:
(a) the fostering, through development 
cooperation policy, of democratic values, the 
rule of law and good governance as well as 
"respect for and enjoyment of human rights" 
which already existed in the Convention;
(b) the enhancement of the ACP-Community
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dialogue to ensure that the development 
strategies of the ACP meshed with the 
Community's cooperation policy and thus provided 
the Community with the instruments required to 
pursue the policy".
The Community proposals for change called for 
specific amendments in the existing Convention in 
several areas related to the objectives of multiple 
conditionality. In pursuit of the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance, the 
Community proposed that an "essential element" be 
inserted in Article 5. This element stated that 
development cooperation policy be associated with the 
consolidation of the three principles. Positive 
measures, in the form of concrete funding, would be 
provided in support of action to foster the 
principles.
On decentralised cooperation i.e., strengthening 
civil sectors, changes were proposed to ensure that 
ACP states indicate the level of resources allocated 
to such cooperation. The criteria governing the 
financing of the cooperation, from Community aid, were
Explanatory Memorandum to Community's Proposals 
for Mid-Term Review, pp.9-10.
See "'Incentive Envelopes': A Critical
Assessment", Lomé IV Review, NGO Briefing 5. The 
proposal was to provide funds to encourage 
satisfaction of the elements of good governance and 
sustainable development. It was based on the 
allocation of funds from "incentive envelopes" for 
those states which met the criteria. It is important 
to note that the judgement as to whether the state 
involved met the criteria would depend on the outcome 
of the policy dialogue with the Community. As I point 
out shortly, changes were also being proposed to 
enhance the role of the policy dialogue.
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also spelt out. Further, the Community proposed the 
elimination of existing provisions in Lomé IV which 
required the express agreement of the ACP state before 
eligible agents could benefit from Lomé resources.
The role of policy dialogue in the donor- 
recipient relationship was considerably expanded in 
the Community's proposals. The new dialogue was to be 
the mechanism permitting a mixing of the ACP state's 
development objectives and the priorities of the 
Community's cooperation policy. The mechanism 
represented a magnified policy dialogue. As was shown 
earlier, it was intended for application during the 
most appropriate moment for such dialogue, the 
programming exercise.
The primary concern of the Community was the need 
to overcome the apparent rigidity of choice of ACP 
states in projects and programmes once their 
indicative planning figures (IPFs) had been indicated. 
For the Community, the enhanced dialogue offered the 
opportunity to discuss not only overall programme 
coherence, as with policy dialogue, but also the 
specific elements contained in a recipient's 
indicative programm.e. In order to ensure that the 
final elements conformed to the conclusions of the 
dialogue, the Community proposed changes in 
procedures.
It also proposed to change the manner of 
allocation of resources. Both of those changes helped
It will be recalled that the Community had 
managed to introduce the basic elements of policy 
dialogue during programming for Lomé III. See Section 
2 .1.2 .
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to stagger the process of programming over several 
phases. The allocation of the IPF was to be made in 
installments. Notification of the first tranche would 
not be considered as a commitment to provide the 
remainder.Progress to each subsequent stage was 
dependent on the ACP states satisfactorily completing 
the preceding phase. They thus allowed approval of the 
final programme to be made dependent on common 
agreement or, at least, on the Community's approval of 
a state's performance.
With the proposed changes, the Community had 
reached the end of its journey along the path of 
conditionality: the inclusion of multiple
conditionality in the Convention itself. The journey 
had started with a concept of inverted conditionality 
which had been put into effect indirectly during 
programming. It had continued through structural 
adjustment and FMOs to reach its destination. From a 
Community perspective, the path might have been 
inadvertently chosen after the Pisani Memorandum but 
its evolution was inherently logical and continuous. 
The question which arises, consequently, is what 
perception did the ACP Group have of the process and 
what was its reaction?
2.3 ACP's INITIAL REACTION
The above journey reveals a continuous evolution 
of the Community along the path to multiple 
conditionality. An analysis of the same steps, from 
the ACP Group's perspective,^^ indicates that ACP
The reference here is generally to the ACP 
Group in Brussels. I have earlier highlighted a gulf
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perceptions of those steps differed vastly from those 
of the Community. They failed to note the significance 
or the increasingly conditional nature of the various 
steps.
2.3.1 Policy Dialogue
The ACP assessment of policy dialogue was 
remarkably accurate in one sense. It was correctly 
viewed as an attempt to introduce conditionality into 
the Lomé relationship. It was an attempt to undermine 
the sovereign right of ACP states to determine their 
priorities for both Lomé and national programming. The 
ACP Group took close note of the Pisani Memorandum and 
highlighted the danger of policy dialogue as a major 
concern in the preparation for negotiations on Lomé 
III.^
The Group, therefore, fought a determined battle 
to prevent its inclusion into the Convention and 
succeeded in having the concept excluded. While the 
Convention did mention a dialogue, it was a vague, 
general reference. It was clear that the thrust for 
policy dialogue had been defeated. In a manner which 
was to be a precursor of several similar reactions, 
the ACP considered the matter closed once the battle
between officials in Brussels and those in capitals 
when I dealt with the regional programming exercise in 
the Caribbean. The ACP capitals were usually involved 
in Lomé negotiating matters only on specific issues. 
It was, however, the Group, in its Brussels 
manifestation, which responded to Community proposals 
on a continuous basis.
Memorandum on the Position of the ACP Group in 
its Future Relations with the European Economic 
Communities, op. cit., p.38.
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had been won in the negotiations. However, the 
Community did manage to persuade several ACP states to 
adopt a form of policy dialogue during the policy 
exercise in spite of the ACP triumph in the
negotiations. The outcome was a telling indictment of 
ACP misperceptions of the nature of Community 
cooperation policy. It was also indicative of the fact 
that an idea once mooted, and approved, takes on an 
auto-dynamism within Community policy. It is a process 
which is difficult for forces, external to the
Community policy-making, to deflect. The ACP had 
relaxed once the current danger of the policy dialogue 
proposal had been turned away. The proposal had, 
however, generated its own momentum against which the 
ACP failed to guard.
A second explanatory factor in the ACP failure to 
avert policy dialogue definitively lay in the
organisational deficit which exists between ACP
representatives in Brussels and ACP policy-makers in 
capitals. It appeared that the full nature of the 
policy dialogue proposal was not transmitted to, or 
considered seriously in, national capitals. The
experience of the Caribbean regional programming 
substantiated that fact. Officials in capitals were 
not sufficiently alert to the insertion of policy 
dialogue in the programming exercise. The conclusion 
drawn by ACP representatives, and bolstered by the 
organisational deficit, was that the contentious issue 
of policy dialogue had lost its salience once Lomé III 
had been agreed. That conclusion was the first of 
several ACP misperceptions of the signposts on 
Community progression towards conditionality.
2.3.2 Structural Adjustment
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In discussing the inclusion of structural 
adjustment support in Lomé IV, the ACP Group was 
insistent that the Community programme should be 
unique. It was not to be designed, or used, as an 
extension of the traditional MFl model, and its 
conditionality, into the Lomé arrangement. During the 
negotiations on the proposal for the SAS, the 
Community sought to allay ACP concerns about MFl-type 
conditionality. It asserted that its SAS was intended 
to help ease the problems caused by existing ACP 
structural adjustment programmes. Its resource base 
was limited^ and, as such, would have to be narrowly 
focused. Its emphasis was on helping to alleviate the 
"negative social effects that may result from the 
process of adjustment efforts".^
The ACP concerns were also assuaged by Community 
reassurances that its SAS would be unique. Two 
features characterised that distinctiveness: its
qualifying criteria based on the three-tiered 
approach^ and its explicit recognition of the 
individuality and developmental choice of ACP 
recipients.
For the ACP, the conditional aspect of the SAS 
was practically non-existent, subordinated as it was 
to a programme which was both unique and supportive of
See Section 2.1.3, footnote 30 for a breakdown 
of SAS resources.
66 Article 244 (f). Fourth ACP-EEC Convention.
The three qualifying criteria for the SAS are 
outlined above in Section 2.1.3.
Article 244 (b) , (d) and (e). Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention.
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ACP efforts. The Group accepted the Community's 
contention that there was a distinction to be drawn 
between the SAS and the MFI model. The SAS was seen, 
by the ACP, as a welcome contribution to the overall 
framework of structural adjustment and reform. It also 
contributed to an area within the overall frameworks 
i.e., the social dimensions, which was usually 
neglected in the traditional structural adjustment 
programmes. Thus, in the context of the evolution of 
conditionality, the ACP did not consider the SAS a 
constraint or a hindrance to their choice and exercise 
of development priorities. In fact, the SAS was viewed 
as an asset and a source of additionality to the pool 
of EOF resources.
2.3.3 Sbabex and the FMOs
The ACP perception of the frameworks of mutual 
obligations was less positive than it was of the SAS. 
The ACP reacted negatively to the FMOs which it saw as 
a set of new and more stringent terms governing the 
use of Stabex receipts. They were not, however, viewed 
as conditionality as the ACP Group had no suspicion 
that such a process was underway. Additionally, Stabex 
benefits accrued only to some of the ACP states. The 
constraints of the FMOs were thus not applicable to, 
nor generally appreciated by, the rest.
The FMOs were proposed in an attempt to ensure 
that Stabex allocations were genuinely utilised in the 
relief of problems affecting the sector suffering from 
a loss in export earnings. Stabex funding also faced 
a constant problem in recent years whereby the annual 
allocations were outweighed by the level of claims 
from recipients. As a consequence, the Community had
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to seek unutilised resources in various parts of the 
Convention. The FMOs were intended to introduce 
efficiency and accountability in the use of Stabex 
receipts.
However, the fact that the ACP had not acquired 
an awareness of the progression from policy dialogue 
to the SAS meant that the ACP concern about the FMOs 
was specific to the FMOs. Its concern was not placed 
in the wider context of an evolution towards 
conditionality. The FMOs were seen as an isolated 
attempt to achieve efficiency and, if possible, a 
minimisation of the cost of the Stabex programme. What 
they were not considered to be was part of a 
discernible process leading to conditionality.
2 . 4 ACP's REACTION TO SIGNPOSTS TO MULTIPLE
CONDITIONALITY
2.4.1 Marin-Matutes Paper
The emergence of the first signpost on the road 
to multiple conditionality only produced a muted ACP 
response. That response was due to two main reasons. 
The first was that the document was portrayed, by the 
Community, as an internal discussion paper for the 
consideration of the Commission. It was not a policy 
proposal which demanded an ACP response. To many in 
the ACP Group, that explanation was sufficient for it 
was unclear what form an ACP response should take on 
an issue which was not a specific proposal for action. 
The policy orientations, within the Paper, also 
presented a tactical dilemma for many ACP states. 
There were states in the ACP Group which were 
sympathetic to the principles of good governance but
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were unwilling to accept a unilateral imposition of 
sanctions by the Community.
The second reason for the muted ACP response was 
technical. The ACP Group was faced by the novelty of 
possible changes which were most alien to the existing 
nature of the Convention. It just did not know how to 
respond to the emphases on démocratisation, the rule 
of law and observance of human rights. Other than a 
formal objection to the insertion of political factors 
into an economic and trade Convention, the ACP's scope 
for a coherent response was limited.
Some, within the Group, contended that the Treaty 
allowed for an exclusion for the ACP from such 
conditionality.^ They based their interpretation on 
the very provisions on development cooperation in the 
Maastricht Treaty from which the Community drew its 
emphasis on good governance. Article 130u(2) stated 
that :
"Community policy in this area shall 
contribute to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and 
the rule of law, and to that of respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Yet, two sections later, the Treaty affirmed:
"The provisions of this Article shall not 
affect cooperation with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries in the
This appreciation of ACP positions was gained 
from my discussions with both diplomatic 
rep[resentatives and Secretariat officials. It is just 
one of many such insights which I was offered, as 
noted in the Introduction.
Treaty on European Union, Title XVll.
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framework of the ACP-EEC Convention. ? | 7 1
That ACP interpretation might well have been a 
misreading of the Treaty. The provision fell within a 
section which dealt with the adoption of measures or 
programmes designed to further the objectives of 
Article 130u. It might thus have been intended to 
indicate that the new programmes would not cut into 
ACP resources. Moreover, there was no plausible reason 
why the Community should have exempted the ACP from 
the emphasis on good governance. Within the 
constraints of its low-key response, the claim of 
exemption was the sole substantive reaction of the 
ACP. In short, the prevailing view of the Group was 
that it was facing a "non-paper" of which the Group 
should take note and await further action by the 
Community. The easiest course of action under the 
circumstances was to accept the Community's 
explanation that the paper was purely for internal 
consumpt ion.
2.4.2 Pons Grau Report
The ACP Group had a much more decisive reaction 
to the Pons Grau Report and the subsequent draft 
resolution. The Report and its follow-up were viewed 
as concrete manifestations of the changes which the 
Marin-Matutes "non-paper" had intimated. The ACP 
reacted very strongly and negatively to the Pons Grau 
assessment and, in particular, to a harshly critical 
report on ACP Governments and their style of 
governance. Thus, what emerged from the report and the 
draft resolution was an impasse. Voting on the draft
^^Ibid. , Article 130w(3).
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had to be suspended to permit consultations between 
the two sides. A compromise was only reached at the 
next meeting of the Assembly in March, 1993.
The Pons Grau Report marked a decisive moment in 
ACP thinking. For the first time, the Group was made 
aware of two important facts. They were the depth of 
Community thinking on the need for stringent 
conditionality and the very narrow room, in Community 
policy, for compromise with that principle. By the 
time of the amended draft resolution in 1993, the 
Commission had produced its overview on development in 
the run-up to 2000 and it had been digested by 
Council. It was clear that the policy proposals in the 
draft resolution represented the position of a wide 
section of the Community in advance of negotiations.
In spite of the distance along the conditionality 
road which the Community had travelled and the 
sobriety which that indication had brought to the ACP, 
the latter Group still retained some hope of avoiding 
the inevitable. It drew some comfort from the manner 
and venue of presentation of the Pons Grau Report. The 
Report seemed caught up in yet another ACP/MEP 
division. The Reports of the Rapporteur-General did 
not usually carry a decisive weight with the 
Community, given the low level of credibility which 
the Assembly enjoyed in the EU. The ACP was therefore 
hopeful that the Pons Grau Report would not have a 
more significant impact than other such Reports.
Secondly, some further solace was gained from the 
fact that firm ACP opposition had forced a rethink of 
the initial harsh criticisms and had led to a less 
divisive compromise. The latter development held out
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the hope that any similar proposals from the 
Community, within the Lomé arrangement proper, would 
also be subject to negotiation. There was thus a 
similar possibility of compromise.
There was, however, a cause for some concern in 
the ACP camp. Along with the seeming homogeneity of 
the MEPs ' position came the reality that some ACP 
states were understanding of the MEPs' thrust for good 
governance. Those states consisted of three different 
factions. The first grouping comprised those states 
which had recently undergone political change as a 
result of the démocratisation trends. They were 
mainly, but not wholly, African. They included Zambia 
and Benin. The letter's representative at the Joint 
Assembly in Luxembourg was a new parliamentarian whose 
party had benefitted from the opening-up of politics 
in Benin. He played an active role in an unsuccessful 
attempt to build an ACP compromise with the original 
Pons Grau resolution.
The second grouping was mainly Francophone 
African and included states such as Gabon. They were 
drawn from those states which had then pledged 
themselves to the democratic process through national 
conventions. They were keen to show that their 
commitment was genuine. They could not be seen as 
opposed to the concepts of démocratisation and good 
governance. The third faction was a disparate set of 
neutral observers, mainly from the Pacific and the 
Caribbean. They were sufficiently secure in their 
democratic traditions that they saw no inherent danger 
in the Pons Grau recommendations. This group was not 
going to lobby for their acceptance but they did not 
think that the matter merited a frontal battle.
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Although their voices were stilled in the overwhelming 
opposition to the draft resolution, they remained an 
internal force for dissent and potential division. The 
Pons Grau Report and its aftermath had brought home to 
the ACP the fact that conditionality was a Community 
focus whose time was coming.
2.4.3 Development Cooperation Policy
The overview of the Commission on development 
cooperation confirmed, to the ACP, the entrenchment of 
conditionality within Community policy-making. It 
served as the basis for Community positions for the 
Mid-Term Review. It left little doubt that 
conditionality, and multiple conditionality, was to be 
a primary focus of Community amendments to Lomé IV.
The presentation of the overview in September, 
1992 was close to the Joint Assembly discussions on 
the Pons Grau Report. Their subsequent evolutions 
overlapped, helping their messages to reinforce each 
other. If anything, the unyielding attitude of the 
MEPs on the Pons Grau draft resolution suggested that 
the future debate on conditionality would see a 
similarly direct approach from the Community. The 
argumentation for, and the justification of, the 
inclusion of multiple conditionality left little doubt 
that the Lomé relationship was being totally changed.
2.4.4 Mid-Term Review
The ACP's response to the contents of the 
overview was subsumed in the Group's preparations and 
positions for the Mid-Term Review. So firm was the 
Community's attitude that the ACP Group seemed quite
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resigned to the inevitability of conditionality. The 
sole recourse of the Group was to attempt to mitigate 
its likely effects. The ACP Group expressed its 
willingness to have the principles espoused by the 
Community introduced into the Convention as an 
amendment to Article 5.^  ^ The Group affirmed, "within 
its own sociocultural environment, its abiding faith 
and deep commitment" to the principles espoused by the 
Community. The Group, however, did insist that the 
introduction of principles should be "without direct 
or indirect conditionalities or cross­
conditionalities". The Group was deeply concerned 
about possible unilateral interpretation by the 
Community. The ACP thus argued the need for an 
effective mechanism for the settlement of disputes 
arising from perceived contravention of the 
principles.
On the companion issue of policy dialogue, the 
ACP had no stated position on the Community's proposal 
for an enhanced policy dialogue and the establishment 
of a linkage with the priorities of the cooperation 
policy of the Community. The ACP had, it seemed, 
bowed to the inevitability of the introduction of 
conditionality during the Mid-Term Review. It had 
chosen, instead, to concentrate on improving the 
substantive provisions of trade cooperation.
72 See chapeau to this Chapter, p. 65 above.
ACP Group, "The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth 
Lomé Convention: Explanatory Memorandum"
(ACP/27/001/94 Rev.3), p. 33.
74 "Mid-term review of Lomé: Main themes and
negotiating positions". The Courier no.146, July- 
August, 1994, pp.IV-V.
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2.5 UNINTENDED ACP CONTRIBUTIONS
The foregoing examination depicted the Community 
as the architect of a policy which progressed to 
multiple conditionality. It presented the ACP as 
largely reactive and captive of Community initiatives. 
This picture is not comprehensive for it fails to 
include some important contributions to the emergence 
of conditionality. Strange as it might seem, the ACP 
Group made several contributions which assisted the 
evolution of the policy. None of these ACP 
contributions was consciously intended to promote 
conditionality, being all designed to further 
perceived ACP interests. Nonetheless, the decisive 
effect of them all was to remove several safeguards 
against the intrusion of political elements into the 
Lomé relationship. The measures arose from the 
promotion of sociocultural and sociopolitical issues 
as valid areas for inclusion in Lomé III and IV 
respectively.
2.5.1 Lomé III: Sociocultural Elements
Social and Cultural Cooperation: At a general 
level, the unintended contributions of the ACP to the 
progression to conditionality began during the 
negotiations for Lomé III. Against considerable 
Community opposition and in the face of strong 
internal dissent, the ACP negotiated successfully for 
the inclusion of a social and cultural chapter. The 
promotion of the provisions was largely the work of 
Ambassador Raymond Chasle of Mauritius. He faced an 
uphill battle. He was bluntly told by one French 
Minister that his efforts would never succeed. Within
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the ACP, there were several states which felt that the 
focus on social and cultural matters detracted from 
more substantive concerns. Those states were concerned 
that the inclusion of the new area would divert funds 
from the material concerns e.g., Stabex and 
programming. On the face of it, nothing in the chapter 
directly addressed, or served as support for, 
conditionality.
More relevant was the symbolic effect of the 
insertion of social and cultural factors into the 
Convention. It signalled the willingness of the ACP to 
put an end to its own long-held position viz., that 
the Convention was an agreement covering trade and 
economic cooperation. Lomé was now moving into non­
economic areas at the ACP Group's insistence. The 
Group itself had removed the barriers. It would not be 
able to turn back any further extension of the 
coverage of issues in the Convention.
Man at the Centre of Development: Lomé III also 
produced a conceptual shift in the Convention. A major 
innovation was the emphasis on the principle that man 
was at the centre of development.^^ This might have 
seemed a truism. However, for a Convention predicated 
on relations between a Group of developing states and 
a Community of states, the reduction of its 
interaction to the lowest common factor was an 
important deviation. The stress on the principle was 
linked to the need to justify the inclusion of 
sociocultural concerns. Cultural expression was not an 
emanation of a state but rather a representation of 
the character of the individual or a group of people.
Article 10, Third ACP-EEC Convention
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Placing man at the centre of development also 
meant that the needs of the individual could no longer 
be considered as subordinate to the needs or the 
priorities of the state. Its relevance to human rights 
concerns should not be ignored. An emphasis on the 
individual suggested that states could not 
legitimately resort to an oft-used argument. Many ACP 
members claimed that they had, on occasion, to 
override individual rights in the interests of the 
wider society. Their argument was that they had to do 
so if they were to guard against ethnic or tribalist 
conflicts or to promote equitable development.
Again, a well-intentioned ACP initiative had sown 
the seeds for a subsequent undermining of one of its 
long-standing tenets. It was the ACP which had 
consistently opposed the Community's imposing human 
rights considerations in an economic cooperation 
agreement. The tenet was actually abandoned later, in 
Lomé IV. The process of its decline had, however, 
begun with the elevation of man to the heart of 
cooperation in Lomé III.
2.5.2 Lomé IV: Sociopolitical Elements
The negotiation of Lomé IV heightened the trend 
of laudable ACP initiatives leading to negative 
outcomes for the Group. Three issues - human rights, 
the environment and decentralised cooperation - were 
illustrative of the trend.
The ACP definitively abandoned the tenet, with 
the inclusion of Article 5 in Lomé IV.
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Human Rights: The new emphasis on man at the
centre of development had set the scene for a valid 
debate on the human rights issue. It was a constant 
concern dating back to the implementation of Lomé 
The issue meant different things to the two groups. To 
the ACP which had raised it during Lomé I, it was the 
basis for a discussion of the Community's relations 
with apartheid South Africa. To the Community which 
had broached the issue during the negotiations for 
Lomé II, it meant a discussion on the observance of 
human rights principles by ACP Governments.^®
In the face of the latter interpretation, the ACP 
sought to contain a reference to adherence to the 
general principles in the preamble to the Convention. 
The Group succeeded in its objective. It feared that 
any more detailed accommodation of the Community would 
have two negative effects. It would have led to an 
intrusion into the internal affairs of its member 
states and to the eradication of one of the main 
planks of the acquis.
By the time of the negotiations for Lomé IV in 
1988, circumstances had changed and had led to a 
variation in ACP policy. The Group wished to bind the 
Community to a meaningful discussion on South Africa. 
It considered that the insertion of provisions on
See Marjorie Lister, The European Community and 
the Developing World (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1988), 
pp. 157-159 and passim, for a treatment of the human 
rights issue, both during the implementation of Lomé 
I and the negotiations for Lomé II.
The Community's concern about the issue had 
grown in the light of the excesses of Uganda under Idi 
Amin.
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human rights in the body of the Convention itself 
would help to achieve its objective. The way had been 
prepared by the earlier agreement, between the two 
sides, to have periodic exchanges on Southern Africa 
at the level of the troika.
The ACP had also been forced to take a firm stand 
on human rights principles by the change in the global 
political environment. The end of the Cold War meant 
that pariah states could no longer evade scrutiny of 
their human rights conduct on grounds of strategic 
importance. More specifically, the ACP had itself 
suffered from the conduct of some of its members. 
Sudan had been subject to constant criticism for its 
treatment of the inhabitants of the southern region. 
The matter had been raised several times in meetings 
of the Joint Assembly by MEPs. Burundi had also 
aroused the Group's concerns with the report of one of 
its periodic ethnic conflicts.
It was the considered view of the ACP that the 
success of its strategy of using human rights concerns 
as a mechanism for discussing Southern Africa was 
dependent on its own credibility. It had to put its 
own house in order and to be seen to be doing so. It 
could do so by addressing directly the question of 
human rights even if it implied condemnation of its 
own members. Thus, the proposal to include a direct 
reference to human rights emanated from the ACP as a 
clear demonstration of its own commitment. The 
provisions were embodied in Article 5 of Lomé IV.
The troika is a Community phenomenon which was 
borrowed by the ACP. It consists of the past, current 
and future Presidents of Council.
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The outcome of the initiative was not as the ACP 
had intended or envisioned. Article 5 became a major 
cause of contention once it had been used, by the 
Community, as justification for the unilateral 
imposition of sanctions on Haiti. The intent of 
Article 5 had been to express a commitment to the 
observance of basic principles on human rights. It was 
wholly positive in design through the provision of 
support for efforts aimed at observing the basic 
principles.
The application to Haiti - however justified and 
it was seen as such by most in the ACP®° - struck the 
ACP as an unacceptable extension of a negative 
interpretation of the Article. The lack of prior
consultation with the ACP did increase the perception 
that the Community had acted unilaterally and raised
the probability that it would do so in the future. The
application took the interpretation in an unintended 
and unforeseen direction. The architect of the ACP 
initiative. Ambassador Chasle of Mauritius, later 
recognised this consequence. He stated that the 
intention had been to reinforce adherence to the basic 
principles and he had never imagined its use as a
punitive measure.®^ The unintended effect of the 
initiative was dual. It provided a legitimate basis, 
within the Convention, for the discussion of ACP 
behaviour on human rights. It also led to its early 
use as a criterion of conditionality.
The regional grouping, the Caribbean, to which 
Haiti belonged was guided by similar sanctions adopted 
in the Organisation of American States.
Interview with Ambassador Raymond Chasle, 
former Head of Mission of Mauritius in Brussels on 4 
September, 1995.
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Environment : A second area of social concern
advocated by the ACP in negotiations for Lomé IV
centred on the environment. The period of the 
negotiations was marked by frequent reports of
developing, and ACP, countries being offered lucrative 
deals on the disposal of industrial waste. The ACP 
Group tried to pre-empt such ventures by seeking 
agreement with the Community on a ban against such 
exports from the latter's member states.^ The proposal 
was resisted by the Community on various grounds. One 
reason given was the fact that dumping of waste was
related to the commercial activity of private
entities, over which the Community had no control. 
Such a ban would preclude intra-Community trade in 
waste. Finally, the Community suggested that the two 
sides would best be guided by the conclusions of the 
international Conference in Basle.
The ACP Group insisted on some form of agreement 
to cover all potentially harmful exports, from 
pesticides to toxic waste. Some, within the ACP, 
argued that the elevation of environmental concerns to 
the top of the negotiating agenda might lead to an 
undesired outcome. They urged caution since it was not 
clear that both sides shared a common perspective on 
the issue.
The compromise which resulted from ACP zeal and 
Community reluctance was a set of provisions which 
justified the caution of the ACP sceptics. The 
Community did agree to prohibit all direct or indirect
Memorandum on ACP Guidelines for the 
Negotiations for a Fourth ACP/EEC Convention 
(ACP/00/012/88 NEC Rev.2), p.84.
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export of hazardous and radioactive waste. On the
other hand, it steered clear of a blanket commitment
to prohibit the export of toxic waste which, in ACP
eyes, was a more encompassing term. However, the
Community managed to include a provision which altered
immensely the thrust of the ACP initiative:
"The Parties, desirous of bringing real 
protection and effective management to the 
environment and natural resources, consider 
that the areas of ACP-EEC cooperation 
covered by Part Two of this Convention shall 
be systematically examined and appraised in 
this light."83
The reference to Part Two of the Convention was 
to a section which covered all areas of cooperation. 
The Community had thus succeeded in making all 
projects and programmes subject to environmental 
impact assessments, as and when they were deemed 
necessary. This qualification has been termed the 
"environmental reflex" which has to be built into 
development projects and considered before approval. 
To the ACP, transparency has not been a characteristic 
of Community development policy. Bureaucratic delays 
in approval, commitment and disbursement of project 
add to the problems of programming. It can well be 
understood why the environmental reflex was viewed, 
by many in the ACP, as another obstacle in the process 
of project implementation.
The environmental assessments would obviously be 
at the behest of the approving body i.e., the 
Community in the form of the Commission. This outcome 
did not serve ACP interests for it gave the Community 
a wide-ranging and discretionary power. Once more, an
83 Article 38, Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (Italics 
are my addition).
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ACP initiative had resulted in the imposition of a 
conditional criterion which the Group had neither 
desired nor foreseen.
Decentralised Cooperation: The third ACP
initiative which took on unintended dimensions was 
decentralised cooperation. It also arose from the 
implementations of the social provisions of the 
Convention. It was argued successfully, in the ACP, 
that changes in resource allocation were required for 
the meaningful implementation of the social Chapter. 
They were also required by the emphasis on the 
individual as the centre of development. Resources 
would have to be allocated to groups and entities 
outside the state. Trade unions, youth groups, women 
and other non-governmental groups were identified as 
potential beneficiaries of Community aid.
Some ACP states were uneasy about the wisdom of 
the policy but were prepared to countenance its 
application. Many more were dissatisfied when the 
Community gained approval for its counter-proposal. 
Under that proposal, decentralised cooperation would 
be conducted directly between the body concerned and 
the Community, thus bypassing the ACP state.
The arrangement presented the ACP with some 
difficulties. First, the Convention was perceived as 
an agreement between states. A provision which 
formally excluded the ACP states from the allocation 
of IPF funds was unsatisfactory to many of those 
states. Their unease was magnified by the prospect of 
direct, unmonitored contact between the Community and 
domestic interest groups. Secondly, the concept, and 
the Community's interpretation, of decentralised
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cooperation corresponded directly to two conditional 
elements i.e., reducing the state and decentralising 
political participation. As such, the concept gained 
an additional, restrictive connotation which had not 
been intended by the ACP.
Each sociopolitical initiative in Lomé IV, as had 
each sociocultural issue in Lomé III, generated an 
effect which was not initially perceived and which 
helped to undermine ACP positions. The ACP Group had 
hoped, through its initiatives, to introduce new and 
positive elements into the Convention. The result had 
been a constant diversion, by the Community, of those 
initiatives. The Community thus gained, for itself, 
additional leverage in each case and, overall, further 
scope for conditionality.
2.6 CONCLUSION
The examination of the origins of multiple 
conditionality demonstrates that the Community might 
have started on the path unintentionally, with no 
fixed objective in mind. That lack of conscious 
planning probably explains why the process skipped 
formal macroeconomic reform. It did, however, develop 
an internal coherence and logic which revealed an easy 
and natural evolutionary flow from one stage to 
another. The ACP, on the other hand, saw most of the 
stages on the route as single issues which were the 
result of isolated strategic choices of the Community. 
It was only in the approach to the Mid-Term Review, 
after Lomé IV was well into force, that the ACP 
deduced that a policy, based on conditionality, was 
being fashioned.
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The analysis highlights four points of 
significance for the future course of my study. The 
first is the self-confidence of the Community in its 
own ability. Its self-assurance has been drawn from 
the apparent ease with which it was able to build its 
programme of conditionality and, critically, from the 
ready compliance of the ACP with each new level. The 
experience suggests that the Community could fashion 
its programme without taking much cognisance of the 
concerns of the ACP Group. It also supports a 
perception that the Community could implement the 
programme with little fear as to the ACP's reaction. 
The ACP runs the risk, accordingly, of being 
marginalised or ignored in Community procedures for 
implementation of the Convention.
The second point of significance rests in the 
operational power which the Community, through the 
Commission, wields relative to the ACP. The 
interpretation of any provision in the Convention, for 
its application, is a matter for the sole discretion 
of the Commission. A literal interpretation can often 
be as damaging to ACP interests as a deliberately 
biased one. What is important, as the application of 
Article 5 substantiated, is that the final 
interpretation of provisions lies with the Commission. 
The ACP must accept the manner in which the Commission 
chooses to apply those provisions, whether they 
conform to the original intentions of the advocates or 
not.
The third point of significance is the existence 
of the organisational gap, within the ACP, between the 
representatives in Brussels and their principals in 
ACP capitals. The gap was visible in the Caribbean
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response to the Community's approaches on policy 
dialogue but it is not a peculiarity confined to that 
region. It is a point to which I will return in my 
treatment of bargaining capacity as it relates 
directly to the effectiveness of the ACP Group in its 
negotiations with the Community.
The fourth notable feature demonstrates a 
weakness of ACP coalition-building and is drawn from 
the attitude of the MEPs during the Pons Grau debate. 
The ACP had often sought, and made, alliances with the 
MEPs on issues of import, most notably on the key 
issue of the level of funding committed to each 
Convention. The MEPs had threatened, on occasion, to 
withhold their approval of the negotiated text if the 
proposed amount of resources was not viewed as 
adequate for ACP needs. That predisposition was at 
variance with the inflexibility shown on 
conditionality and the Pons Grau report.
The conclusion which I draw is that the MEPs have 
been willing to support the ACP on those matters which 
help assert or increase their - the MEPs' - own 
strength relative to the Council. In short, the MEPs 
base their willingness, or not, to help the ACP on the 
relevance of the issue to the internal jostling for 
power within the Community. Conditionality offered no 
such promise. Consequently, alliance, or even 
compromise, with the ACP could readily be foregone.
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CHAPTER 3 
BARGAINING CAPACITY
In this Chapter, which is the first of those 
dealing with capacity, I examine the relational 
bargaining capacities which the ACP and the EU bring 
to the process of conditionality. These bargaining 
capacities include, first, those which appear relevant 
to discussions on conditionality. They also include 
those which have been generated during the experience 
of the Lomé Conventions i.e., up to the conclusion of 
the negotiations for the Mid-Term Review in 1995. In 
that sense, bargaining capacity is seen as relational 
in that it is cast in the specific context of ACP-EEC 
relations, drawing on the negotiating weight which 
each side has displayed in that relationship. It is 
not strictly relative in that it does not necessarily 
correspond to the weights which the two sides possess 
as separate groupings. The weight of the EU is 
disproportionately greater than that of the ACP. Its 
application, in such a match, would allow for little 
redress by the ACP. Thus far, in its relations with 
the ACP, the use of the EU's inordinately greater 
power has not been a common feature of negotiations.
1 look at bargaining capacity from three 
perspectives. 1 first assess the capacity generated by 
factors internal to the relationship. Here, 1 examine 
organisational structure I format ; technical support 
and continuity); the relative weight of the two sides 
in the relationship; and command of information. The 
second perspective covers countervailing factors i.e., 
those external to the relationship which might have
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been used by one side or the other to augment its own 
weight or offset that of the other in the 
relationship. I cover group presence; external 
credibility; external coordination; and domestic 
manoeuvrability. The third perspective covered in 
bargaining capacity is that of the expectations which 
the two groups bring to the negotiations. These 
expectations are based on the projections which the 
groups form of the likely outcome of the negotiations 
and on assessments of the ratification process needed 
to implement that outcome.^
In this Chapter, I will focus on the first two 
perspectives. The third area of expectations is more 
specific as expectations will vary in each 
negotiation. I will, therefore, reserve the 
examination of that perspective for a specific set of 
negotiations in the following Chapter. In that 
Chapter, I will examine the applicability of 
bargaining capacity in the negotiations for multiple 
conditionality in the Mid-Term Review.
3.1 WHY NEGOTIATE?
There is, however, a prior question which I must 
answer before turning to an analysis of the bargaining 
capacities which the two sides bring to the
 ^ See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", International 
Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp.435-437. Putnam 
divides the process of negotiation into two stages: 
Level If when bargaining between negotiators leads to 
a tentative agreement and Level 11, when each group of 
constituents discuss whether they should ratify the 
agreement. He further contends that the need for Level 
11 ratification affects Level 1 negotiations.
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conditionality process. The question is simple and 
direct although it demands a fairly comprehensive 
response: why should there be negotiations over the 
EU's intention to introduce conditionality into the 
relationship?^ The question is based on the history of 
conditionality within structural adjustment programmes 
under the MFIs and within bilateral aid programmes. 
The perception is that the history has rarely shown 
recipient states as having much scope to alter 
standard prescriptions of conditionality by 
negotiation.^
The introduction of conditionality has been 
principally on a "take it or be left out" basis. 
Conditionality thus operated as a collateral of the 
loan process in financial areas'^  or as an allocative 
criterion in bilateral aid.^ It was either a necessary 
action by recipients for the continued allocation of 
financial assistance from the MFIs or the qualifying 
condition which potential beneficiaries had to meet to
 ^ I am grateful to a friend and former colleague, 
Lloyd Searwar for raising this obvious but most 
pertinent question.
 ^ The literature is discussed in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.3.2. See footnote 24 of that Chapter for an 
indicative list.
See Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan and John Toye, 
Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1991), Vol. 1, pp. 66- 
67.
 ^The use of conditionality as a criterion in the 
allocation of aid is developed in Joan M. Nelson and 
Stephanie J. Eglington, Global Goals, Contentious 
Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality
(Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council,
1993).
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obtain bilateral assistance.
My response to the question is that, in this 
case, there will be negotiation in either one or both 
of two instances. I will, first, give a general 
response in favour of negotiation before turning to 
the specific nature of ACP-EU relations under Lomé. 
Negotiation will be necessary because multiple 
conditionality goes beyond the normal transactions of 
a financial or economic arrangement i.e., loan 
conditionality, to encompass social and political 
factors.
Loan conditionality is a collateral for future 
loan tranches. Its satisfaction can be readily 
identified by the donor and rewarded or punished 
accordingly. However, the sociopolitical components of 
multiple conditionality require the recipient to play 
a pro-active role in ensuring the satisfaction of the 
conditional terms. The positive involvement of the 
recipient is necessary and compliance cannot be 
achieved by mere diktat. In order to comply with the 
requisite terms, the recipient has to be able to 
identify, and be willing to implement, the required 
tasks. The delineation of those tasks has to be part 
of a process which is agreed, even if not agreeable, 
i.e., through negotiation.
Secondly, the process of negotiation is 
represented in its first stage by the determination to 
pursue the programme of conditionality and by the 
identification of the nature of the conditions to be 
applied. It is followed by the later stage of 
implementation. Then, the set of criteria involved in 
the application of conditionality, the operational
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details, must be sufficiently clear so as to permit 
implementation. Among the areas which need to be made 
predictable are the content of the terms, the timing 
of implementation, the scale of provisions and the 
triggering of sanctions in the case of evasion or 
slippage by recipients. At both stages - programme 
design and implementation - agreement on the criteria 
and on the process has to precede initiation, thus 
requiring negotiations at an early stage.
In the specific case of Lomé, an analysis of the 
options available demonstrates that negotiations would 
be necessary. The conditionality game^ shows that 
conditionality, whether introduced as an ultimatum or 
as a proposal for consideration, leads to negotiations 
to identify terms and conditions of implementation. 
This design phase is followed by further negotiations 
at the level of implementation. In the event, the 
conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of Lomé IV 
illustrate the point. The first stage of negotiations, 
on programme design, has resulted in an agreement to 
have multiple conditionality included as provisions of 
the amended Convention.
The inclusion does not preclude the need for a 
second stage of negotiations to identify, and agree 
on, the content of conditionality. It is generally 
agreed that the principle of multiple conditionality
 ^ Mosley, Harrigan and Toye use a three-stage 
model to describe the game of conditionality in 
structural adjustment (see Power and Aid, op. cit.. 
Vol. 1, p. 76): at the stages of programme design,
implementation and refinancing. Here, I am looking 
primarily at the stage of programme design.
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in the Lomé arrangement lacks operational content.^ The 
operational details have not been spelled out as to 
how conditionality will be applied, what level of 
infringements or what mix of violations will trigger 
sanctions. There is thus ample scope for negotiation 
at the stage of implementation.
3.2 FACTORS INTERNAL TO THE RELATIONSHIP
The factors internal to the ACP-EU relationship 
on which I focus are the organisational structure of 
each group; the relative weight of each group in the 
relationship; and the relevant command of information.
3.2.1 Organisational Structure
In examining the organisational structure of the 
AGP and EU, I highlight three specific areas: form of 
representation; technical support; and continuity.
Form of Representation: Drawing on the typology 
of characteristics identified by Sjostedt, Spector and 
Zartman,® the respective capacities of the AGP and the
 ^There are no specific details mentioned in the 
conclusions. The provisions are pitched at a very 
general level. See Introduction above for a
description of the provisions.
® See Gunnar Sjostedt, Bertram I. Spector and I. 
William Zartman, "The Dynamics of Regime-building 
Negotiations" in Sjostedt, Spector and Zartman eds., 
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned
from the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) (London/Dordrecht/Boston: Graham 
& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994). The typology drawn 
from multilateral negotiations is discussed in Section
1.3.2.
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EU can be measured in three areas: multiparty;
coalition and consensus. In the first area, 
multiparty, an analysis of the AGP Group in 
negotiation demonstrates the effects of multifaceted 
interests in each Group. The membership of the AGP 
stood at seventy (70) • states, divided into six 
groupings, as of July, 1995:^ 16 in West Africa, 10 in 
Gentral Africa, 9 in Southern Africa, 12 in East 
Africa, 15 in the Garibbean and 8 in the Pacific. At 
of that date, the EU's membership was fifteen.
The EU follows what has been called a "mixed 
procedure""^ in its representation. The Gommunity is 
usually represented in Lomé negotiations by the 
Gommission and an EU spokesman, although EU member 
states are present as part of the negotiating Group. 
At the level of the negotiating groups, involving the 
Gommittee of Ambassadors, the Gommission speaks for 
the Gommunity. In the Ministerial groups, the EU is 
represented by a "bicephalic head"^^ or negotiators in 
tandem i.e., a Ministerial representative and a senior 
Gommission o f f i c i a l . ^  in the latter case, it is the 
Minister who takes the lead as spokesman.
This time is chosen because it marked the date 
at which the negotiations on the Mid-Term Review were 
concluded.
See Appendix 1, Table 1.
“ See Paul Taylor, The Limits of European 
Integration (London: Groon Helm, 1983), p. 124.
2^ Ibid. , p. 125.
See The Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990, 
pp. 10-11 for a classification, "The Structure of AGP- 
EEG Negotiations".
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In any event, the Community exhibits a unified 
position on the issues under negotiations. It is clear 
that its negotiating stance has evolved from close 
internal coordination. In both forms of 
representation, the Commission functions as part of a 
collective Community group and as a representative of 
the member states. The conclusion which is drawn is 
fully in accord with that described by Taylor: the
Commission is, in practice, an agent of the member 
states and liable to control by them, although allowed 
to act on their b e h a l f .
The ACP Group is represented in negotiations by 
a single spokesman although a different spokesman is 
chosen for each negotiating or working group. It is a 
system which dates back to the very outset of Lomé 1. 
On any single issue, the choice of an ACP spokesman is 
usually a sensitive matter. It requires a delicate 
balancing of interests among many individual states 
and six separate groupings. The sensitivity and 
balance are exemplified by the reality of special 
interests. Where a particular region maintains special 
interests in Lomé, that region seeks to safeguard its 
interests by exercising some control over their 
negotiation.
The Caribbean is an example of a region with such 
special interests. The Caribbean states came to Lomé 
with a list of special commodities which are covered 
by Protocols viz., bananas, rum and, latterly, rice.^
Taylor, The Limits to European Integration, op. 
cit., p . 142.
Sugar, though the major concern during the 
negotiation of Lomé 1, is governed by a separate 
Protocol of indefinite duration and is thus not re-
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These commodities enjoy preferential access for a 
specified level or quota of exports to the Community. 
The Caribbean states have sought, in all the 
negotiations and often against strong African 
opposition, to ensure their control of ACP 
negotiations on what are termed the Special Protocols. 
They have been successful in their efforts in that the 
Minister responsible for the negotiating group 
covering Protocols, normally the Trade Group, has 
usually been a Caribbean representative.
The relevance of this fact is demonstrated by the 
selection of Ministerial spokesmen for the last two 
negotiations. In the negotiations for Lomé III, there 
were twelve negotiating areas. One of the Caribbean 
spokesmen, the Minister from Guyana, had 
responsibility for the Trade Group^^ which included the 
Protocols. In the negotiations for Lomé IV, the 
Caribbean briefly lost Ministerial control of the 
thematic group on Trade for the first negotiating 
meeting in Brazzaville in February, 1989.^ By the 
convening of the next Ministerial meeting in Brussels 
in June, 1989, the Caribbean had sufficiently 
manifested its interest in its traditional areas of 
concern as to regain the post of spokesman for the
negotiated at the end of each Convention.
This group needs to be distinguished from the 
Commodities and Stabex group which covered 
agricultural commodities subject to normal export 
trade.
See the list of ACP Ministerial Spokesmen, The 
Courier, No. 89, January--February, 1985, p. 27.
It should be noted that the day-to-day, 
operational control was continuously held by the 
Caribbean in the person of the Jamaican Ambassador.
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Trade Group. The post was occupied by the Minister 
from Barbados.^
The Caribbean control of the Protocols brief has 
benefitted from an important fact. The only commodity, 
other than bananas, rice and rum, which is covered by 
a negotiated Protocol is beef. It is the primary 
concern of the Southern African grouping which does 
not normally have identifiable interests strongly 
opposed to those of the Caribbean. Southern Africa is 
thus quite willing to follow the Caribbean lead in 
this area, forming an issue-oriented coalition around 
the protection of their joint interests in the Special 
Protocols.
While the above example is an indication of the 
diversity of interests within the ACP, it is also 
demonstrative of the constraints facing the ACP in the 
two areas of coalition and consensus, With respect to 
coalition, the ACP Group faces a combination of 
constraints based on both numbers and interests. The 
ACP would seem to have reduced the problem of forging 
a coalition among seventy members by the mechanism of 
sub-dividing the Group into six regional groupings. 
However, the regional groupings represent a mixed 
blessing. The division into six does help to forge a 
common position more readily than would an attempt to 
do so among seventy. It is easier for a regional 
grouping of fifteen or sixteen neighbouring states to 
identify a common position for translation into an ACP 
position than it is for the overall group. At the same 
time, however, a deeply-held position of an individual
19 "The Structure of ACP-EEC Negotiations", The 
Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990.
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State can become entrenched among the members of a 
wider regional bloc through the mechanism of the 
regional coalition. The possibility of such an 
occurrence depends on the issue and its importance to 
the more influential members of each regional bloc.
There are several instances during the history of 
Lomé which support the view that regional groupings 
can be more divisive than cohesive within the Group. 
During the negotiations for Lomé I, the issue of sugar 
was, possibly, the first such example: the
accommodation of the producers of that commodity was 
one, if not the, major obstacle to overall agreement. 
The point is granted that the commodity concerned both 
the Caribbean and the Pacific but it was of much less 
importance to the largest group, Africa. Similarly, 
during the negotiations for Lomé II, the need to 
satisfy the concerns of the Caribbean rum producers 
again posed a major obstacle to reaching agreement. 
Both of those issues have been well-documented in 
early studies on Lomé.
There have also been several instances in which 
the internal unity of the ACP Group has been 
imperilled by the use of the regional card in support 
of the interests of an individual state. This has 
occurred most notably in cases of either elected or 
representative posts. The most graphic example has 
been the case of the appointment of the ACP Secretary-
See Marjorie Lister, The European Community and 
the Developing World (Aldershot, U .K.: Avebury, 1988); 
John Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism: The Lomé
Conventions and North-South Relations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985); Carol Cosgrove- 
Twitchett, Europe and Africa: From Association to
Partnership (Farnborough, U.K.: Saxon House, 1978).
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General. The most difficult periods in the history of 
the ACP Group as a coalition have been those in which 
the Group sought to elect its Secretaries-General. The 
choice of a successor, at the end of Lomé II in 1985, 
was particularly d i f f i c u l t . The choice was between 
candidates from Trinidad & Tobago in the Caribbean and 
Kenya in East Africa. It resulted in a struggle which 
left severe and sustained rifts between the various 
regions. The contest for the post led to the first 
exercise of the vote, withJ n the ACP Group, on any 
issue. A similar set of developments occurred, at the 
time of the subsequent election at the end of Lomé III 
in 1990. Then, the incumbent from Trinidad and Tobago 
(Caribbean) was challenged for the post by a candidate 
from Ethiopia (East Africa) .
In both cases, the proposing state obtained the 
endorsement of its regional grouping for its candidate 
and thus transformed the contest into an intractable 
test of regional strength. Compounding the situation 
on both occasions was the fact that East Africa is a 
sub-grouping within the wider African group. The 
division between East Africa and the Caribbean rapidly 
polarised into an Africa vs Caribbean divide. What the 
examples underline is how easily a perceived strength 
of the ACP - the breaking down of the overall group 
into more manageable groupings - can complicate, 
rather than assist, the task of forging an internal 
coalition.
Difficulties in forging internal ACP coalitions
See Lister, The European Community and the 
Developing World, op. cit., p.177 for an early example 
of the implications of the first contest for 
succession as Secretary-General.
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also impact on the area of consensus for they can lead 
to another divisive phenomenon: the creation of cross­
party coalitions on issue areas. The failure of the 
ACP to agree internally has periodically resulted in 
members of the Group seeking a consensus, in their own 
interests, with the EU. One example of such a 
development occurred within the important Stabex 
scheme. It is the most vital feature of the Lomé 
Convention for many ACP states since it represents 
their largest single benefit from the Convention.
It has been a constant ACP complaint in each 
Convention that the resources provided for the Stabex 
scheme are not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the claimants. There is, thus, a regular annual 
shortfall in Stabex resources with a consequential 
failure to meet claims in full. The failure generates 
ACP dissatisfaction which is augmented each year by 
the preceding year's gap between claims and receipts.
The gap was particularly large by the end of 1989 
when the entire allocation under Lomé III had already 
been used up. Indeed, the amount granted for Stabex 
aid, up to that time, had surpassed the allocation of 
925 million European Currency Units (ECUs) under Lomé
One indication of the scale, and importance, of 
Stabex transfers is the fact that the total allocation 
to all of the ACP under the first three Lomé
Conventions was 21,600 million ECU. However, net
Stabex transfers to the 51 eligible ACP states (out of 
65) in the ACP during the period 1975-88, i.e.
excluding 1989 under Lomé III, were 2,080 million or 
nearly 10% of all funding. This was an amount net of 
the sums replenished or repaid. Of the neL amount
transferred, over 78% (more than 1622 million ECU) was 
received by just 16 ACP states. See Annex 2 of "The 
Export Earnings Stabilization System (Stabex), Europe 
Information, January 1990.
133
Ill by over 250 million ECUs.^^ The amount approved up 
to the end of 1989 did not include or cover the 
transfer requests for the Stabex year 1989. The 
Commission was forced to search for some means to 
cover the shortfall. The traditional mechanisms had 
been to use accumulated interest from undistributed 
EOF allocations or to reallocate unutilised funds from 
earlier Conventions. Those mechanisms were unlikely to 
prove adequate that year. The Commission, therefore, 
proposed that Stabex could benefit from the unutilised 
portion of funds allocated to the special financing 
system for mineral products (Sysmin) in Lomé 1 1 .^
The proposal provoked an immediate and deep 
schism within the ACP. ACP mineral producers were 
particularly upset. Sysmin was perceived to be a 
notoriously difficult scheme from which to benefit, 
given its extensive evaluation and slow allocation 
processes. There were several states which still had 
applications under consideration for benefits from the 
Lomé II provisions. Those states were now faced by the 
prospect of the funds being allocated elsewhere while 
their applications were still pending.
23 "Prom Lomé III to Lomé IV: Review of Aid from 
the Lomé Conventions at the end of 1989", Europe 
Information, p. 17. The amount approved for Stabex aid 
had already totalled 1192 million ECUs while only 925 
million had been allocated for all five years of the 
Convention.
The Commission proposed the use of an 
additional 70 million ECUs of Stabex transfers, made 
up of about 54.6 million from the outstanding balance 
of the Sysmin provision under the 6th EOF and smaller 
amounts from interest rate subsidies and emergency 
aid. See "ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé: Annual Report of 
the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers (1990)" (SN 1879/91), 
pp. 22-23.
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The Commission's response to the complaints was 
to indicate that almost none of the pending 
applications had any chance of success. It was a 
response which provided little reassurance for the 
mineral producers. In contrast, the Stabex 
beneficiaries were clearly delighted with the proposal 
which they saw as a solution to their own problem. 
They immediately signalled their agreement with it and 
joined the Commission in pushing for its 
implementation. The Stabex recipients also had the 
advantage of being far more numerous than potential 
Sysmin beneficiaries.^^ The consequence was an issue- 
based consensus which enjoined a wide majority of the 
ACP with the EU and worked against internal accord 
within the ACP Group.
The preceding examples are not intended to be 
wholly descriptive of the manner in which the ACP 
Group formulates its negotiating positions. They are 
intended to serve as indications of the difficulties 
which the Group faces in doing so. 1 am also trying to 
show that features of the Group's organisation, which 
might appear to be supportive of its internal unity, 
also serve as serious constraints on that unity. The 
EU, for its part, also faces problems of internal
It is difficult to quantify, with any 
certainty, the number of potential Sysmin 
beneficiaries as each application for benefit was 
considered as an isolated case. However, the limits on 
numbers were clear: oil was not covered under the
scheme and the funds under consideration were those 
for which there were existing applications. Those 
applications probably numbered 10 while the stabex 
recipients exceeded 50.
1 am grateful to Dr. Coulibaly, the Expert on 
Sysmin in the ACP Secretariat, for the confirmation of 
details of this episode.
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consensus and coalition in forging its own negotiating 
positions, as would be expected of a grouping of more 
than a dozen states. However, there is a fundamental 
difference between the ACP and the EU in Lomé 
negotiations: the ACP are principally "demandeurs" or 
claimants in the relationship while the EU fills the 
role of donor.
Two distinctive features characterise the 
different perceptions which the ACP and the EU hold of 
the Lomé negotiations. The two Groups have widely 
varying objectives. I have already touched upon the 
first as arising from Ravenhill's depiction of the ACP 
states as "demandeurs". The ACP Group seeks to gain 
from the Conventions through the acquisition of 
incremental benefits or the consolidation of existing 
ones. The EU's position is either defensive of the 
status quo or reactive to ACP demands. Very rarely 
does the EU seek a specific gain of its own.
Additionally, there is a difference in 
negotiating flexibility and, thus, in the scope for 
trade-offs in bargaining. The ACP, as the Group in 
quest of benefits, always has to determine whether or 
not it can afford to maintain an unwavering position 
on any single issue. The EU has a more limited scope 
for flexibility in negotiations. Its positions have 
been formed mainly through internal bargaining and it 
is extremely difficult to go back on such internal
This point is made by John Ravenhill. See 
Ravenhill, "Negotiating the Lomé Convention: A Little 
Is Preferable to Nothing", pp.219-220 in I. William 
Zartman ed.. Positive Sum: Improving North-South
Negotiations (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction 
Books, 1987).
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consensus. Moreover, the issues at stake for the EU do 
not present much opportunity for gain and, 
consequently, for amendment in bargaining. The EU sees 
the Lomé negotiations as periodic exercises intended 
to consolidate an existing set of arrangements.^® It 
thus resists firmly ACP attempts to extend EU
obligations through major changes.
The second difference in perception is based on 
political expectations. The Joint Council of Ministers 
(COM) represents the highest decision-making forum 
within the ACP-EU relationship. The Joint COM meets 
once annually although, during negotiations, it meets 
more often. Its scheduling does not allow for
intensive negotiations during its meetings. 
Consequently, the detailed negotiations, and the
normal management of the Convention during 
implementation, are delegated to the Committee of 
Ambassadors (COA). Given the status of the COM, there 
is a tendency, on the part of the ACP Group, to refer 
thorny matters during negotiations and implementation 
to the Ministers, both to its own COM and the Joint 
COM.
The ACP negotiators in the COA view the COM as a 
valid decision-making body which can override 
blockages at lower levels. They thus tend to defer 
consideration on difficult or persistent issues and 
pass them on to the Ministers. Their hope is that 
their political superiors can succeed with their peers 
where they have failed at the lower level. The 
Community, in turn, sees the COM as a genuinely
Ibid. Ravenhill offers an analysis of the 
negotiating processes for Lomé II and III.
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political body in which views are exchanged and 
decisions are ratified. It is not a forum for the 
detailed debate or "horse-trading" which typify the 
COA or negotiating groups. The ACP states thus find 
themselves without a valid political forum in their 
dealings with the EU as the recourse to the political 
bodies does not result in substantive discussions.
A complicating factor derives from the fact that 
the EU Ministers can and do meet regularly on EU 
matters. Indeed, contiguity and Community routine 
allow ready recourse to consultations on any issue. 
The ACP Ministers, in contrast, only meet twice per 
year, once in preparation for the Joint COM and, 
secondly, for an administrative session. ACP 
consultations on negotiable Lomé matters only take 
place at the annual COM which precedes the Joint COM. 
Accordingly, agreement on common positions among the 
ACP Ministers is often difficult to achieve during the 
limited periods available for such Councils. Internal 
ACP and joint ACP-EU consensus often prove elusive in 
problematic situations. One side has too little time 
or opportunity to consider the issues in depth while 
the other side, though blessed with greater 
opportunity, is unwilling to use the COM as a 
negotiating body.
To a lesser extent, a similar situation has 
developed with the ACP-EU Joint Assembly where the ACP 
representatives only meet on the two annual occasions 
when they gather for the Joint Assembly. In contrast, 
the EU Parliamentarians in the Joint Assembly are 
regularly in contact as members of the standing 
European Parliament. ACP Parliamentarians are often 
unfamiliar with the details of the Convention for,
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understandably, Lomé matters are not a priority item 
on the agendas of national ACP Parliaments. This 
latter problem was reduced to some extent by the fact 
that the Conventions did allow for an ACP 
"representative" to attend on behalf of each state. 
Many states designated their Ambassadors as their 
representatives, thus meeting the twin needs for 
familiarity with the topic and saving on the cost of 
attendance.
More recently, the EU has argued that progress 
towards political liberalisation demanded that the ACP 
states be represented by bona fide parliamentarians. 
The conclusions of the Mid-Term Review upheld the EU 
position. They state that an ACP state can only be 
represented either by a Parliamentarian or a nominee 
designated by the relevant ACP Parliament. Only in 
the absence of a national Parliament can another 
representative be chosen and, then, only with the 
prior approval of the Joint Assembly.
The relevance of the Joint Assembly stems from 
the growing importance which it is assuming in the 
implementation of the Lomé Convention. The enhanced 
powers of the European Parliament (EP) in the 
functioning of the EU has resulted in provisions which 
give the Parliament powers of ratification and, thus, 
a greater voice in the determination of EU policy.
Article 32.1, Lomé IV Convention as revised by 
the agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November, 1995, 
the Courier No. 155, January-February 1995.
See Juliet Lodge, "EC Policymaking: 
institutional dynamics", pp. 26-33 in Lodge (ed.). The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 
2nd Edition (London: Pinter, 1993).
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The Parliament and its representatives in the Joint 
Assembly have been gradually, but increasingly, able 
to affect EU policy under Lomé. This ability was 
markedly demonstrated by the decision to impose 
sanctions on Haiti after the military overthrow of the 
legally-elected Aristide Government. The Commission 
based its decision to impose sanctions on a resolution 
of the EP.31
In a real sense, it is the MEPs within the 
Assembly, not the Joint Assembly itself, who have been 
gaining influence in Lomé matters. This development 
stems from their dual role as members of the Assembly 
and, more importantly, as MEPs. It has been under 
their stimulus that the Assembly has devoted greater 
attention to the conduct and policies of ACP states.^ 
One implication of this focus is that the Commission 
has begun to take more account of the recommendations
The resolution was adopted on 1 October, 1991. 
It is important to note that it was a resolution of 
the European Parliament, not of the Joint Assembly. 
This fact helps me to draw an important distinction. 
I had earlier discussed the relations between the 
Joint Assembly and the Community (and Commission) and 
the ACP (see Sections 2.2.3). While the Community 
rejects the claims of the Assembly to authority over 
it, the same is certainly not true of the Parliament. 
There is a much healthier respect for its authority, 
given its powers to affect the budget and Commission 
appointments.
The Joint Assembly has shown a gradual but 
marked increase in the number of resolutions submitted 
and approved on the internal situations in ACP states. 
In January, 1989, there was none at the Bridgetown, 
Barbados Meeting. There were two (2) at the Luxembourg 
Meeting in September, 1990 but there were eight (8) 
approved at the Luxembourg Meeting in September, 1992. 
See Dossier: The ACP-EEC Assembly; Its Beginnings and 
Growth^ how it works and what is has achieved 1964- 
1992 (Group EPP (CD), Luxembourg, 1993).
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and resolutions of the Assembly. The Joint Assembly 
has thus seen a heightened interest and greater 
involvement of the EU representatives in areas which 
impact directly on the states of the ACP 
Parliamentarians. The latter, on the contrary, remain 
constrained in their ability to respond by their 
inability to hold regular consultations and their lack 
of familiarity with the substantive issues.
Technical Support: An examination of the
comparative weight of the technical support, the ACP 
Secretariat and the Commission, helps to illustrate 
the huge disparity which exists between the two 
groups. The ACP Secretariat suffers from very limited 
numbers: in 1989, it had a total of eighty (80)
members of staff, a total which included both experts 
and support staff. Indeed, only fifteen (15) of that 
number were experts. Such a low number of experts does 
not allow for a comprehensive coverage of the various 
issues which are included in the Convention or for the 
provision of the requisite technical skills which are 
demanded by implementation.
The Commission, in its Directorate-General for 
Development (DG VIII), fielded more than 200 experts 
in 1985.^ DG VIII is divided into six Directorates 
with sub-divisions into "desks" covering individual 
countries or small groups of countries. It also has
Ravenhill, "Negotiating the Lomé
Convention...", op. cit., p.222.
See John Chinwi Mgbere, Cooperation between the 
European Community and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries (1957-1990): a study in group diplomacy
(unpublished thesis presented for the award of the 
Ph.D degree. University of London, 1994), pp.205-6.
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sections which are responsible for the thematic areas 
of the Convention such as Stabex and evaluation. 
Additionally, the Commission has offices in most of 
the ACP states. It is clear that the Commission is 
able to devote far greater expertise than the ACP in 
almost every area of the Convention.
The ACP Secretariat faces other severe 
constraints. 35 The first is in the nature of its 
leadership. The Secretary-General is elected to his 
post for a term of office which coincides with the 
duration of the Convention. In the case of Lomé IV, it 
was for the first half of the Convention i.e., five 
years. The electoral process for the post has become 
very intensive, as demonstrated by the succession 
contests after Lomé II and III. The protracted 
struggle, which it provokes, has led to the incumbents 
devoting a significant proportion of their time to 
cultivating future support for possible re-election. 
The Secretaries-General, therefore, have to be 
conscious of the repercussions of their actions lest 
they adversely affect potential allies. The image is 
thus of a Secretary-General with a dual focus: one eye 
on the effective functioning of his office; the other 
on cultivating possible support.
The role of the ACP Secretariat is an additional 
concern for it has been deliberately designed with a 
low profile. It enjoys a clearly subordinate position 
to the ACP diplomatic representatives. The Secretary- 
General and his Secretariat do not enjoy powers to 
initiate policy as does the Commission. They cannot
35 Lister, The European Community..., op. cit., 
pp.174-177 outlines some of the limitations which face 
the ACP Secretariat.
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propose or recommend policy options for the ACP Group. 
He and the experts can only respond to directions from 
the COA. The Secretariat is thereby confined to 
responses on specific enquiries, even on sectoral 
issues where it presumably enjoys a competitive 
advantage in technical knowledge.
A further constraint on the ACP Secretariat lies 
in the nature of its financing. Each ACP state pays an 
assessed contribution, on a proportional basis, as its 
share of the Secretariat budget. The salaries of the 
experts and their direct support (secretaries, 
consultants, etc.) are met from the European 
Development Fund (EDF).^® Given the low proportion of 
experts on the ACP staff, a significant proportion of 
the budgetary burden thus falls on the ACP states. It 
is a burden which has placed the ACP Group under a 
continuous difficulty. Individual states, when faced 
with domestic financial problems, have tended to cut 
back on contributions to international organisations 
as one of their first options. The ACP has suffered 
accordingly in its budgetary contributions.
Compounding the problem is the fact that the 
functioning of the ACP Group, which is not an organ of 
the Lomé Convention, bears no direct relation to 
operation of the Lomé Convention. Convention benefits, 
for states which are already members of the
The Secretary-General is not classified as an 
expert for the purposes of EOF payment while the 
treatment of the Deputy Secretary-General, a post 
newly reinstated in 1992, is still a matter of debate. 
In the latter case, the ACP designates the post as 
expert while the EU terms it political, like that of 
Secretary-General, and thus not qualifying for EDF 
funding.
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Convention, are in no way affected by their standing 
in the ACP Group. In sum, a state which is in default 
of its financial contribution to the ACP Group faces 
no sanction within the Convention. It only faces a 
reluctantly imposed sanction of restricted 
participation within the ACP Group itself. The 
consequence has been that the ACP endures a perennial 
problem of delinquent states and consequential 
budgetary shortfalls. It is a fact which has not 
served to make the Secretariat a more financially 
secure or effective body.
For its part, the Commission suffers from none of 
the above problems. Its sources of financing are 
assured through the regular budget of the EU. Its 
central involvement in the negotiation and 
implementation of the Convention has been outlined 
earlier. In relative terms, the Commission is 
disproportionately better endowed with technical 
expertise than the ACP Secretariat. The political head 
of DG Vlll is the Commissioner for Development but the 
functional head of Commission Services, in DC Vlll is 
the Director-General. While there might be, and often 
have been, political trade-offs in choosing the 
officials for those posts, there is an assured 
continuity. It is provided by the Commission Services 
in the form of the roster of officials who guide the 
daily implementation of the Convention.
The role of the Commission is also much better 
defined than that of the ACP Secretariat. It can 
propose courses of action in the relationship with the 
ACP and has often used that capacity to influence 
possible policy options. The starting-point itself of
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conditionality, as shown in Chapter 2 ,^ lay in the 
initiative of Commissioner Pisani. Another example of 
such an attempt to influence policy was the
unsuccessful proposal to formulate a debt-forgiveness 
scheme for ACP states. The scheme was proposed by the 
Commissioner for Development, Manuel Marin, during the 
negotiations for Lomé IV in 1990.
More importantly, DG VIII is situated within a 
European Commission which has acquired greater 
internal cohesion through the breadth of its
activities. They encompass coordination of both
domestic and international economic matters. In 
contrast, the sole concern of the ACP Secretariat has 
been the management of Lomé. Its involvement in that 
management has, nonetheless, only been partial, 
contested as it is by the overarching control of the 
C o m m i s s i o n . This disparity in experience is only 
magnified when combined with the other ACP
deficiencies.
Continuity: The third aspect, which I examine, is 
continuity in organisation and negotiating capacity. 
In the case of the ACP, I will focus on continuity in 
two linked areas: continuity of representation and
continuity of attention. The implementation of the 
Lomé Convention has been transformed into a continuous 
series of negotiations: between the ACP and the EU as
37 See Section 2.1.1.
38 See Section 2.6 which highlights the conclusion 
that the Community does exercise a wide operational 
control. It is a point which is developed more 
extensively later, both in this Chapter and in Chapter 
5 on Operational Capacity. See Sections 3.2.2 and
5.5.2.
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two collective groups; between individual ACP states 
and the Commission; and within the ACP. All of these 
negotiations are crowned by the periodic re­
negotiation of the Convention itself.
The ACP, as a Group, meets regularly, often 
weekly or twice weekly, at the level of the Committee 
of Ambassadors. This routine is usually only varied 
during the vacation periods in August and December. 
Additionally, the various sub-Committees dedicated to 
the specific issue-areas of the Convention e.g.. 
Trade, Agricultural Commodities, Stabex and 
Development Finance, also hold regularly scheduled 
meetings. The consequence is a continuous process of 
consultations and meetings which attract the major 
attention of ACP representatives in Brussels. The 
sheer weight, complexity and persistence of the issues 
demand that the representatives devote both time and 
constant attention to the mastery of their brief. 
Moreover, the process of meetings makes the 
deliberations in Brussels the key element in the 
management of the Convention. It thus places a great 
emphasis on the contribution of the representatives in 
Brussels.
Continuity of representation, under such 
circumstances, is of the greatest import if the 
complex matters are to be properly addressed and 
effectively handled in negotiation. Such continuity is 
based on consistency of representation through a 
regular rotation of representatives. It also depends 
on the need, through that rotation, to ensure that 
familiarisation with, and mastery of, the various 
issues is achieved. The process of rotation would not 
impinge greatly on the negotiations if adequate
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continuity was provided by the ACP Secretariat. 
However, as I have indicated earlier,^ the Secretariat 
suffers from severe deficiencies in both technical and 
material resources and is thus unable to provide the 
required support.
There is the additional complication arising from 
the varied quality of representation available to the 
ACP states in Brussels. The representation in Brussels 
can vary between a technical choice from a subject 
Ministry e.g.. Trade,'’® a professional choice from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or, perhaps, a career 
public servant or ex-politician. Given the crucial 
role which such representatives play in the 
negotiating process in Brussels in both bargaining and 
technical matters, they can suffer from two major 
limitations. First, the individual contributions can 
be widely disparate, particularly where the 
representative lacks either technical or negotiating 
skills or both. Secondly, familiarity with the 
specific issues of Lomé demands an investment in time 
which, once acquired by the individual, can often be 
lost through untimely rotation. A change of subject 
Ministry often results in the need to acquaint a new 
set of home-based officials with the issues.
The second aspect of continuity, that of 
attention, is best measured by the Ministerial 
interest in Lomé. There are two dimensions to the 
problem. The first stems from the jurisdictional void
See the preceding sub-section on Technical
Support.
By subject Ministry, I mean the national 
Ministry which has been assigned responsibility for 
dealing with Lomé matters.
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in ACP states into which responsibility for Lomé often 
falls. The relevant subject Ministries include Trade, 
Agriculture and Finance but the overall control of an 
overseas Mission is traditionally that of Foreign 
Affairs. The Brussels Mission is, thus, often a "step­
child" of several Ministries, with a corresponding 
lack of priority attention from most. It is this lack 
of a recognisable central control that contributes to 
an attention span and a break in continuity at the 
policy-making level.
The second dimension of the continuity of 
attention is more readily measured by the Ministerial 
attendance at meetings of the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers. Earlier, I had indicated that the COM 
served as the highest political forum within the 
Convention and that it had a significant value for the 
ACP. In light of this fact, it is remarkable how few 
ACP Ministers actually do attend COM meetings. On 
average, it would be considered an exceptionally good 
attendance at a COM where half of the ACP delegations 
were headed by Ministers.
More telling is the nature of Ministerial 
representation when they do attend. At one COM during 
the final negotiations for Lomé IV, the Caribbean had 
the following array: Foreign Affairs (Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago); Trade (Barbados and Grenada); 
Finance (Guyana); and Industry (Suriname).^ The other 
states were not represented by Ministers. Only half of 
the Caribbean states had any Ministerial 
representation and where they did, the various
Attendance at the ACP-EU COM in Luxembourg, 27- 
29 October, 1989 as contained in the List of 
Attendance of the Meeting.
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responsibilities covered a wide spectrum. More 
importantly, there is no regional forum which would 
allow for regular consultation among the Ministries 
which were represented. There is thus an obvious 
problem, even within a single region of the ACP, of 
providing coordinated coverage of Lomé.
On the EU's side, there is a similar difficulty 
with continuity of representation: all diplomatic
missions are subject to regular rotation and to the 
transfer of experienced representatives. However, this 
problem is significantly reduced, if not eliminated, 
by the fact that the Commission is the EU body 
responsible for the routine administration of the 
Convention. Unlike the ACP Secretariat, the Commission 
is reasonably well equipped, in terms of technical and 
material resources, to meet the task. The Commission 
is also formally endowed with the authority to carry 
out its task. It is the Commission, therefore, which 
plays the central role, on the EU's side, in this 
aspect of bargaining capacity. It is to the Commission 
that one has to look to determine whether continuity 
of representation and of attention is provided. It is 
indeed provided, for the one constant in the Lomé 
relationship has been the technical services of the 
Commission. They are not hostage to the vagaries of 
jurisdictional disputes among Ministers. They are not 
subject to the rotation process and they are 
adequately equipped to be the managers of the daily 
implementation of the Convention.
The EU also suffers from a low level of 
Ministerial attendance at COM meetings but, unlike the 
ACP, it has a less deleterious effect. First, the 
Commission and the Secretariat of the EU Council of
149
Ministers serve as the institutional memory for the 
Ministers and national delegations. There is no 
comparable body on the ACP's side. Secondly, the EU 
has a lower level of dependence on its political 
representatives for the determination and approval of 
negotiating positions. Their continued presence and 
attendance to issues are thus much less of a vital 
factor in the effective functioning of the EU in its 
negotiations with the AGP, Finally, there is an 
obvious reality: constant consultation and
coordination of positions are much easier and more 
regular for the geographically contiguous EU than they 
are for the widely separated ACP states.
3.2.2 Relative Weight in the Relationship
A second area of importance in the bargaining 
process is the relative weight of the sides in the 
process as determined by the experience over the 
periods of the Conventions. I examine the relationship 
to determine which party, if any, has exerted the 
greater influence by looking at four areas: the
control of the agenda; the allocation of resources; 
the rules of the relationship; and internal cohesion.
Control of the Agenda: In spite of the
negotiated nature of the Lomé Conventions, each 
Convention has had a priority emphasis which has been 
determined by the EU. In Lomé I, the emphasis was on 
agriculture and rural development while, in Lomé II, 
it was on energy and food production. The priorities 
in Lomé IV were rural development, food security, 
rational management of natural resources and
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agricultural production in ACP states.^ in each case, 
the emphasis was decided by the EU, based on its own 
appreciation of the priorities under the Convention. 
The decision to introduce conditionality, in the 
middle of an existing Convention, is a graphic example 
of how the EU sets the agenda for the relationship.
The Community's control is well illustrated by a 
comparison with the attempts of the ACP to impose its 
own priorities. The issue of South Africa is, 
probably, the longest-running manifestation of these 
priorities. ACP attempts to debate apartheid in South 
Africa^ and to establish a common policy for the Lomé 
parties on the issue date back to the implementation 
of the first Convention. The ACP efforts continued up 
to the negotiation of Lomé IV but were not successful. 
The EU argued that the Convention covered trade and 
economic matters. The issue of South Africa, as a 
political matter, did not fall within the ambit of the 
Convention. It also stressed that relations with South 
Africa were a bilateral concern of individual member 
states and not subject to a collective Community 
approach.
Two separate themes, during the negotiations of 
Lomé IV, help illustrate the frustrated attempts of 
the ACP to influence the priorities of the Convention. 
Both were perceived by the ACP as being of the utmost 
importance to their development. They were debt and 
the processing, marketing, distribution and
42 Article 6, Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé.
Lister, The European Community..., op. cit., 
pp.199-201 for a treatment of the ACP attempts to have 
the matter of relations with South Africa discussed 
within Lomé.
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transportation (PMDT) of commodities. By the late 
1980s and the renegotiation of Lomé IV, debt had 
become an intolerable burden for many ACP states, a 
fact which was recognised by many in the Community. 
Indeed, the strongest advocate of the inclusion of 
some form of debt relief for ACP states was 
Development Commissioner Marin. However, ACP efforts 
to obtain some form of debt relief within the 
Convention were rejected by the Community. The 
Community cited, as its grounds, that most ACP debt to 
Community member states was bilateral in nature and, 
therefore, not amenable to treatment within a 
multilateral Convention. It was contended that only 1% 
of ACP debt to European states fell within the ambit 
of the Convention. The Community was only prepared to 
countenance two related measures. Future Stabex and 
SYSMIN transfers would no longer be replenishable 
i.e., refundable and structural adjustment resources 
would be allocated as grants.
The question of PMDT was seen by most in the ACP 
as one possible solution to the problems of limited 
industrial development and the poor application of the 
industrial provisions of the C o n v e n t i o n . it also 
responded to a long-held desire of the major ACP 
commodity producers to overcome their continued 
relegation to being mere raw material exporters. While 
the EU was willing to express a general approval of 
efforts to improve PMDT, it was unwilling to approve 
specific targets, such as 25% of production by the 
year 2000. The EU was also unwilling to be bound to 
explicit measures of support for PMDT within the
The record of industrial cooperation is 
discussed in Section 5.3.1 below.
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Convention. The Community's concern was that the
measures might be seen or used by the ACP as a
commitment by the EU to absorb the future exports of 
such processed commodities. Despite the apparent 
importance of the issues to the ACP, its efforts in 
both cases - debt and PMDT - failed notably to 
influence the agenda.
Having noted the lack of success of the ACP to 
insert priority items on the Lomé agenda, I should 
indicate that the record was not a list of abject 
failures. There were a few ACP efforts which did
succeed. I have examined these issues - social and
cultural cooperation; human rights; environmental 
concerns and decentralised cooperation -in the 
previous Chapter.However, as indicated earlier, they 
each succeeded in a manner which was not expected by
the ACP and which did not always redound to the
benefit of the Group.
Allocation of Resources: The manner in which the 
level of EDF funding is determined at the end of each 
negotiation remains the method fashioned in Lomé I.'’^ 
It is decided after internal debate and trade-offs 
within the Community. The equally important issue of 
how the funds are allocated between the various
sections of the Convention is also a matter for the EU 
alone. Thus, the common ACP criticism that STABEX 
funding is inadequate to meet the annual shortfalls of 
the ACP claimants usually presents the ACP with a
45 See Section 2.5 above.
46 See Ravenhill, Collective Cllentelism..., op. 
cit., passim and Cosgrove-Twitchett, Europe and 
Africa..., op. cit., passim.
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"fait accompli". The determination of an acceptable 
level of Stabex funding has never been a matter for 
mutual discussion, much less mutual accord. There is, 
thus, a perennial problem of a funding gap between ACP 
claims and the annual allocation within the 
Convention. While the persistence of the problem does 
result in a continued frustration for the ACP, it also 
highlights the EU's strong control over the allocation 
of resources.
In the more general areas of EDF project funding 
project approval, criteria for allocation, 
management and evaluation - the final decision lies 
with the EDF Committee. The Committee is an internal 
EU body. The control and determination of the 
suitability of EDF funding are thus within the EU's 
sole purview. It is an advantage which is magnified by 
the fact that the procedures of the Committee are 
rather opaque and regarded by the EU as internal 
matters. When combined with the determination of EDF 
resources, the funding arrangements result in a 
predominant control by the EU over the allocation of 
resources.
Rules of the Relationship: The question of whose 
interpretation or point of view prevails in the 
application of provisions of the Convention is an 
important aspect of the relationship. This was a 
contentious issue from the earliest days of Lomé, 
particularly in the areas of Community trade policy 
which might impact on the ACP. The solution was to 
create a consultation mechanism to allow the ACP to 
present its views on the particular policy. Over time, 
the ACP has come to question the utility of the 
consultation process for two principal reasons. The
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first is that the consultation process has evolved 
into something remarkably similar to notification, 
whereby the ACP is merely informed of a future change 
in EU policy. One such example was the extension of 
the generalised system of preferences (GSP) to non-ACP 
countries. A case in point was GSP extension to coffee 
exports from some Central and South American countries 
involved in the fight against drug-trafficking.
The second reason for ACP dissatisfaction with 
consultation was that the mechanism often seemed a 
pointless option to the Group. Even where the process 
was followed, the EU claimed that the specific policy 
was part of a wider trade relationship and part of its 
international obligations. Its hands were thus tied. 
The examples abound: the erosion of ACP privileges as 
part of GATT negotiations or the more recent 
liberalisation of the sugar and banana markets as part 
of the negotiations for the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). The effect, in ACP eyes, is that the EU is able 
to fashion its policy without reference to its ACP 
commitments. It is then up to the Convention to adapt 
to the new reality. In other words, the EU interprets 
consultation as a process of informing the ACP of its 
future plans. There is no parallel obligation to take 
account of ACP concerns or reaction.
More important is the question of who interprets 
the operational provisions of the Convention in cases 
of confusion or dispute. It is the Commission, as the 
body responsible for day-to-day implementation of the 
Convention, which assumes the responsibility for 
interpretation. Even in cases where there might not be 
an apparent lack of clarity, the Commission has 
determined the operational meaning of a provision and
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given effect to that interpretation during 
implementation. Most of the issues cited in the 
previous Chapter help to substantiate how the 
Community usually prevails in the application of the 
rules of the relationship.^
As I have elaborated on those examples in some 
detail, I will merely use one of them as illustration 
in this case. The use of Article 5 of Lomé IV is one 
example of the Community, through the Commission, 
exercising control over the rules of the relationship. 
The first application of the Article was made very 
shortly after the Convention was ratified. The 
Community, on the basis of a European Parliament 
resolution, used Article 5 to suspend Haiti from the 
benefits of the Convention,'^® following the military 
coup against President Aristide. There was no prior 
consultation or agreement with the ACP.
The EU's course of action might well have been 
fully justified and laudable but the interpretation of 
the scope of Article 5 was solely that of the EU. The 
ACP reaction was, in the main, uncertainty and 
hesitation. It allowed the EU to act in total 
disregard of an unclear ACP position and, thus, to 
establish a wide-ranging precedent. The ACP, at the 
insistence of Sudan which feared a similar judgement
In addition to the example of Haiti which 
follows, the issues relating to the ACP's social 
initiatives, covered in Section 2.5, all demonstrate 
the Commission's control of the application of the 
rules of the relationship.
The Convention was ratified on 1st September, 
1991; the European Parliament passed its resolution on 
Haiti on 11th October, 1991 and the suspension of 
Haiti was announced during the same month of October.
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to that of Haiti, did set up a working group. Its 
mandate was to examine the interpretation of Article 
5 and to engage in further discussions with the EU.^  ^
The deliberations were drawn-out but had no effect on 
the decision already taken or on the precedent 
established.
Internal Cohesion: The final aspect of the
relative weight of the two parties in the relationship 
relates to the cohesiveness of each group. It reflects 
how well they were able to coordinate their responses 
on particular issues. An important influence on 
internal cohesion was the public image conveyed. In 
other words, were internal debates and dissension 
transmitted publicly, thus signalling to the other 
side the existence of internal divisions and a 
potential for exploitation of those divisions?
In this regard, the two sides displayed marked 
differences in Lomé negotiations. The nature of 
decision-making, within the EU, has been such as to 
keep the debates and negotiation internal to the 
Community. There was no need to enlist the support of 
the ACP on any issue. Any persuasion which had to be 
done was that of other EU states. Disputes and 
divisions, within the EU, were not made public in 
discussions with the ACP. The image, conveyed by the 
Community, was one of internal cohesiveness. Secondly, 
the process of decision-making in the EU on Lomé
Interview with Ambassador Chasle of Mauritius 
who was the architect of initial provision in Article 
5 and headed the ACP Working Group on Article 5. In 
the interview. Ambassador Chasle admitted that he had 
not foreseen the Community's interpretation of the 
Article. This issue is treated in Section 2.5.2.
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matters allowed the details and potential for dispute 
to be played out at the lower levels. Recommendations 
were made by the Commission or the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) before the final 
ratification by the COM of the EU.
The case of debt relief for the ACP was an 
example of such decision-making. Debt relief had the 
personal support of the Development Commissioner 
himself and, possibly, that of France. Despite that 
strong support, the matter did not survive the 
internal EU debate at the levels of COREPER and the 
COM. It thus never became an issue at the bilateral, 
ACP-EU level of negotiation. Even if France, in the 
Presidency of the EU at the time, felt very strongly 
on the issue,she had no opportunity to pursue the 
matter beyond the councils of the EU. The episode 
confirmed what had always been apparent to the ACP: 
the homogeneity of EU negotiating positions, whatever 
the known empathies of one or other member state.
On the ACP's side, the image and the reality were 
much the opposite. Internal dissention was not only 
common but it was often brought to the attention of 
the EU in visible attempts to obtain the support of 
the Community. I have described the STABEX dispute on 
funding and how the beneficiaries of the system made 
common cause with the EU to ensure the success of
There were persistent reports, at the time of 
the signing in Lomé in 1990, that France, as President 
of the EU COM, would make a grand gesture of debt 
relief on the occasion and that President Mitterand, 
himself, would be present to make the gesture. In the 
event. Prime Minister Rocard did attend but no relief 
was extended as France had obviously failed to 
persuade her partners to support debt relief.
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their interests. It was an indicative case but it 
might not have been the sole instance of a lack of ACP 
internal cohesion.
A more intriguing example was that of the choice 
of duration of the current Lomé IV Convention. The ACP 
Group had long been divided between the relative 
merits of the traditional, five-year Convention and 
those of a Convention of unlimited duration. The 
differences had again emerged during the preparations 
for the negotiations for Lomé IV. They remained 
unresolved even as the negotiations developed. As late 
as the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg 
where the matter was finally resolved, the ACP had not 
reached a definitive position. The question of the 
duration had not been directly addressed within the 
ACP, if only to avoid internal division.
The circumstances of the final Sunday at 
Luxembourg were confused. The ACP had undergone an 
all-night session deciding on the election of a new 
Secretary-General. In the wider negotiations, a number 
of largely organisational features were still to be 
finalised. The consequent choice of a Convention of 
ten (10) years’ duration emerged from this void as an 
administrative arrangement. Its paternity could not be 
readily claimed by any negotiator, other than the 
Commission Services. In short, it was inserted into 
the conclusions to ensure completion of the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . The outcome was an example of how an
5" See Section 2.1.4 above.
52 My personal recollection of events as a 
participant in the negotiations has been confirmed in 
discussions with colleagues in several ACP Missions 
and with officials of the ACP Secretariat.
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internal ACP division permitted the Commission to 
provide a solution which would have an important 
impact on the very existence of the Convention.
My assessment of the relative weight of the two 
parties demonstrates that the ACP is at a grave 
disadvantage. The control of the agenda rests firmly 
in the hands of the EU, whether in terms of the 
priorities within the Convention or in the subsequent 
application of the agenda. This assessment holds even 
in the areas where the ACP has managed to influence 
the agenda to its own benefit. In such instances, the 
ACP's influence has been outweighed by the EU's 
dominance of the rules of the relationship. The 
letter's control of the rules has resulted in an 
interpretation or implementation of these areas in a 
manner which has often run counter to the ACP's 
intention. Control of financing is a critical element 
in any relationship and Lomé is a vivid example of 
that fact. The role of the ACP has been limited to the 
implementation of projects and programmes. The funding 
of these programmes and the ultimate authority for 
them rest with the EU in the form of the EDF 
Committee. Finally, the ACP's indecision on many 
issues contrasts starkly with the public unanimity in 
the EU's negotiating positions. This indecision helps 
to transmit a sense of ACP vulnerability to the other 
side.
3.2.3 Command of Information
The third area of the internal factors in 
bargaining capacity covers the command of the 
information available to the two parties. In this 
area, 1 examine the knowledge of each other's position
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i.e., of their "win-set" in Putnam's terminology,^^ and 
suasion. the relative ability to influence each 
other's position through contact or persuasion.
Knowledge of Each Other's Position: An important 
aspect of the bargaining process is the knowledge 
which the parties have of the negotiating options of 
their adversaries. Each party to the negotiations has 
a set of parameters which serve, on the upper echelon, 
as the maximum acceptable and as the optimal 
agreement. At the lower limit, they represent the 
point below which the negotiators cannot go and as the 
point below which agreement is not possible. The 
series of options in between those points all fall 
within the scope for negotiations. Of course, the 
respective ranges of negotiable options of the various 
parties do not always coincide. Nor is it readily 
discernible what the range for any party is likely to 
be. What is of great import is how accurately any one 
party can determine the acceptable range of another. 
Such information will allow the informed party to 
gauge how far it can push the other side in 
negotiation. It can also determine what, within its 
own range of options, will both prove acceptable to 
the other side and maximise its own gains.
In the context of the Lomé relationship, the 
knowledge of the other's position is a function of 
analytical capabilities and of awareness of the 
other's economic conditions. It can immediately be 
seen that the Lomé relationship is highly asymmetric.
The concept of the "win-set" or parameters for 
bargaining is developed in Putnam, "Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics..." op. cit., pp.435-452.
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It involves only a minuscule portion of the EU's 
global economic activity. However, for almost all the 
ACP states, its impact is comprehensive, affecting all 
sectors of their economies. It covers trade, 
agriculture, finance and industrial development. Thus, 
in the normal conduct of affairs within Lomé, the 
scope is there for the consideration of anything and 
everything within the ACP economies. On the contrary, 
it allows for the consideration of very little in the 
EU's. At the widest level, therefore, the EU starts 
with a decided advantage in the command of information 
from the normal management of the Convention.
This natural advantage was increased by 
developments within Lomé III and IV. They led to the 
institution of a policy dialogue as part of the 
programming exercise for each ACP state benefitting 
from the Convention. The dialogue covers the 
developmental priorities of the state and helps decide 
how the assistance from the EU can contribute to those 
priorities. Again, as a matter of course, the EU is 
made aware of the policy options and parameters of all 
ACP states. There exists no comparable mechanism, for 
the latter, which allows discussion on the EU 
development policies. Lomé is, after all, merely one 
multilateral dimension of Community policy as distinct 
from the individual, bilateral programmes of the 
member states.
There is another negative factor facing the ACP. 
There exists no vehicle, or indeed reason, for the ACP 
states themselves to acquire greater knowledge of each
These developments are discussed in Sections 
2 .1.1 and 2 .1.2 above.
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other's conditions. Indeed, logic and practical 
experience suggest that the individual state guards 
jealously any information on its economic position. 
The fear is that the knowledge might be used by 
others, to its detriment, in discussions with donors. 
The ACP thus has less awareness, than does the EU, of 
each other's economy and "win-set". The EU's command 
of knowledge in this sphere is magnified by donor 
coordination. The Community maintains regular contact 
with the MFls which monitor the economic and financial 
policies of the ACP.
At the technical level, the study of the 
Secretariats^ demonstrated that the EU was much better 
equipped to perceive the problems of economic crisis 
and to identify the policies needed to meet the 
problem. Those tasks require certain data-gathering, 
analytical and technocratic requirements which are 
beyond the capabilities of the ACP Secretariat and, 
perhaps, of most ACP state. The Commission is more 
capable of mobilising both the skills and the human 
resources needed. The ACP is a collective example of 
countries with limited abilities to meet the capacity 
needed for effective management of the developmental 
demands of adjustment.^ These limitations are further 
compounded by the unwillingness of the individual 
states to subordinate their particular interests to a 
common, unified group interest.
Suasion : The ACP also has a limited ability to
55 See Section 3.2.1 above.
See Thomas Callaghy, "Towards State Capability 
and Embedded Liberalism...", op. cit., pp. 120-22 for 
an analysis of the demands which adjustment place on 
state capability.
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affect the formation of opinion and position in the 
EU. There have been periodic efforts to mobilise 
public opinion in support of ACP objectives but the 
results have been mixed at best. The most common 
manifestation has been to lobby support on the quantum 
of EDF resources at the end of the negotiations of the 
Convention. The ACP Group has regularly lobbied the 
European Parliament on the issue when, as has occurred 
on each occasion, the Community declaration has fallen 
short of ACP expectations. Forces in the Parliament, 
sympathetic to the ACP position, would use the threat 
of a veto of the entire Convention to browbeat the COM 
of the Community into increasing the level of funding. 
However, the threat has usually worn off after time as 
consensus was achieved between the internal Community 
bodies.
Similarly, the ACP has failed in its objectives 
when it sought to mobilise the press on matters 
central to its perceived interests. Such was the 
result of its efforts on contentious issues i.e., 
sugar and rice, which emerged from the enlargement of 
the Community to include Portugal and Spain. The 
results have not always been negative for the ACP. It 
was on the issue of sugar that the ACP achieved its 
most notable success in lobbying within the Community. 
The satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations to 
include sugar in Lomé I depended on an accommodation 
being made with Community beet producers. It marked a 
significant convergence of the two competitive 
interests, ACP cane and EEC beet producers.
The convergence did not last as enlargement 
forced competition for market shares in one of the new 
member states, Portugal. The Portuguese market had a
164
stated demand for some 300,000 tonnes of sugar. Its 
preferred choice was for cane sugar which was its 
traditional import and for which the refinery capacity 
existed. That choice posed two problems. The first was 
for the Community which did not want to increase its 
imports of ACP cane sugar under the Sugar Protocol. It 
was thus unwilling to enter into a commitment to 
satisfy Portugal's import needs with cane sugar. The 
Community also did not wish to have the cane sugar 
exporters benefit at the expense of domestic beet 
producers.
The second problem was for the producers 
themselves. With such a large increment at stake, the 
struggle for the Portuguese market brought the cane 
and beet producers into clear conflict. Both sets of 
producers have lobbied furiously for a greater share. 
The issue arose with the accession of Portugal in 
1986. It should have been resolved during the period 
of transitional measures covering Portugal's 
accession. It had not been resolved by the end of the 
Mid-Term Review in mid-1995. It continued to be 
governed by a special measure which requires the ACP 
producers to make annual requests to supply the 
Portuguese market.Each annual set of requests was 
then treated by the Community as a distinct exercise 
which is separate from the Sugar Protocol. The 
Community faced a difficult choice, either increase 
the Protocol or to enter into a final allocation which 
might place the beet producers at a disadvantage.
The sugar producers in the ACP did maintain a
See Annex XXVlll of Lomé IV as revised by the 
agreement signed in Mauritius, op. cit.
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commonality of interest with the European cane sugar 
refiners and European national parliamentarians in 
constituencies where cane sugar refining was 
important.58 This coalition has been important in 
promoting and defending ACP sugar interests. However, 
it has been one of their few successes. It has had a 
diminishing effect as the sugar issue has become 
caught up in the compromises of the Uruguay Round. The 
conclusions which led to the creation of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) demand a reduction of EU 
sugar exports on the world market. It has led to 
adverse effects on the price offered to domestic 
producers and ACP exporters. The ability of the 
ACP/refiner coalition to influence Community sugar 
policy has been limited by the need to satisfy the 
global concessions.
The ACP gained much less from the lobbying of the 
officials and entities directly involved with the 
implementation of the Lomé Convention. There are 
examples where an individual state has been able to 
obtain support from the Commission or EU states on a 
specific issue. Individual success has not usually 
been translated to a collective success for the ACP 
Group as a whole. The individual success was often a 
demonstration of links between high officials in the 
capitals of ACP states and comparable figures in the 
EU or in the Commission.
5® The ACP Sugar Sub-committee holds regular 
meetings with the major sugar refiners e.g., Tate & 
Lyle to discuss matters of common interest. 
Periodically, usually annually, meetings are also held 
by the Sub-committee with British Members of 
Parliament and trade unionists representing workers 
in sugar-related areas.
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The EU has been much more successful at 
developing and benefitting from such links than has 
the ACP. The EU has done so in two ways. The first was 
a residue of the early, pre-Lomé days of association 
when the Association of African states and Madagascar 
(AASM) countries were represented diplomatically in 
Brussels by EC states. There remained, from that early 
relationship, a continuing closeness. It existed 
principally between the Francophone ACP states, which 
comprised the AASM, and the Community. That closeness 
consisted of high-level contact and personal 
acquaintances and had been demonstrated in several 
ways over the duration of the Conventions. The most 
dramatic had been their use to override decisions of 
ACP representatives in Brussels. During the 
negotiations for Lomé IV, the Gabonese Ambassador, 
serving as ACP spokesman in the working group on PMDT, 
was recalled home in the middle of the negotiations. 
The common belief within the ACP was that France had 
objected to his firmness on the issue and had 
complained to his Government.
The second form of suasion used by the EU derived 
from technical contacts. These had built up between 
senior ACP officials involved in Lomé matters and 
representatives of the EU and the Commission. Many ACP 
states customarily sent high-ranking officials from 
the capital to lobby and discuss important projects 
with the EU. Similarly, the programming exercise for 
each national indicative programme (NIP) allowed for 
further high-level contact between the Commission and 
officials in the capitals. It was out of those 
contacts that the linkages developed. At another 
level, the Commission Delegates in the ACP capitals 
worked closely with the designated National
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Authorising Officers (NAOs) who were often Ministers 
or very senior officials. Again, the contacts which 
arose led to an ease of access for the Delegates to 
ACP policymakers. This access was often used when the 
EU needed to persuade the national Government of its 
point of view.
It was also used to lobby the individual 
Governments against the collective view of the ACP in 
Brussels. One example of suasion through high-level 
contacts was offered by the case of the Caribbean 
regional programme at the end of Lomé III. The 
Commission was concerned that it faced criticism over 
the fact that there had not been an adequate 
disbursement of funds allocated to the programme. It 
wished to show a much higher level of utilisation of 
the funds. Every effort was made, therefore, to find 
last-minute projects which could be approved and 
initiated to increase the level of disbursement. In 
spite the fact that a regional list of programmes had 
been agreed by the Community and by the Caribbean 
Governments, two different Prime Ministers were 
encouraged to submit late projects directly to the 
Commission.
The two projects were the provision of student 
housing for the Jamaican campus of the University of 
the West Indies and the construction of an airport on 
an island in the Grenadines off St. Vincent. Only the 
latter project had been proposed by by St. Vincent to 
the regional forum but it had failed to gain 
acceptance within the regional mechanism. Nonetheless, 
they were hastily approved, by the Commission, to
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boost the disbursement level. The revealing aspect of 
the example Is the fact that the contact was at the 
highest level of Government In the two states. It 
demonstrated the range of suasion exercised In the 
Lomé relationship.
The Importance of such suasion should not be 
underestimated because It has resulted In an affinity 
between ACP policy-makers In the capitals and EU 
political and technical officials. The affinity was 
not based solely on an appreciation of the Issues In 
Brussels but on two other factors as well. It was 
based on what national benefits the ACP officials 
considered likely and on the possibilities, which the 
EU saw, of Influencing decisions. The affinity was 
also generated by a common perception: Lomé concerns, 
being technical In nature, were only truly understood 
by technical agencies I.e., subject Ministries In 
capitals and the Commission.
In such a perception, the role of the diplomats 
In Brussels Is a necessary Inconvenience: they are
facilitators, not primary actors. In the detailed 
operations of the Convention. It Is thus relatively 
simple for Informal discussions to take place outside 
of the bilateral ACP-EU context. It Is also easy for 
Information to be shared, and conclusions reached, 
through these Informal contacts. I have touched, 
earlier, on the type of dialogue which accompanies the 
FMOs covering Stabex transfers. In this dialogue, 
there Is, most often, a direct contact between 
Commission officials and policy-makers In ACP
59 Discussions with CARICOM officials dealing with 
the regional programme within the Caribbean Forum.
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capitals.60
There is a third area in which the EU's superior 
command of information was unquestionable. It was the 
EU which had produced the first draft of 
conditionality proposals and thus set the basis for 
discussion. In any form of bargaining, it is a 
critical advantage to have the other side negotiate on 
one's terms or one's text. The EU succeeded in doing 
so by providing the terms of reference for 
negotiation. The ACP could only react to that 
initiative. It proved extremely difficult for the 
Group to overcome the EU's advantage. As outlined in 
the previous Chapter, the ACP could offer little 
technical or other recourse to the Community's 
proposals. The conclusions of the Mid-Term Review 
demonstrate that the outcome was, in the main, a 
ratification of the initial Community proposals.The 
ACP did manage to overcome the various linkages, such 
as that between Stabex transfers and structural 
adjustment support, which had been proposed. However, 
the basic premise of multiple conditionality - the 
myriad forms of cross-conditionality connecting 
political, social and economic obligations - was 
maintained intact.
See Section 2.1.4.
See Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.4.4.
The negotiation of multiple conditionality in 
the Mid-Term Review is covered in Chapter 4.
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3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CONDITIONALITY NEGOTIATIONS
The conclusions of the foregoing analysis of the 
internal factors are not favourable to the ACP and 
show a preponderant capacity in favour of the EU. The 
latter has a greater command of information, both in 
its knowledge of the other side's position and options 
and in the specifics gained from the operation of the 
Conventions. All the EU organs - the Commission, the 
COM and the Parliament - have acquired increased 
standing and authority since the beginning of Lomé. 
The increased stature does not necessarily derive from 
the Convention itself but rather from the deepening of 
the integration process within the Community. Their 
coherence and organisational strength have both 
improved during that time.
On the contrary, the ACP has shown little 
organisational strengthening during that period. In a 
number of areas - coalition building, regional 
groupings and consensus - the ACP has not been able to 
overcome inherent weaknesses and mutual suspicions. 
The internal strength lies with the EU: this is
readily apparent in the areas of human and technical 
resources, information and cohesion. The examination 
of the internal factors supports the view that it has 
been the EU which has gained more weight from the 
relationship. It would thus be better able to mobilise 
that weight during bargaining on conditionality.
The identification of strategy and tactics is a 
general but important aspect of the bargaining process 
between the ACP and the Community. An examination of 
the three substantial memoranda prepared for the
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negotiation of Lomé II, III and IV^  ^ revealed a major 
deficiency in ACP preparedness. It also provided an 
instructive guide to the bargaining capacity which the 
ACP will command.
The deficiency lies in the lack of attention 
given to negotiation strategy and tactics. Only in one 
of the three, that for Lomé III,^ were there a 
detailed consideration and elaboration of the 
negotiating options available to the Group. The 
section covered the negotiating process, the duration 
and structure of negotiations, procedures, choices and 
possible negotiating postures of both sides. The 
corresponding section on strategy in the subsequent 
memorandum for Lomé IV spanned a grand total of three 
pages and dealt with the issue in a very cursory 
m a n n e r . G5 The contrast between the two documents helps 
to substantiate the view that the ACP's organisational 
structure was woefully lacking in its preparedness for 
negotiation. It had failed to develop the necessary 
tactical options for negotiation of the Convention on 
two of the three occasions.
Where the Group did explore such options in the 
Lomé 111 memorandum, the recommendations proved to be
1 have dealt with these three memoranda as they 
were the ones drawn up by the ACP as a whole. The
initial negotiating documents, prepared in advance of 
Lomé 1, were prepared as regional texts representing 
the views of the three regions.
Memorandum on The Position of the ACP Group in 
its Future Relations with the European Economic
Communities (ACP/0023/83 NEC (Rev.4), pp.120-140.
See Memorandum on ACP Guidelines for the 
Negotiations for a Fourth ACP/EEC Convention 
(ACP/00/012/88 NEG Rev.2), pp.176-178.
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most interesting. They highlighted many of the 
shortcomings which have been raised in my examination 
above. The recommendations stressed the need for
continuity of representation. They urged that a 
Ministerial spokesman "be ready to display the
necessary discipline and sacrifice of time and effort 
required without which he is unlikely to be able to 
effectively discharge his undertaking to the ACP."^^ 
The recommendations also underlined the need to avoid 
inter-regional friction over the choice of negotiators 
and areas of interest.
The Memorandum singled out for particular mention 
the risks involved in achieving and maintaining group 
consensus. The hope was thus to avoid cross-party 
alliances which might serve to "relieve a pressing 
individual national problem or difficulty for the 
particular s t a t e . I t  recognised the need for
suasion, on the part of the ACP, through contact with
European public opinion, press and Community 
Ambassadors and capitals. It also highlighted the 
limitations of the ACP Secretariat and the need for 
the ACP to be able to defend its positions on sound 
technical terms. In addressing those problems, the 
Memorandum called for a strengthening of the technical 
expertise of the Secretariat through the provision of 
officials from ACP states and regional organisations.^®
The negotiating brief urged that the ACP should 
"always have clearly in view not only its overall
Memorandum on the Position of the ACP 
Group...", op. cit., p.126.
Ibid. , p. 137 . 
Ibid., p.138.
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objectives and principles, but the specific objectives 
in each negotiating area, with the priorities clearly 
s t a t e d . T h a t  was a plea for consistent preparation 
of the type which had produced the section itself 
i.e., an elaboration of strategy. It was a message 
which was to be ignored. The ACP Group, as noted 
above, failed to do so for the next round of 
negotiations in Lomé IV. That failure provided ample 
proof that the ACP remained afflicted by severe
organisational constraints. The Group, while fully 
aware of the limitations with which it was beset, had 
been unable to overcome them. The implications for 
bargaining on multiple conditionality are self- 
evident .
3.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS : COUNTERVAILING CAPACITY
It is clear, from the above, that the ACP 
Group suffers from a disparity in weight in the 
factors, internal to Lomé, which affect bargaining. 
One mechanism for offsetting the advantages of the EU 
would have been to build up strengths outside the 
relationship i.e., a countervailing capacity. I 
examine the external factors in four areas: group
presence; external credibility; coordination and 
domestic manoeuvrability.
3.4.1 GROUP PRESENCE
I contend that, in order to mobilise external
support, the two sides needed to demonstrate that they
had projected their Group's recognition beyond Lomé. 
My focus here covers the composite areas of external
Ibid., p. 135.
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prestige, external projection and association.
External Prestige: A comparison of the external 
prestige of the two groups reveals that the EU has 
better managed to build up its prestige. On the other 
hand, the ACP, in spite of certain inherent advantages 
which it carried, has lost merit. The EU has exerted 
a growing presence and heightened prestige through the 
numbers and the sheer economic size which it 
represents. It comprises fifteen member states but 
they contain over 300 million people. As an economic 
grouping, the EU stands as one of the three global 
pivots of economic growth, rivalled only by Japan and 
the United States.
The EU's prestige has been enhanced by the 
efforts which it has been making at deepening its 
integration process. They include the forging of a 
Single Market, the expansion of its membership and the 
attempts at closer harmonisation of internal policy 
among its members. The EU has maintained an important 
presence in international fora, including representing 
the member states in matters of international trade. 
A concrete manifestation of the EU's external prestige 
is the fact that its President and the President of 
the Commission are bona fide members of the Group of 
Seven, the group of leaders^ who meet to discuss 
global economic policy. These several aspects of 
external presence portray the EU to the world as a 
large, cohesive and economically strong grouping
It should be noted that the President of the EU 
participates in the meetings of the Group of Seven 
when the country in the post of President is not an 
automatic member of the Group. The automatic members 
are France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. The President 
of the Commission is always present.
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forging ever-closer links among its members. 71
In the case of the ACP, the experience has been 
much the opposite. The ACP Group started with several 
factors which militated in favour of a greater 
external presence. The ACP was in the unique position 
of being the only formalised Third World grouping. It 
had the experience of a long, negotiated association 
with a representative group of developed countries. It 
had done so at a time when the Third World, as 
represented by the Group of 77 (G-77), had failed to
move the industrialised world towards negotiation on 
perceived concerns. Further, the association had been 
based on substantive issues of economics and 
development, not on the non-binding discussions which 
characterised international economic fora. The 
experience, therefore, should have endowed the ACP 
with unique qualities. It was in a position to serve 
as a stimulus to, and living laboratory for, the 
fashioning of G-77 policy for negotiating with the 
North.
The reality was quite the opposite as the ACP did 
not manage to build on its inherent strengths. If 
external prestige is to be measured by international 
recognition, then the ACP has an extremely low 
prestige. It suffers the ignominy of not even 
commanding observer status in fora such as the United 
Nations (UN) or the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Nonetheless, sub-sets of the Group -
I am not attempting here to make a value
judgement on the merits of closer EU integration or of
a confederal Europe, an issue which is evoking very 
strong feelings among domestic groups in most member
states. I am merely reflecting what I perceive to be
the view held by the wider international community.
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CARICOM, the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS), 
the South Pacific Forum (SPF) - all enjoy such 
standing. This discrepancy was visibly manifested at 
the GATT High-Level Meeting in Brussels in December, 
1991 where the ACP Secretariat had no accreditation. 
It thus had no means of helping to coordinate 
positions among its members on topics of critical 
import to the Group. It had to petition ACP states to 
include its officials in national delegations so as to 
establish a presence.^
Projection and Association: As a derivative of 
its external prestige, the EU has acquired an external 
projection which is high-profile and well recognised. 
This profile is enhanced by its involvement in 
resolving issues such as trade disputes, whether with 
the USA on agriculture in the GATT or with Japan on 
import barriers. The image created is that of a 
collective body committed to the defense of the 
interests of its members. Its external projection has 
also been increased by the efforts which the EU has 
made in areas other than the economic. These efforts 
include the coordination in foreign and defence policy 
and action in the former Yugoslavia. In the area of 
association, the EU has also expanded the scope of its 
interaction. It has done so through the expansion of 
its membership and the extension of cooperation 
programmes to several other European states.
The ACP Group has been noticeably less successful 
in both areas. It has had a relative lack of success 
in building up its external prestige. The poor record 
has resulted in the Group being unable to project
Interviews with ACP officials in Brussels.
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itself significantly, outside of the Lomé 
relationship. The level of recognition which the Group 
enjoys is particularly low. Within its own member 
states, the ACP Group and its purpose are largely 
unknown.^ Internationally, its external projection is 
equally low, as was demonstrated earlier by its 
external representation. The weakness of the ACP's 
group presence is especially marked in the area of 
association. Its weakness is apparent in both its 
internal association and its external relationship to 
other groups of developing countries.
One indicator of strength of association lies in 
the growth of internal coordination and cooperation on 
different issues. In the case of the ACP, the growth 
would be visible in efforts made at achieving at 
technical and economic cooperation within the ACP. 
Such cooperation marks the degree to which the Group 
has been able to forge a common reality beyond its 
incarnation in the Lomé relationship. The history of 
the Group has, indeed, been marked by several attempts 
at cooperation which led to high-level Declarations, 
such as those of Suva and Kingston.
The Declarations laid out the objectives of 
intra-ACP cooperation and programmes designed to 
achieve those objectives. Despite the laudable 
intentions, the objectives have not been attained for 
one main reason. The programmes were too general in 
nature, covering too wide a range of sectors. No 
priority was identified among the sectors and
See Mgbere, Cooperation between the European 
Community and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries..., op. cit., passim.
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projects. The ACP has not been able to initiate any of 
the projects in those programmes. Thus, by one measure 
of association, internal cooperation, the ACP has 
failed in its efforts.
At the wider, external level, there has been a 
long separation between the ACP and the larger G-77 on 
a basis of functional specialisation. The ACP focused 
on the "hard", beneficial issues of economic 
cooperation while the G-77 was seen as concentrating 
on the more nebulous, "policy" issues of international 
economic relations. That distinction led to the ACP 
deferring, to the G-77, on issues with global 
implications unless they impinged on the substantive 
issues of ACP-EU cooperation. The ACP concentrated on 
its Lomé agenda and left the representation of its 
members on wider issues to the G-77. The deference to 
the G-77 had a deleterious effect on the external 
projection and association of the ACP. The eclipse of 
the North-South dialogue has led to the lowering of 
the profile and involvement of the G-77. With the 
decline of the G-77, the ACP has also lost its 
principal channel for dealing with issues of 
international significance. Its external projection 
has thus been further reduced.
3.4.2 External Credibility
The credibility of the two groups has also been 
an important aspect of their efforts to build a 
countervailing power. This credibility, as it relates 
to multiple conditionality, rests on their perceived 
ability to handle financial and technical matters.
Financial & Technical Matters: The EU, as part of
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its own programme of integration and harmonisation of 
policy, has acquired a growing expertise in dealing 
with financial and technical matters. Thus, the EU, in 
its own right, carries a significant measure of 
credibility in such matters. As a major multilateral 
donor, the Community is involved in the routine 
contact among donors, whether on an informal basis or 
in the ambit of the OECD.^ '* The EU has also gained a 
specific knowledge of the economies of the ACP states 
from its control and management of the Conventions. It 
is in the last area that the distinction between the 
credibilities of the two groups is most marked. As a 
measure of the financial and technical expertise of 
the EU on ACP countries, it is with the Community that 
the MFIs consult on issues concerning the ACP.
The ACP, on the contrary, suffers from a total 
lack of credibility in the financial and technical 
spheres. The Group's standing may be low in many 
areas, given its lack of technical and human 
resources. However, its status is particularly low in 
the more specialised areas of finance and 
macroeconomics. The ACP, as a Group or Secretariat, 
has little external credibility in these areas, as 
demonstrated by the attitude of the MFIs. The MFIs 
discuss ACP economies either with the individual state 
or with the EU as a body which has a collective view 
of the ACP Group. There is no contact between the MFIs 
and the ACP Secretariat despite the letter's long
In my interviews with Commission officials, I 
was made aware of the direct involvement of the 
Commission in various policy and research groups in 
both the OECD and the MFIs in Washington. In the 
latter case, one such group is the Special Programme 
for Africa looking at economic reform and political 
liberalisation.
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record of association as a Group.
Moreover, it is in the estimation of its members 
that the ACP suffers most. As part of the operation of 
the Conventions, the ACP states should supply reports, 
to the Secretariat, on their experiences in various 
aspects of the Convention. Such details have been 
requested on trade benefits and problems, on project 
implementation and on regional cooperation. The
experience of the ACP Secretariat in obtaining that 
information has not been good. The states have 
generally failed to provide the information. They have 
retained it because they regard it as private. They 
have also refused because they regard the ACP
Secretariat as lacking the necessary authority to 
lobby their cause effectively.^^
This reluctance is particularly noticeable in the 
area of project assistance and finance. It is an area 
where the conduct of individual programmes is
considered to be sensitive and not a matter for the 
general consumption of the Group. The experience
following the ratification of Lomé IV offers an 
example of the Group's assessment of its collective 
credibility on financial and technical matters. There 
were provisions in the Convention relating to 
investment and structural adjustment. The ACP 
Secretariat, in appreciation of that fact, created new 
posts to service the new areas. Nonetheless, the 
authority to finance the new posts was withheld by the 
ACP COM because it felt that there was no urgent need 
for their services. At the time of writing, the posts
This assessment was gleaned from my discussions 
with various ACP officials and representatives.
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are still not fully f i l l e d . I t  remains doubtful 
whether the flow of the necessary information from the 
individual states will be sufficient to justify 
filling the posts. ACP states have not been willing to 
circulate statistics on national economies. It is thus 
unlikely that, in cases of sensitive financial 
matters, details will be made available to the 
inexperienced officials of the ACP Secretariat.
The implementation of the structural adjustment 
provisions in Lomé IV also serves as a useful 
indicator of ACP credibility. The provisions were 
included in the Convention to address some of the 
neglected aspects of adjustment programmes in the ACP 
states. In spite of the creation of a post to handle 
adjustment matters, the ACP's effort at implementation 
has faced a major obstacle in dealing with sensitive 
areas of the domestic economy. The states have 
divulged little or nothing of their individual 
experiences, either under Lomé or with the MFIs, to 
make the task of the Secretariat feasible.
The introduction of multiple conditionality adds 
a sociopolitical dimension to the sensitive areas of 
economic adjustment. Therein lies another important 
reason why the ACP states consider a likely role for 
the Secretariat as inconsequential. Until the 
introduction of conditionality, the implementation of 
the Conventions has deliberately steered clear of 
political issues. The ACP Secretariat has not had the 
opportunity to gain political credibility and has 
never been involved in the domestic affairs of its
There is an officer in one of the posts on a 
temporary basis.
182
members. Very few states trust either its judgement or 
its command of skills. To a large extent, this is due 
to its total lack of experience in intra-ACP 
cooperation which is one area upon which such trust 
could have been built.^
3.4.3 Coordination
One further area from which the EU has gained 
external countervailing power is that of donor 
coordination. The coordination has been pursued within 
the EU itself and, externally, among groups of donors. 
The EU has drawn closer to a common, coordinated 
approach to development at the bilateral and Community 
levels. The consensus on the introduction of multiple 
conditionality is one indication of such coordination. 
The internal consensus has been strengthened by the 
growing coordination, generally, among international 
d o n o r s . The wider coordination has been evident 
within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the MFIs where common 
approaches are constantly being fashioned and 
reaffirmed.^ The coordination among donors has a 
special significance for the application of 
conditionality to recipients. It helps to ensure that
The ACP's failings in intra-ACP cooperation was 
briefly discussed in the previous section. An example, 
the project on the ACP roster of experts, is treated 
in more detail in Section 5.2 below.
See Nelson and Eglington, Global Goals, 
Contentious Means..., op. cit., pp.83-86 for a 
description of donor coordination.
See, for example, OECD, "DAC Orientations On 
Participatory Development And Good Governance", 
Vol.II, No.2 (OECD Working Papers, 1994).
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the latter face a common series of donor criteria.
All that I have noted thus far - the lack of 
intra-ACP cooperation, low level of information shared 
and the sensitivity of information - argues in favour 
of a Community superiority in the area of 
coordination. However, there are factors which suggest
that the ACP might be able to mobilise some
countervailing power in this area. As raised earlier, 
most ACP states have undergone, or are presently
undergoing, conditionality programmes. They have thus 
gained some experience in dealing with such 
programmes. Such states have a vested interest in 
ensuring that the conditions imposed by the EU do not 
present burdens additional to those already being 
faced. Accordingly, they should be willing to place 
their pool of knowledge at the disposal of the Group.
Secondly, while donor coordination does allow for 
a common approach to the treatment of recipients, it 
can also give rise to conflicts in programme
objectives among donors. There are already indications 
that the Community has enunciated views, in the 
councils of the MFIs, which deviate from the 
traditional positions. The EU has insisted that the 
traditional prescriptions for adjustment and 
conditionality should be moderated to take account of 
the particular circumstances of the individual 
recipient :
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"... the studies seem to underline that the
insistence of outsiders on the implementation of 
a variety of reforms did not always contribute to 
internalize the responsibility for the economic 
reform programme. The excessive use of
conditionality tends to distract governments from 
working out more long-term, coherent development 
strategies, adapted to the political economy, 
administrative capacity and economic potential 
of their countries. .
The Community had long recognised this distinction, as
demonstrated by its SAS proposed in Lomé IV. Its
approach had been fashioned to meet the failure of
standardised programmes to address adequately the
social dimensions of adjustment.
Even as I recognise these potentially positive 
features of coordination for the ACP, I must also 
acknowledge that there are offsetting, negative
factors. First, the implementation of the SAS in Lomé 
has demonstrated that the ACP states have been 
unwilling to contribute or share information on 
certain areas of the national economy. This is a fact 
which does not bode well for future cooperation on 
multiple conditionality. Secondly, the history of Lomé 
has also shown that the ACP states have shared a long 
and varied involvement in aid programmes. However, as 
the underlying rationale of this thesis would 
indicate, that common knowledge has not proved very 
useful to the Group in dealing with the Community. 
There is, therefore, no reason to assume that the 
Group will be able to mobilise its conditionality
European Commission, "The Design of Economic 
Reforms in the Context of Political Liberalisation", 
p.20. (The emphasis is my own). This potential 
difference in the EU's approach is developed in 
Chapter 6.
See Section 2.1.3.
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experience more successfully.
The EU's implementation of the SAS programme has 
already revealed a closer coordination with other 
donors and the MFIs.®- There is no reliable indication 
that the EU will be any more disposed to blaze an 
individual path in the much more complex arena of 
multiple conditionality. Finally, the Community, like 
other donors, has always sought to keep recipients 
isolated by insisting on a case-by-case treatment of 
states in matters relating to debt and adjustment. 
There are thus two factors encouraging a continuing 
lack of ACP coordination: the internal ACP
unwillingness to share information and the Community's 
strategy to deal with the states on an individual 
basis.
3.4.4 Manoeuvrability
This aspect of bargaining capacity draws upon the 
study by Thomas Callaghy on state capability®® in which 
he looks at the role of the state in economic 
adjustment. Callaghy categorises the prevailing 
political economy of the industrial countries as a 
"compromise of embedded liberalism".®^ It is a policy
®® In my interview with Deputy Director-General 
Peter Pooley, he outlined the form in which such donor 
coordination has already been effectively organised. 
Individual donors assume responsibility for separate 
components, matched to their relative strengths and 
interests, within adjustment programmes.
®® Thomas Callaghy, "Towards State Capability and 
Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for
Adjustment" op. cit.
®^ The term is borrowed from John Gerard Ruggie. 
See Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and
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of commitment to international economic liberalism 
along with the use of state power to minimise its 
domestic social consequences. The policy has been 
succinctly described by James Mayall as "Keynes at 
home and Smith abroad". Callaghy argues that the 
policy has not been extended to the developing world. 
He suggests that there are lessons for the developing 
world to be gained from embedded liberalism. He 
contends that successful adjustment requires linking 
liberalisation and domestic political stability as a 
form of embedded liberalism.
There is a growing realisation of the importance 
of the linkage among the donors and the countries 
undergoing adjustment. The realisation is evidenced by 
the Community's stress on the adaptability of 
adjustment programnries®^  and the almost universal 
commitment of the Third World to economic 
liberalisation.87 There remain at least two problems. 
The first stems from the extent to which this 
realisation has influenced donor policy. The 
recognition of the need for the linkage may exist.
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic
Order", International Organization, Vol.36, No.2 
(Spring, 1982), pp. 379-415.
8^ Cited in Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy 
of International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), p.355.
8^ See Section 3.4.3 above for an outline of the 
Community's position.
87 In his study, Callaghy cites various examples, 
including Ghana, Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Zambia. 
See Callaghy, "Towards State Capability...", op. cit., 
pp. 122-128. The ACP, for its part, committed itself 
to market economics and an enhanced role for the 
private sector in Lomé IV.
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However, it is still subordinate to ensuring that 
developing countries commit themselves, above all, to 
a pure form of economic liberalism. The second problem 
arises from the limited capabilities of developing 
countries to create and manage the compromise of 
embedded liberalism in the face of conditionalities.^ 
It requires them to undergo interlinked economic and 
political processes at the domestic and international 
levels simultaneously.
It is the capacity to manage the compromise which 
I have characterised as "manoeuvrability" i.e., the 
availability of options for action. In this regard, I 
look at three areas: the existence of embedded
liberalism; domestic capacity; and alternative sources 
of assistance.
It is necessary to make a general comment before 
examining the topic in detail. Manoeuvrability applies 
much less, if at all, to the EU than it does to the 
ACP. Constraints on manoeuvrability for donors are 
limited since they are the ones who impose the 
conditions and, consequently, have little need for 
options. In the case of Lomé, the history of the 
Conventions has shown that there is a very small 
constituency, within the domestic polities of EU 
states, in favour of the ACP Group and its interests. 
The value of Lomé for the EU has diminished over time 
and, accordingly, the Convention has slipped down the 
agenda of concerns within the Community. The concerns 
about reliability of commodity supplies and the moral 
and colonial ties within EU member states which 
militated in favour of the initial Convention have all
Ibid., p.120.
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diminished. There is, therefore, little possibility of 
domestic pressure against the EU's treatment of the 
ACP. If anything, domestic pressure, within the
Community, is likely to be in favour of stricter
conditions in the disbursement of EU assistance. The 
EU is facing strong demands for the application of 
accountability, efficiency and economy in the use of 
its funds for both internal and external purposes. In 
such a context, it is only to be expected that the 
desire will be to subject the allocations to the Lomé
Convention to critical consideration and strict
conditions.
I have, accordingly, focused on the ACP in my 
treatment of manoeuvrability. The scope for pursuing 
a policy of embedded liberalism, within the ACP 
states, has changed greatly during the existence of 
the Convention. The Lomé Convention began as an 
arrangement in which political elements were 
specifically excluded. As I noted at the very outset, 
one of the distinctive features of the relationship 
was the recognition that the Convention was based on 
a respect for the sovereignty and developmental 
choices of the ACP states.This delineation was well 
respected by the EU and remained in effect until the 
end of Lomé III.
The ACP states were, in theory, free to pursue 
their chosen types of economic and political logic 
without constraint from the Lomé Convention. The 
operation of the Convention thus hardly impinged on 
their autonomy in the domestic sphere. It is not the 
objective of this thesis to ascertain whether or not
See Introduction, pp. 17-19.
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the ACP states exercised their autonomy successfully. 
The reality was that their autonomy of action was not 
much constrained by the obligations of Lomé. By the 
time of Lomé II, however, the EU had become concerned 
at the lack of development in many, if not most, of 
the ACP states. It was particularly interested in 
pursuing, with the ACP, what was becoming a growing 
phenomenon of MFI assistance: a policy dialogue to
ensure that development assistance was granted in 
accord with the objectives of domestic economic 
policy. That quest was the essential thrust of the 
Pisani Memorandum.
While the ACP had managed to resist EU efforts to 
introduce policy dialogue during the negotiations for 
Lomé III, the dialogue had been inserted into the 
Convention by Lomé IV. It was accompanied by carefully 
couched caveats. They included the assurance that the 
dialogue would in no way impinge on the freedom of 
action of the ACP.^ However, the recent trends have 
been in the opposite direction. To a large extent, the 
changes in Lomé have been reflective of the wider 
changes in the global environment. With the end of the 
Cold War and the upsurge of liberalism, recipients of 
development assistance have been held accountable for 
their performance on several counts. These include 
their efficient use of aid funds; their observance of 
human rights; their commitment to democratic practice; 
and their adherence to market principles.
The Pisani Memorandum and its impact have been 
treated in greater detail in Chapter 2.1.1.
The progress towards the introduction of policy 
dialogue is covered in the previous Chapter. See 
Section 2.1.2.
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Within the Lomé relationship, there have also 
been changes which impacted negatively on the autonomy 
of the ACP states. These changes also reduced the 
ACP's scope for pursuing a policy of embedded 
liberalism. As detailed earlier, the experiences in 
Sudan and Burundi had drawn attention to human rights 
practices of ACP states. They encouraged both the 
European Parliament and the ACP-EU Joint Assembly to 
broaden their focus on Lomé. They began to pronounce 
not only on the implementation of the Convention but 
also on domestic issues in ACP states. The distinction 
between the economic content of Lomé and ACP socio­
political autonomy had been eroded. The erosion placed 
a serious constraint on the option of the ACP states 
to manoeuvre domestically without reflection on the 
Convention.
It is to be noted that the changes described 
above took place against the background of intrinsic 
defects in the domestic capabilities of ACP states. I 
have already touched on the bureaucratic and technical 
weaknesses of the ACP^^ but the point cannot be over­
emphasised. These weaknesses left the ACP in a 
position where the Group played an unequal role in the 
operational side of the Convention. They also meant 
that the ACP states did not possess a sufficiently 
strong capability to meet the new accountability in 
the relationship. They were unable to fashion and 
pursue the programmes which would be required. The 
deficiencies in the capabilities of the ACP states 
were increasingly met by the provision of external
The human rights issue is covered in Section
2.5.2 above.
See Section 3.2.1 above.
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expertise.94
The ACP Group was faced by a reduced scope for 
manoeuvre and by an inherently weak capacity to 
fashion policy. It also faced the post-Cold War 
reality of reduced sources of possible aid. At a 
general level, the potential pool of aid sources had 
diminished, either through greater donor coordination 
or reductions in the levels of funding in various 
countries. The geostrategic concerns which had 
motivated many aid programmes during the Cold War had 
also disappeared. The alternatives, which had formerly 
existed, had been further restricted. Many ACP states 
had themselves been suffering from economic woes and 
had been forced to undergo structural adjustment. With 
the critical scrutiny of their economic management, 
they had lost most of their traditional flows of 
development assistance. For many of these countries, 
the EU, with its ignorance of political factors, had 
remained a major support. It had remained a source of 
continued assistance during a period when they had 
been shunned by other traditional donors.
The issue of external technical assistance, and 
its relevance to Lomé, is examined more extensively in 
Chapter 5. See, for example. Sections 5.2 and 5.5.1.
Two notable cases were Guyana and Ethiopia 
during the late 1980s. One observer, the former 
Finance Minister of Guyana, pointed out that only the 
EEC and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDE) 
offered continued assistance to his country during 
this time. In the case of Ethiopia, the Commission not 
only continued its assistance under Lomé but even 
served as a "honest broker", on Ethiopia's behalf, 
with the MFIs.
192
3.5 CONCLUSION
Each aspect of countervailing capacity has been 
relevant to bargaining on conditionality. The analysis 
reveals that the EU managed to build up its external 
prestige through its international projection and 
associations. The ACP, on the other hand, has slipped 
from its early prominence of 1975 when it served as a 
demonstration of the South’s potential. It is now a 
Group with little global presence and little effect on 
international policy. The ACP is thus unlikely to be 
able to mobilise effective external support on 
conditionality, an important issue in international 
policy. The relative quiescence of the G-77 has 
deprived the ACP of both its sole vehicle for external 
projection and a possible source of external support.
Relative to the EU, the ACP suffers from a lack 
of credibility, both functionally and as a group. In 
matters of relevance to conditionality, i.e., 
financial, technical and sociopolitical issues, the 
ACP Group has had an extremely limited record of 
experience, with a poor rate of achievement. It is 
unlikely that ACP states will entrust the sensitive 
areas, covered by conditionality, to the stewardship 
of the inexperienced ACP Secretariat. Nor will it 
provide details on such issues - financial data, 
economic policy, sociopolitical options - for the 
collective information of the Group. The track record 
of the ACP in dealing with technical areas will leave 
no one confident of its ability to represent them on 
such matters. The EU is accustomed to dealing with 
financial and technical matters as part of its daily 
routine of Community affairs. The ACP, on the 
contrary, carries no external credibility as a body
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experienced in handling such issues. It is to the EU, 
not the ACP, that the MFIs turn for consultation on 
the economic situation of the ACP states. The ACP thus 
lacks credibility in the eyes of both its members and 
the external community. It also lacks the functional 
authority to handle such matters.
I have dealt earlier with the area of 
coordination^ where I indicated that the EU enjoys an 
inordinately greater supremacy. However, it is here 
that the best possibility arises for the ACP to 
benefit, in a bargaining sense. The areas of 
adjustment and conditionality are largely unchartered 
waters for both donors and recipients. The history of 
practice in adjustment is still emerging. The area of 
multiple conditionality is both more novel and more 
complex so relevant experience and reliability of 
prediction are much more sketchy. The fact is that 
neither donor nor recipient can draw much comfort from 
a coordination of approach. Unfortunately, the reality 
is that neither side, especially the donors, is 
inclined to accept this constraint.
The manoeuvres of embedded liberalism offer the 
ACP very limited options to reduce the impositions of 
conditionality. Callaghy argues that they offer the 
developing countries needed opportunities in the 
social and political spheres to manage the impact of 
economic conditionality. However, the additional 
complexity of multiple conditionality suggests 
differently. The EU appeared convinced that such 
sociopolitical manoeuvres had been a contributor to 
the failure of economic conditionality. They needed to
See Section 3.4.3 above.
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be curtailed. From the EU's perspective, the promise 
of embedded liberalism compounds the problems of 
evasion on the part of the ACP. The introduction of 
multiple conditionality, with its inclusion of 
sociopolitical criteria, thus blocks that escape valve 
for the ACP states.
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CHAPTER 4
BARGAINING CAPACITY AND CONDITIONALITY:
THE MID-TERM REVIEW
The third perspective of bargaining capacity, as 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, is that of the
expectations which the parties bring to the 
negotiations. They consist of the assumptions which 
each side has of its own and of the other side's
negotiating options as well as of the constraints on 
those options. An important component of expectations 
relates to the estimations of the parties of the
prospects for ratification of the outcome of the
negotiations.^
The expectations which negotiators carry in any 
negotiation are, of course, specific to the particular 
bargaining conditions. In looking at bargaining 
between the ACP and the Community, I will therefore 
focus on the negotiations for the Mid-Term Review. It 
is a valuable opportunity to examine the various 
expectations of the two parties in a specific context. 
1 will concentrate principally on the bargaining for 
multiple conditionality within the overall 
negotiations which is directly related to the primary 
concern of this thesis. Reference to other areas of 
negotiation, within the Mid-Term Review, are thus 
incidental to this main area.
" For a treatment of ratification, see Robert D. 
Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games", International Organization 42 
(Summer 1988), pp. 435-437.
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4 .1 EXPECTATIONS
4.1.1 Individual: ACP
The ACP Group brought a number of expectations to 
the negotiations for multiple conditionality within 
the Mid-Term Review. All of these argued in favour of 
the Group’s acquiescence to the introduction of some 
form of conditionality. The first two expectations 
were related and emanated from the Lomé relationship 
and the timing of the conditionality proposal by the 
Community. First, the ACP had no option but to 
negotiate on multiple conditionality. The initial 
inclination of the ACP was to seek to defer the 
negotiation. The main reason advanced was that it was 
a novel and unprecedented intrusion into the 
established pattern of the relationship. However, this 
approach was preempted by the timing of the proposal. 
It came in the middle of an existing Convention, a 
timing which forced the ACP Group to take a definitive 
decision. The Group had to deal with the matter at 
that point in time or it ran the risk of seeing the 
second half of the Convention placed in jeopardy. The 
Community would not be willing to continue to extend 
benefits to an ACP Group which had refused to accept 
the responsibilities and accountability which 
conditionality represented.
Secondly, there not only had to be negotiations 
on multiple conditionality but the negotiations had to 
come to a positive conclusion. Again, the concern was 
that a failure to agree might lead to the loss of the 
expected benefits of the second half of Lomé IV. There 
was, of course, opportunity for bargaining on scope, 
timing and content of the conditions. However, the
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inevitability of the decision to accept some level of 
conditionality was beyond question. Thus, the ACP was 
faced with two initial, interlinked expectations. The 
first was that multiple conditionality had to be 
negotiated during the Mid-term Review. The Group also 
had to agree to its imposition in some form lest it 
lost its access to the benefits of the second half of 
Lomé IV.
A third expectation further reinforced the 
realisation that conditionality had to be accepted. It 
stemmed from a factor which had been raised in Chapter 
3. The Group had little hope of offsetting its 
imposition through countervailing support.^ The ACP 
Group had few alternative sources of developmental 
assistance other than the Community. In any event, any 
such donor, whether multilateral or bilateral, would 
demand similar conditional provisions in return.
Finally, the Group could not be certain of 
presenting a unified stance on conditionality even if 
it wished to object to the proposals of the Community. 
It would be recalled that the Governments of several 
ACP states had benefitted from political 
liberalisation and were themselves pursuing the types 
of market-led programmes sought under the 
conditionality provisions. They included Benin, Zambia 
and Guyana. In addition to those states, there were 
others e.g., Congo and Gabon, which were committed to 
national democratic conventions. Finally, there was an 
amalgam of states, mainly Caribbean and Pacific, which
 ^ The failure of the ACP to mobilise 
countervailing support in bargaining is treated in 
Section 3.4.
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had a long history of commitment to democracy. Such 
states, for various reasons,  ^ were not strenuously 
opposed to the basic concepts of the Community's 
proposals i.e., political liberalisation, good 
governance and market reform. Consequently, the ACP 
Group was not in a position to mount a concerted 
defence against conditionality. This last fact 
provided the ACP with further reason to move towards 
acceptance of the principle of conditionality.
It is useful to note that the ratification 
process did not directly affect ACP expectations. 
However, the consideration of the loss of benefits 
from the second half of Lomé IV alerted the ACP to the 
possible consequence. Ratification did assume a 
certain importance as all members of the Group 
expected the relationship to persist, in some form, 
beyond Lomé IV. The continuation of the Convention 
would depend on the record of compliance of the ACP 
states. Each state's record of compliance with the 
provisions of conditionality would, therefore, be 
instrumental in determining its eligibility for future 
Convention benefits. There were some ACP states which 
felt that, as the implementation of conditionality lay 
in the future, there might be opportunity for 
compromise on its provisions. Their rationale was 
based on the possibility of evasion or on limited 
capacity. Indeed, the evidence from structural 
adjustment programmes has been that deliberate evasion 
on the part of recipients and slippage due to poor
 ^ The groups, within the ACP, which were 
understanding of the push for good governance have 
been discussed more extensively in Section 2.4.2.
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technical capacity have both been common features.^
This prospect of future compromise was one 
element which helped draw together the various ACP 
factions on multiple conditionality. Multiple 
conditionality depends on cross-sectoral 
conditionalities and on participation by Governmental, 
private and other non-governmental sources. The scope 
for trade-offs among the qualifying criteria are 
greater than those for adjustment. It was a view held 
by some ACP states which opposed the imposition of 
multiple conditionality. In such circumstances, an 
agreement on multiple conditionality was not 
necessarily too high a price to pay for continued Lomé 
benefits. The costs of the actual process of 
implementation i.e., the fuJ.l incidence of conditional 
burdens, lay in the uncertain future. The various ACP 
groupings could thus be reconciled. There was no need 
to justify multiple conditionality to those states 
which understood the motivation behind its 
introduction. For the opponents of multiple 
conditionality, there was some hope to be drawn from 
the possibility of future compromise.
4.1.2 INDIVIDUAL : EU
This ACP perspective was probably an optimistic 
assessment because the EU did not share the ACP's 
complex view of the implementation of multiple 
conditionality. The Community adopted a simplified 
approach to the process. The basic expectations of the
" See Chapter 1, Footnote 24 for an indicative 
list of studies on the implementation process of 
adjustment programmes.
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Community on the negotiations substantiate this fact. 
The first was born out of the progressive manner in 
which conditionality had evolved in the relationship 
and in the overwhelming superiority which it 
maintained over the ACP. In the view of the EU, the 
ACP had no other option than to accept the imposition 
of conditionality. The Community was also cognisant of 
the factors which affected the ACP. It was especially 
conscious of the fact that the latter had no 
significant alternative sources of development 
assistance.
Secondly, the Community was aware that the ACP 
states, in the main, already faced conditionality 
programmes with the MFIs and bilateral donors. The 
shock of the introduction of conditionality into the 
Lomé relationship would, therefore, be short-lived. 
Its introduction would conform to the reality of 
donor-recipient relations facing many ACP states. For 
its part, the Community has been increasingly 
building conditional elements into its external aid 
programmes, as demonstrated by its programmes with 
Eastern Europe. The ACP was being made aware of the 
fact that conditionality was becoming a sine qua non 
of Community assistance.
With respect to ratification, the EU did have to 
make a determination as to its choice of means for 
pursuing the ratification process. The Community was 
all too conscious of the limited technical capacity 
which the ACP possessed. In recognition of that fact, 
the EU had two choices. It could fashion a programme, 
adapted to that lack of capacity, with less strict 
criteria. Alternatively, it could design a more 
standard programme, with a genuine risk of seeing it
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founder on the obstacle of limited capacity. Implicit 
in both choices was a reliance on the ACP recipients 
to participate fully ir the implementation process by 
sharing the ownership of rhe programme.
The EU made its choice, during the negotiations, 
in a manner which responded ro the problem of limited 
ACP capacity. Its choice was also in keeping with its 
traditional practice of implementing Lomé provisions. 
The Community chose to outline a standard of multiple 
cross-conditionalities but it also sought to enhance 
its own powers of implementation in the Convention. I 
will return to this issue later as it is a critical 
element in the study of operational capacity in the 
Lomé relationship.5
4.2 INITIAL NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES
4.2.1 European Union
As the Community was the initiator of the 
proposal for conditionality, it is more practical to 
focus, first, on its strategy. As early as September, 
1993, the Commission had approved, in principle, the 
negotiating brief for the Mid-Term Review for 
submission to the Council for final authorisation.^ The 
actual negotiations with the ACP did not start until 
May, 1994. Commissioner Marin identified three main 
objectives in that brief. They were designed to make
 ^This element is dealt with in detail in Chapter
5.
 ^ See "The Commission Proposes the Review of 
Certain Provisions of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention", 
Press Release of the European Commission, (IP (93) 736, 
9 September, 1993).
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Community support for ACP development more effective 
"in the light of recent developments on the 
international political stage and of the lessons 
learned in the present Convention..."^
The three objectives were:
(a) to ensure that the Convention asserted 
the principles of democracy, the rule of law 
and good governance;
(b) to adapt the instruments of ACP-EEC 
dialogue to take better account of the basic 
principles and priorities of Community
cooperation policy;
(c) to achieve more coherent and effective 
use of ACP-EEC cooperation instruments and 
procedures.
The Commissioner also proposed the extension of the 
scope of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers to create a 
political dialogue, preferably on a regional basis 
i.e., EEC Troika of Presidents/Africa; Troika/ 
Caribbean; Troika/Pacific
Central to the elaboration of the proposal was
the Community expectation that the ACP faced an
inevitable choice. The economic crisis, the end of the
Cold War and the "new world interdependence" no longer 
made it possible to work with the model that was 
conceived twenty years ago.^ The statements of the 
Commissioner did not make allowance for the
 ^ Ibid., p .1.
® See Chapter 2, Footnote 78 for a definition of 
the troika.
 ^ Europe Agence Internationale No. 6061 of 10 
September, 1993, p.5.
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consideration of an ACP response or for negotiations 
on their substance. Their message was unambiguous. The 
reality which the ACP faced was that Lomé could only 
survive if it was able to adjust to recent global 
changes.
4.2.2 ACP Group
The conclusions which the ACP Group had drawn 
from its expectations of the negotiations had been 
less than encouraging. Their conclusions forced the 
Group into adopting a damage limitation strategy 
towards the conditionality negotiations in the Mid- 
Term Review. The Group had not been able to discern 
the early initiatives of the Community towards 
conditionality in the early years of Lomé IV. It had 
thus been unable to formulate a substantive response 
to the process as it developed. It was all too 
evident that the ACP could not prevent the imposition 
of conditionality. Its sole recourse was to see, to 
what extent, it could contain the severity of the 
conditions.
Secondly, the ACP reaction to the Commission's 
negotiating brief of September, 1993 took almost six 
months to formulate. It was submitted only in 
February, 1994.^ Moreover, on so central an issue as 
multiple conditionality, which covered two of the 
three main objectives of the Community, the ACP 
devoted exactly two (2) paragraphs out of fifty-three
10 1 have described this failure in Chapter 2.
The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Lomé 
Convention : ACP Memorandum to the European Union
(ACP/27/003/94 Rev.3).
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(53) in the text of its Memorandum. The ACP 
highlighted, therein, its concern with the EU's policy 
of unilaterally withdrawing development assistance 
from ACP states as sanctions. The ACP indicated that 
it would propose the incorporation of an effective 
mechanism for resolving disputes arising from such 
violations. The Group also proposed that, in 
accordance with the present Convention, Convention 
resources be used to lend practical support for 
measures in favour of democratic values and 
institutions.
Subsequently, in a document published one month 
later in March, 1 9 9 4 ,^ the ACP expanded slightly on 
its treatment of the good governance provisions. It 
accorded one (1) page out of forty-six (46) and three 
(3) paragraphs out of one hundred and sixty-eight 
(168) to "Human Rights, Democracy, the Rule of law and 
Good G o v e r n a n c e " . The length of the treatment might 
have been marginally increased. However, on a relative 
basis, the topic had been accorded just as perfunctory 
an examination and even less consideration.
The ACP sought to make specific proposals, in 
three areas, for amendment of the Convention :
(a) introduction of the principles {of good 
governance, etc.) without direct or indirect 
conditionalities or cross-conditionalities 
in line with current international thinking
1^ Ibid. , p . 2.
1^ The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Lomé 
Convention: Explanatory Memorandum (ACP/27/001/94 Rev. 
3) .
14 Ibid. , pp. 32-33.
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and the direction in which many ACP states 
have themselves decided to move;
(b) providing for an effective mechanism for 
the resolution of disputes arising from any 
perceived contravention of the provisions;
(c) providing financial support for 
democratic change, human rights..., provided 
that the request for the support shall 
originate from the ACP state concerned and 
be included in the indicative programme as 
one of the sectors for intervention.^^
From the above, it is clear that the ACP Group 
had resigned itself to its fate. Nonetheless, it was 
trying to see how best it could retain some modicum of 
control over the development of conditionality. It did 
not wish to abandon both judgement and responsibility 
for action to the Community. The damage had been done 
and was accepted by the ACP; its task was now to limit 
the severity of the conditionality programme.
4.3 NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
A useful guide to the overall negotiating 
positions of was offered by the statements of the two 
Ministerial representatives at the opening of the 
negotiations in Swaziland in May, 1994. I do not 
propose to examine each speech in detail. However, a 
brief content analysis reveals a great deal of the 
substantive positions and of the perceptions which 
informed those positions.
Ibid., p. 33. (Italics are mine).
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4.3.1 ACP
In outlining the Group's negotiating objectives, 
the President of the ACP Council of Ministers, George 
Brizan of Grenada, identified several elements needed 
for the introduction of the principles of governance 
and democracy. They included consultation; patience; 
material support; cultural understanding and positive 
encouragement. The ACP Group restated its commitment 
to the general principles. It acknowledged that 
"development could be considerably enhanced in an 
environment where human rights are respected, 
democracy practised, the rule of law prevails and good 
governance a constant objective of political 
leadership" .
The ACP President recognised that some ACP states 
still had significant steps to take in the pursuit of 
those principles. However, he drew attention to the 
reality of ensuring inherent stability between the 
"incipient nature of many [ACP] states and their 
institutions". He stressed the problems of their 
inherent poverty and the likelihood of a high degree 
of political, social and economic instability. It was 
in that context that the Group called for joint 
identification of the tasks to be undertaken, the 
employment of the appropriate instruments and the use 
of existing institutions.
See Opening Statement by the Honourable George 
Brizan, President of ACP Council of Ministers in 
"Opening of negotiations in the Context of the Mid- 
Term Review of Lomé IV: Conclusions of the Meeting
between ACP and EU Ministers", Mbabane, 20 May, 1994 
(ACP/00/003/94).
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Minister Brizan first urged the need for a 
workable mechanism for consultation between the 
parties. He argued that punitive measures could "be 
dysfunctional and should therefore not be employed as 
the principal instrument of change". Secondly, he 
called for an appreciation of the sociopolitical 
problems in ACP states which the EU had gained from 
the historical links between the two Groups. He noted 
that the development of social and political 
institutions in the EU itself had been the result of 
a long evolution. Accordingly, he urged patience on 
the part of the EU: it was not responsible policy to 
wish away sociopolitical reality in the haste to see 
ACP societies change.
Thirdly, he stressed that the material costs of 
desirable change would be high and particularly so in 
cases where progress might have slowed. He thus called 
on the Community and the ACP to accept that the 
process of promoting such change would require 
material and financial support.^® The ACP President 
further urged the need to take due cognisance of the 
specific sociopolitical and sociocultural environment 
of ACP states. He emphasised that support of the 
processes of change be provided through "instruments 
of encouragement rather than exclusions or 
penalties". He concluded by presenting the three main 
pivots in the ACP position on conditionality, 
mentioned above.
Ibid. , p. 2. 
Ibid. , p . 3 . 
Ibid. , pp. 3-4.
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There were two notable features in the 
presentation of the ACP negotiating position on 
conditionality: its context and its concession. The
tone of the presentation and the elements identified 
for the promotion of the basic principles of 
governance were both cast in the context of an appeal. 
It was an appeal to the Community to appreciate the 
ACP's position. In other words, the ACP had conceded 
the point that it was the EU which determined the 
parameters of the negotiations. First, it was the EU 
which had to assent to joint consultations, prior to 
enacting punitive measures. It was the EU which also 
had to agree to consider the pace of sociopolitical 
change. Finally, positive encouragement for the 
process i.e., material assistance, could only be 
provided by the EU. Even as the ACP Group elaborated 
its position, it was signalling that its position was 
dependent on the acquiescence of the EU.
The ACP had conceded that the introduction of the 
basic principles was unavoidable. It had also 
acknowledged that the Community would pursue the 
promotion of those principles, regardless of ACP 
views. The Group could only accept the inevitability 
and seek to limit the potential damage. It sought to 
do so by accepting the introduction of the principles 
but without cross-conditionalities. That insistence 
rang rather hollow, given the ACP's resignation to the 
fact of sanctions. Its acceptance of sanctions was 
indicated by the emphasis which the ACP placed on 
positive measures of encouragement for good 
governance. That emphasis was a recognition that, in 
cases of contravention, the consequence would be 
punitive measures.
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A second feature of the ACP's position was 
concession on an issue which should have proved of 
some bargaining value to the Group. At the outset of 
his presentation, the ACP President touched on the 
issue :
"Neither partner should feel itself so close 
to perfection in these goals^ that criticism 
of its record is inappropriate. . . we have 
not always been impressed with all aspects 
of the EC's approach to the perception of 
this subject. The strengthening of the Human 
Rights clause should, inter alia, permit 
some scrutiny of the Community's 
arrangements for ACP nationals within the 
EU ' s borders .
The issue of the treatment of ACP nationals - 
migrant workers, students, etc. - had been a regular 
topic of debate between the two sides during the
implementation of Lomé III and the negotiation of Lomé
IV. The matter had been of sufficient concern to 
warrant a study on racism and xenophobia by the Joint 
Assembly. It had also become a focal point in the work 
of the Social and Cultural Foundation.
It was of sufficient import to the ACP to have 
served as one counterpoint for the Group in the debate 
on governance. It would have ensured some semblance of 
balance in the projection of the issue in the
Convention. The ACP failed to make use of the
opportunity to develop its own position on the issue. 
However, some reference to it was contained in the 
conclusions. This failure reflected an admission by
The reference here is to the basic principles 
of human rights, démocratisation and good governance.
Opening Statement of President of ACP 
Council..., op. cit., p. 2.
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the ACP Group that it was on the defensive in the 
negotiations over conditionality. It was thus unable 
to broaden the debate to include its own legitimate 
and long-standing concerns.
The ACP's presentation of its negotiating 
position included other elements which were relevant 
to bargaining capacity and conditionality. They also 
serve as a justification of the conclusions drawn in 
the preceding Chapter. They covered external 
projection and the lack of technical capacity. In the 
case of external projection, the ACP President 
underlined the Group's weak international stature by 
seeking the assistance of the Community. He called on 
the Community to plead the ACP's cause in two 
important areas: the liberalised trading system,
following on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and 
international debt negotiations.
While neither area was directly linked to 
multiple conditionality, the ACP Group's appeal helped 
to emphasise its own lack of an external projection. 
The appeal also signalled the Group's willingness to 
have the Community act as its porte-parole on 
multilateral issues. Thus, the ACP urged the EU, as 
the latter sought to strengthen its competitive 
position internationally, to "take the opportunity to 
channel some of the additional scope thereby created 
in the direction of the ACP.
The ACP also urged the Community to act as its 
patron in the global debate on the important issue of 
international debt:
Ibid. , p. 5.
211
"We further call on the Community to design 
and agree upon a coordinated debt policy and 
to use its influence within the Bretton 
Woods institutions to have those entities 
institute a debt reduction policy and 
programme for severely indebted ACP 
members. "^ 3
The second element, drawn from those treated in 
the last Chapter, was the ACP's lack of technical and 
human capacity. The ACP Group bluntly criticised the 
failure of Convention mechanisms relating to trade 
development to facilitate the growth of ACP economies. 
According to the ACP, they lacked appropriate 
infrastructure, institutions and human resources.In 
focusing on human resources, the Group both 
highlighted a specific problem and identified its 
agreed means of solution. The existing Convention had 
espoused the increased use of ACP human resources in 
areas such as consultancies, implementation of EOF 
contracts and research.The rationale was that 
sustainable growth was dependent, to a significant 
degree, on the provision of qualified and experienced 
human resources.
The ACP states complained that the widespread 
substitution of external technical assistance deprived 
indigenous experts of critical experience. They 
contended further that the departure of the foreign 
experts often left a void which was difficult to fill. 
They urged the Community to follow the lead of the 
MFIs and regional development banks. The latter were
Ibid. , p . 11. 
Ibid. , p. 6.
Article 275(c) of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention 
of Lomé.
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now encouraging the greater participation of nationals 
in the implementation of projects in their own 
countries.26 That second complaint was based on the 
Community's failure to live up to the commitment to 
greater use of ACP expertise in programme and project 
implementation.
However, it did pinpoint two separate concerns 
which were important factors in the elaboration of a 
conditionality programme. The first was the admission 
that the ACP states lacked national expertise, a need 
which was not being met by the Community's method of 
implementation of the Convention. The second, and more 
critical, observation was that the preferred approach 
of the EU of meeting that need was to employ external 
technical assistance.
This latter feature has had two effects. The 
first has been to limit the contribution of the 
Convention to the building of the ACP national command 
of crucial skills. The second effect was to retain and 
solidify EU control over the implementation process. 
The identification and qualification of experts had to 
be done in accordance with Community criteria. It was 
a fact which, most often, resulted in a preference for 
European experts. Community control was also manifest 
in its practice of reverting to the EU's own services 
to assume a greater responsibility for Lomé projects. 
It is a practice which is readily apparent in the
26 Opening Statement by the President of the ACP 
Council..., op. cit., pp. 13-14.
22 Article 275 (j) of the Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention.
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operation of the Convention.^® It is also a critical 
element of the approach proposed by the Community for 
implementing the second half of Lomé IV and its 
multiple conditionality programme.
4.3.2 EU
The initial negotiating position of-the Community 
was articulated by the President of the Council of the 
European Union, Minister Theodores Pangalos of Greece. 
He adopted a position which was reflective of both 
past Community attitudes to the Convention and the 
varying expectations which the Community had brought 
to the negotiations. The context of his presentation 
was "change within continuity" which had been a common 
theme of the Community since Lomé 11. Its intent was 
to build upon an accepted base formula which had 
improved functioning, not overall reform, as the 
principal objective. This central theme allowed the 
Community to propose the need for change so as to 
reflect transformed global realities. The theme also 
allowed it to reaffirm its commitment to the 
principles of the acquis - partnership and dialogue; 
equality and non-discrimination; respect for 
sovereignty; and secure and reliable aid.
At the same time, the President of the EU Council
The practice is extensively covered in Chapter 
5 on Operational Capacity.
Speech by the President of the Council of the 
European Union on the Occasion of the Formal Opening 
of Negotiations for the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth 
Lomé Convention in "Opening of negotiations in the 
context of the Mid-term review of Lomé IV: Conclusions 
of the Meeting between ACP and EU Ministers" 
(ACP/00/003/94), p. 3.
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based his short and direct statement^ on the 
Community's main expectations. These were that the ACP 
faced an inevitable choice and that the introduction 
of conditionality was a given, just requiring mere 
explanation. The explanation lay partly in the changed 
global reality. It also stemmed from the need to 
recognise that respect for democratic values was 
necessary for sustainable and balanced development.
In keeping with these expectations, the
President outlined the changes which were required of 
the ACP. The changes evoked three basic principles of 
accountability, effectiveness and e f f i c i e n c y . First, 
in order to ensure ACP accountability for the
application of good governance, the Community proposed 
the insertion of an "essential element" clause into
the Convention. This clause was to enable appropriate
measures to be taken in cases of grave and persistent 
violations of human rights or serious interruption of 
the democratic process. The clause, while respecting 
objective and fair criteria, non-discrimination and 
consultation, was drawn up in keeping with Article 
130u of the Treaty of the European Union
The contrast, in length, between the ACP and EU 
statements was graphic: the text of the ACP's took up 
nineteen (19) pages while that of the EU was 
considerably less than half that length.
Speech by the President of the Council of the 
European Union..., op. cit., p. 5.
Herein lies a link with the Pisani Memorandum 
and the origins of conditionality. Effectiveness had 
been a primary motivation of the inverted 
conditionality which had been proposed by the 
Memorandum. See Chapter 2.1.1 above.
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(Maastricht) . It thus called into immediate 
contention the argument, noted earlier, of some in the 
ACP that the Article made a specific exclusion for 
Lomé. 34
Secondly, in the interest of effectiveness, the 
Community sought changes in the programming of Lomé 
assistance. The changes were intended to allow 
incentive instruments and supplementary resources to 
take greater account of Community objectives in
priority sectors. The priority sectors were identified 
as support for institutional and administrative 
reform; enhancing the value of human resources; the 
environment; and revitalising the economic fabric 
through revival of the private sector. Three of these 
four illustrative examples were directly related to 
one or other objective of multiple conditionality. The 
Community was thus striving to ensure that its main 
goal was intrinsically woven into all areas of
negotiation and change.
Finally, the Community turned to the third pillar 
of efficiency. It called for an amendment of
Convention procedures and the improved implementation 
of projects through the use of studies and technical 
assistance. This call was based on the recommendations 
of the "post-Fiji" study on procedures for financial 
and technical cooperation. Minister Pangalos stressed
33 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
34 See Section 2.4.1 for the discussion of this 
argument which was raised by some ACP states.
33 See Report and Resolution of the ACP-EEC 
Development Finance Cooperation Committee (ACP-CEE 
2130/1/93 REV 1, May 1993), pp. 40-68 for the
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that the "limited readjustment" would in no way 
involve the transfer, to the Community, of any of the 
responsibilities so far held by the ACP states.
There was some doubt cast on that reassurance 
when viewed against the rationale proposed in the 
Commission document presented to the Council for the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . The document stated that the current 
system was "confused, complicated and, above all, 
unbearably bureaucratic".^ In spite of the 
reassurance, the Commission proposals clearly emanated 
from considerable discontent with the prevailing 
regime. One important aspect of the proposals was the 
replacement of the fixed five-year EOF allocation for 
each ACP state by a sliding arrangement of tranches. 
The release of each tranche, after the first, would be 
dependent on the state satisfying its various 
commitments. The proposals for change in the detail of 
the Convention were buttressed by the Community's call 
for a new and wider dialogue with the ACP. The purpose 
of this dialogue was to address genuine policy themes 
and issues of a general nature.
There was very little in the Community's 
presentation which was amenable to negotiation. In the 
main, the proposals were designed to bring the
conclusions of the study. The document was the 
response to a demand made by the Commissioner Marin 
for a study on the obstacles to implementation of the 
operations of the Convention. It was termed the post- 
Fiji study because the demand was made in Suva, Fiji 
at a Joint ACP-EEC Council of Ministers Meeting in 
1990.
36 See Section 4.2.1 above.
Europe Agence Internationale No. 6061, p. 6 {10 
Sept. 1993).
217
Convention into line with the new reality of multiple 
conditionality. First, it would do so through the 
introduction of the punitive clause in cases of 
contravention. It would also ensure that the ACP 
states could be held to account for their commitments, 
through the revised procedures for phased aid 
allocation. The contrast between the presentations of 
the two sides matched their negotiating expectations. 
The ACP Group was constrained by its limited or non­
existent options. It was a supplicant seeking 
primarily to minimise the potential severity of 
conditionality. The EU, confident of its own 
negotiating power, tried to coat the bitter pill of 
conditionality in the sugar of justifiable 
explanations. It would maintain respect for 
partnership, dialogue and sovereignty but the ACP 
needed to face up to changed realities.
4.4 OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The conclusions of the negotiations represented
a significant triumph for the Community in that it
obtained approval for the major elements in its
negotiating brief. Multiple conditionality was
accepted as a general concept although the details of
its application were left for elaboration during the
process of implementation:
"Respect for human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law, which 
underpins relations between the ACP States 
and the Community and all provisions of the 
Convention and governs the domestic and 
international policies of the Contracting 
Parties, is an essential element of this
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Convention.
The sanction to ensure compliance with the above 
commitment was expressed in a suspension clause. It 
outlined a process of consultation among the parties, 
in the case of contravention, to resolve the matter. 
Should consultation fail to resolve the matter, the 
offending party could be suspended from the 
Convention.39 The conditionality clause was accompanied 
by two related provisions. The first was an increased 
emphasis on the positive measures i.e., the provision 
of financial resources to encourage the promotion of 
human rights, démocratisation and good governance.^ 
The second was the explicit identification of the 
economic plank of conditionality. It stressed the 
importance of promoting an environment favourable to 
the development of the market economy and of the 
private sector.^
The Community had thus obtained approval for its 
measures aimed at promoting good governance and 
economic liberalisation. It gained agreement on both 
the negative measures of sanction and the positive 
measures of encouragement for good governance. 
However, it did not obtain all that it had sought on 
the issue of conditionality. The ACP sought, and
33 Article 5.1 of the Lomé IV Convention as 
revised by the agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 
November, 1995, the Courier No. 155, January-February, 
1996.
3^ Ibid., Article 366(a). The relevant provision 
is spelled out in the Introduction above.
Ibid., Article 5.3.
3^ Ibid., Article 6.
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managed, to have rejected the Community's efforts to 
link most resource transfers to the conditionality 
regime. Stabex transfers, in particular, had been 
singled out as one area which should be made subject 
to conditionality provisions. The ACP managed to 
frustrate the Community's attempts to establish that 
linkage.
On the other hand, the Community did obtain 
agreement on the companion measures for the 
application of conditionality. The negotiators agreed 
on the changes to the aid procedures, as proposed by 
the Community. These changes subjected the provision 
of EOF resources to a phased allocation and a series 
of conditionalities. As was customary, each ACP state 
would be allocated a nominal EOF indicative figure. 
However, unlike prior practice, the Community would 
not be legally obligated to make that allocation 
available to the state. 70% of the amount would be 
allocated during the first tranche of three years. The 
remaining 30% would be subject to a favourable review 
of the first three-year period of implementation.
There remains some uncertainty as to exactly what 
constitutes "favourable review" but some criteria have 
been advanced, all in the name of efficiency and 
effectiveness. These include the following: the size 
of the total allocation; progress made in implementing 
the first tranche; the state of preparation for the 
second tranche; and the specific situation of the ACP 
state concerned.
42 See Michele A.M. Lowe, "Lomé IV - The Next Five 
Years and Beyond", Briefing Paper 1 (Prepared on 
behalf of the Council for Europe, November 1995) .
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The second measure supporting conditionality was 
the introduction of a wider form of political 
dialogue. It was intended to cover "issues and 
problems of foreign policy and security and those of 
general interest and/or common interest to a group of 
countries.
"...the Council of Ministers shall conduct 
an enlarged political dialogue...
Such dialogue may also take place outside 
this framework {Lomé) with a geographical or 
other composition suited to the subjects 
under discussion... "^ ^
The provisions were intended to permit exchanges 
on issues of political import to groupings within the 
two parties. They would also legitimise a much wider 
form of dialogue on all areas of policy, including 
social and political issues. Such issues were formerly 
matters of domestic concern but are vital to the 
implementation of multiple conditionality. The 
provisions also established a potential format for the 
political dialogue which could be organised along 
regional or sub-group lines. This proposal has a clear 
potential to undermine the unity of the ACP as a 
Group. It encourages the presentation of issues from 
sub-groups representing less than the whole of the 
ACP, with a possible danger of partisan or special 
interests being pursued. There is thus a potential for 
ACP divisiveness.
The gains of the ACP Group, in the negotiations 
on multiple conditionality, were much less noteworthy.
New clause in the Preamble of the Lomé IV 
Convention as revised...
Article 30.3, Lomé IV Convention as revised... 
(Italics are mine).
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The main thrust of its negotiating position - the 
attempt to limit the potential severity of multiple 
conditionality - was ineffective. The Group failed to 
obtain the inclusion of provisions which might have 
served to soften the imposition of a full multiple 
conditionality programme.
The ACP failed totally to gain any ground on the
treatment of ACP nationals in EU countries. An initial
reading of the revised Convention would seem to
indicate that the ACP had made some progress. The two
sides agreed on what seemed a clear commitment:
"The Member States (and/or, where 
appropriate the Community) and the ACP 
States will continue to ensure, through 
legal or administrative measures which they 
have or will have adopted, that migrant 
workers, students and other foreign 
nationals legally within their territory are 
not subject to discrimination... notably in 
respect of housing, education, health care, 
other social services and employment.
However, the apparent gain was ephemeral, as a close
analysis of the relevant provision reveals.
Since Lomé III, the ACP had been struggling to 
have the Convention address the problem of its 
nationals in the Community. The provision seemed to 
have responded to the Group's concerns. However, what 
appears, at first blush, to be a laudable advance by 
the ACP turns out to be hollow and exhortatory. The 
provision above did call on both parties to respect 
the rights of each other's nationals but it is a 
restatement of the provision in Lomé IV. It contains 
no new elements or commitments.
Ibid., Article 5.2.
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Unlike the treatment of conditionality, there is 
no accompanying measure to ensure the enactment of the 
provision. There is no scope for the periodic
monitoring of the enactment or for a review of the
situation in Community states. The procedures
governing Article 5, of which the provision is a part, 
are contained in Article 366(a) of the revised
Convention. The process in the latter Article refers 
solely to the "essential element" i.e., respect for 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of 
law. In effect, the process applies primarily to the 
ACP.
The nature of the consultation mechanism, for 
dealing with disputes arising from Article 5, 
militates against the ACP. Article 366(a) speaks of 
either party bringing up for consultation a perceived 
infringement of the essential element. It thus implied 
that the ACP could also bring the Community states to 
book on an issue of good governance e.g., their 
treatment of ACP nationals. It is a remote but 
theoretical possibility, given the definition of the 
essential element. However, the subsequent clauses 
indicate that the consultation mechanism makes no 
allowance for the involvement of an individual EU 
state. The mechanism will comprise of representatives 
of the troika of EU Presidents and the Commission, on 
the Community side, and representatives of the ACP 
troika plus two additional members of the ACP Council 
of Ministers chosen by the state concerned.
The mechanism removes the possibility of a charge 
of infringement being brought against a Community 
state. It thus implies that the sole scenario for 
consultation is the Community in dispute with an ACP
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State, not vice-versa. The commitment on the treatment 
of foreign nationals in the Community was potentially 
a major bargaining tool for the AGP. It has emerged, 
in the final conclusion, as little more than a pro­
forma pledge of honour by the Community, with no 
apparent means of ensuring its compliance.
4.5 CONCLUSION
The outcome of the negotiations on the Mid-Term 
Review served to justify many of the observations made 
in the analysis of bargaining capacity. The respective 
expectations of the AC? and the EU, as outlined at the 
beginning of this Chapter,were fully reflected in 
the conclusions of the negotiations. None of the 
conclusions called into question either the superior 
negotiating power of the Community or the inevitable 
choice facing the AGP.
The elements discussed in the previous Chapter 
were also verified, in the main, by the conclusions. 
1 have already demonstrated the relevance of external 
projection and the lack of AGP technical capacity. 1 
will only cite one other which has been substantiated 
by the assessment of the negotiations of the Mid-Term 
Review. It is among the more salient: the EU's control 
of the agenda. The Community's control was evident in 
two ways. It was evident in the EU's preparedness, as 
shown by the early submission of its negotiating
See Section 4.1 for the outline of the 
respective expectations.
See Section 4.3.1 above.
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position.48 The EU's control was also visible in the 
negotiating posture of the AGP Group. The letter's 
position was always reactive, seeking to mitigate the 
effect of the proposals of the Community.
The outcome of the negotiations demonstrated an 
important omission by the AGP Group. The Group did not 
attempt to negotiate or clarify the operational 
details of multiple conditionality. Its attention was 
fully concentrated on its effort to mitigate the 
effect of conditionality. The AGP's failure to clarify 
the details of programme design meant that the second 
stage of conditionality negotiations would be left to 
the individual state. It also meant that the AGP had 
failed to make use of its collective negotiating 
strength. It would be left to the individual state, in 
question, to negotiate, with the Community, on the 
level and duration of sanction and on the other 
related issues. Based on the analysis of bargaining 
capacity in Chapter 3, the Group's negotiating 
strength was not particularly effective. However, its 
collective negotiating power is considerably greater 
than that of any single AGP state.
The AGP Group had also missed an opportunity to 
move the debate on conditionality to a legitimate and 
important area of concern. Its focus had been on 
evading the inevitable, the introduction of 
conditionality. Given that inevitability, negotiation 
on the imposition was a moot issue. The AGP failed to 
recognise the value of moving the conditionality 
debate to another level, that of clarifying the 
implementation details. The ideal time to have done so
48 See Section 4.2.1.
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would have been during the negotiations of the Mid- 
Term Review. Conditionality was a central issue in 
those negotiations and it was there that the AGP, as 
a Group, could have exerted its most concentrated form 
of negotiating power.
The negotiations for the Mid-Term Review also 
demonstrated an important aspect of the Community's 
policy towards Lomé. It was less evident in the 
negotiations on conditionality than it was in the 
overall negotiating position of the Community. It will 
be recalled that the EU had proposed changes in the 
procedures governing resource allocation and 
programming.49 The thrust of the changes was to place 
more of the Convention operations under the control of 
the Commission. Many of the proposals were not agreed 
but, collectively, they conveyed a strong message. The 
message was that the Community was determined to 
establish its own firm control of the Convention. In 
introducing multiple conditionality, it was 
establishing its overt control over the qualifying 
criteria for assistance. It sought to do the same for 
operational matters through its proposals for changes 
in procedures and programmes.
In sum, the negotiations on the Mid-Term Review 
verified the main conclusion of Chapter 3: the EU did 
exercise an overwhelming control of bargaining 
capacity. The examination of operational capacity in 
the next Chapter will indicate whether the EU also 
demonstrated an inherent superiority and control in
49 See Section 2.2.4 on the Mid-Term Review where 
the proposed changes are raised. They are discussed, 
in greater detail, in the next Chapter, in Sections 
5.5.1 and 5.5.2.
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the operations of the Convention
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CHAPTER 5 
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
In this Chapter, I examine operational capacity, 
the second element of residual capacity. First, I 
concentrate on its nature and on the varying 
interpretations which the AGP and EU hold of 
operational capacity. I asses the role of the 
institutional arrangements of the Convention in the 
four main areas of cooperation - industrial 
cooperation, the trade regime, agricultural 
cooperation and the management of financial and 
technical cooperation. I then examine the extent to 
which any capacity generated has helped to build 
adaptability to changed conditions. I conclude with an 
overall assessment of the contribution of the Lomé 
relationship to operational capacity.
This Chapter is, in part, an attempt to gauge the 
developmental effectiveness of ACP-EC cooperation 
under Lomé. My focus on the two Groups, as 
collectives, excludes coverage of the developmental 
impact on the individual AGP state, except in cases 
where it allows me to generalise to the Group. I will, 
therefore, not place great emphasis on the 
"development ecology" of the individual state^ i.e., 
the quality of economic policies pursued; the degrees 
of compliance and honesty; the efficiency of aid
 ^The term "developmental ecology" is introduced 
in Trevor Parfit's study of aid to Sierra Leone under 
Lomé I. See Parfit, "EC Aid in Practice: Sierra
Leone", p. 143 in Christopher Stevens ed., EEC and the 
Third World: A Survey 4 - Renegotiating Lomé (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).
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planning; and the level of popular mobilisation and 
participation.2 Some of these qualities will be touched 
on but in the context of a general treatment of the 
AGP Group as a whole.
The concept of developmental effectiveness, 
however, embraces more than the absorptive capacity of 
the recipient state. It involves the objectives of the 
aid programme, its formulation and design as well as 
its implementation. All of these elements contribute 
to the overall effectiveness of the programme and 
thus, to its developmental impact. Consequently, I 
must look at the donor's role in Lomé cooperation if 
I am to assess the operational capacity generated by 
that cooperation. In order to do so, I examine the 
EU's role in various areas of operational capacity, 
juxtaposing it against that of the AGP.
The contribution of the EG was raised in my 
contacts with Commission and AGP officials.^ Both sides 
saw the effectiveness of programmes being affected by 
the quality of Commission services but from differing 
perspectives. There have been very few evaluations of 
Lomé assistance in terms of its developmental 
effectiveness.4 A perusal of the inventory of EG
 ^ See Enzo Grilli, The European Community and the 
Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
1993) , p. 125 for a typology of the elements of 
developmental ecology.
 ^ The matter arose in my interviews with Peter 
Pooley, Deputy Director-General of the Development 
Directorate, DG VIII, of the Commission and with Carl 
Greenidge, Deputy Secretary-General of the AGP.
 ^ There are only two studies done on individual 
states under Lomé I: Trevor Parfit, "EEC Aid in
Practice: Sierra Leone" and Adrian Hewitt, "Malawi and
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studies of Lomé cooperation^ reveals that there have 
been some evaluations of sectors and individual 
programmes and projects. However, there is little on 
the overall aid programme. There is certainly nothing 
on the generation of capacity in recipient countries. 
By mid-1995, the end of the period under study, the 
Commission had begun a general evaluation of its 
developmental assistance covering all aid recipients, 
not just the AGP.®
My effort to measure operational capacity 
generated by ACP-EU cooperation must rely on a limited 
set of material. These are principally the secondary 
studies of the various sectors of the Convention and 
the published reports of the Court of Auditors of the 
Community. The Court publishes an Annual Report on the 
EOF as part of its general audit of the Community. The 
Report on the EOF is largely from an auditor's point 
of view. Nonetheless, the Court of Auditors does 
produce, periodically, a specific treatment of a 
section or sections of the Convention. This treatment 
is usually part of the Annual Report or issued as a 
Special Report. It has not been applied to the 
Convention in toto or to the whole of the AGP Group. 
However, it has dealt with aid to groups of AGP 
states.
the EEC: The First Seven Years", both in Christopher 
Stevens ed., EEC and the Third World: A Survey 4, op. 
cit.
 ^ See European Commission, Evaluation Inventory 
(Third Edition, November 1994).
 ^ Interview with Sean Doyle, Head of the 
Evaluation Unit of DG VIII on 6 September, 1995.
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Operational capacity, in my judgement, 
encompasses more than developmental effectiveness. It 
also involves a notion of sustainability. In this 
sense, sustainability means, first, a generation of 
capabilities to handle the demands of existing 
programmes. It also includes capabilities to meet 
demands arising from changing conditions in the 
relationship. Operational capacity, if it is to be 
effective and sustainable, must equip both the donor 
and recipient with two basic capabilities. They are 
the ability to adapt to changing social, economic and 
political circumstances and the capacity to channel 
resources in a pragmatic manner, essential for 
successful development.^
5.1 INTERPRETATIONS OF OPERATIONAL CAPACITY
The two Groups hold different perceptions of 
institutional capacity and of the contribution which 
the Convention has made to the building of that 
capacity. The perceptions are not contradictory 
although they are not inherently complementary.
For the Community, the Convention makes a dual 
contribution to the building of ACP capacity. It 
contributes, first, through technical cooperation 
i.e., the provision of technical assistance and 
training. Secondly, it does so through the operational 
experience which the ACP states gain from the joint 
management of the Convention. Both aspects are
 ^For a treatment of adaptability as an aspect of 
capacity, see Dennis A. Rondinelli & John D. 
Montgomery, "Managing Economic Reform: an alternative 
perspective on structural policies". Policy Sciences 
23, 1990, p. 77.
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outlined in the Convention. The primary emphasis is on 
technical cooperation which is intended to assist the 
ACP states to develop national and regional manpower 
resources and sustainable institutions.® Training is 
seen as a vital component of technical cooperation 
which helps "phase out technical assistance with a 
view to staffing projects entirely and on a permanent 
basis with nationals of the ACP s t a t e s . With respect 
to management capacity, the Community claims that the 
Convention offers a unique feature. Its novelty lies 
in the joint role which the ACP recipients play in the 
appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of projects and 
programmes.
The ACP, on the other hand, adopts a more 
pragmatic approach to the contribution of Lomé to 
operational capacity. The ACP judges the contribution 
in terms of the skills and expertise which the Group 
has acquired in managing the various sectors within 
the Convention. However, there are nuances within 
this interpretation. The first is that a distinction 
has to be drawn between the ACP, as a Group, and its 
functional arm, the ACP Secretariat. Secondly, the ACP 
distinguishes between capacity in handling "global"
® See Articles 275 and 276 of the Fourth 
Convention of Lomé for the provisions applicable to 
technical cooperation.
 ^Ibid., Article 275 (j).
Ibid., Article 222.3.
I am grateful to Carl Greenidge, Deputy 
Secretary-General of the ACP Secretariat for this 
interpretation of operational capacity. During the 
latter stages of the negotiations on the Mid-Term 
Review, he served as Officer-in-Charge of the 
Secretariat.
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issues and in dealing with issues which are 
"Convention-specific". Global issues are those where 
the main fora for discussion and decision lie outside 
the Lomé arena e.g., those within financial 
cooperation. Convention-specific issues e.g., those 
within the trade sector, are those which derive 
directly from the ACP-EU arrangements.
The two qualifications are important and linked. 
In addressing operational capacity within Lomé, 
attention must be given to the functional arm, the ACP 
Secretariat, although the ACP Group, as a political 
body, does play a critical role in policy-oriented 
areas. The linkage between the two distinctions lies
in the recognition that the capacity of the ACP
Secretariat is directly affected by the nature of the 
issue, whether global or Convention-specific. I will 
elaborate on this matter in my treatment of the
contrioutions of the two ACP arms to operational 
capacity.
5.1.1 Community
In examining the Community's focus on technical 
assistance, there is some basis for ambivalence in 
determining whether such assistance has been a 
positive contribution to the ACP. Increased programme 
responsibilities have led to a growing burden of work 
in the administration of the EOF. The EOF has been 
faced with the emergence of new elements in the
operations of the Convention. They include more 
complex demands of programme management, the 
introduction of new instruments such as structural 
adjustment support, Stabex reforms and the increase in 
the involvement of non-governmental partners in
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implementation.
The Commission is cognisant of these new burdens:
"To avoid this new workload slowing down aid 
operations, or leading to an inadequate 
monitoring of their quality, greater 
recourse to technical assistance personnel 
and the setting up of management units 
financed under the programme in question 
have become more frequent. But these units 
have a limited life span and transferring 
their tasks to national authorities when the 
programme is completed is not always easy."^^
This admission goes to the heart of the ambivalence on 
the value of technical assistance. From the ACP 
perspective, such technical assistance, however 
desirable, often proves a major obstacle to the 
utilisation of comparable national skills.
This is not to say that the experience of 
Community technical assistance has not often been 
positive. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this 
point. The first is drawn from the early emphasis in 
Lomé projects, in the 1980s, on the strengthening of 
infrastructure in ACP countries. The Community, in 
dealing with a project on the supply of potable water 
in Guyana, was able to introduce a holistic approach 
to the project. It was able to broaden its focus from 
supply of the services to encompass tariffs for its 
provision and the related issue of sewerage 
treatment.The approach helped to enhance national 
capacity in the overall water sector. Similarly,
European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 1994 
(Special Edition of ACP-EU Courier, June 1995), p. 38.
Interview with Carl Greenidge who formerly 
served as the subject Minister in Guyana for Lomé 
matters.
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projects on sea defence helped to broaden capacity to 
deal with irrigation and agriculture.
The second positive example is drawn from the 
health sector. Within the sector, the EU has increased 
its allocation from 160 million ECUs under Lomé II to 
260 million in Lome III and to 690 million in Lomé 
IV. It is a programme covering a wide range of 
activities but I wish to focus on the HIV-Aids 
programme. In 1990, the Commission sought to reorient 
its approach to concentrate on three areas: the
development of regional programmes and capacity in 
training health and research staff; the coordination 
of actions related to this major health problem; and 
helping ACP states to draw up and implement a multi­
sectoral response. The programme covers 35 countries, 
one-half of the ACP membership, and has been 
considered to be quite effective. The ACP has clearly 
recognised the contribution of the EU in building up 
collective capacity to deal with the Aids problem. At 
the Joint Assembly of ACP-EEC Parliamentarians in 
Kampala, Uganda in 1991, the ACP representatives 
sought greater Community involvement in combatting the 
disease. Motivated by the high incidence of Aids in 
the East Africa region, they called for Aids to be 
considered a major theme for study by a working group 
of the Assembly.
In spite of such positive contributions, the ACP 
Group has maintained a consistent clamour for a more
See European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 
1994, op. cit., pp. 59-60 for a description of health 
sector programmes.
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equitable treatment in the area of technical 
assistance. There is the fact, conceded by the EU, 
that there remains a major difficulty in replacing 
expatriate assistance by national counterparts. 
However, there is a greater ACP concern that the 
provision of technical assistance, in the form of 
consultants, is overwhelmingly skewed towards EU 
nationals. This bias has resulted in a low level of 
involvement of ACP nationals in consultancies or on 
technical missions. In defence of its current policy, 
the EU argues that the only limit on its use of ACP 
nationals has been their unavailability as experienced 
consultants. The Community contends that there are 
simply not enough ACP experts to match the 
expectations of the ACP Group. This response has not 
satisfied the ACP which continues to insist that 
little effort has been made to identify and utilise 
suitable ACP consultants. As I will illustrate 
shortly, the ACP did try to help resolve the problem 
through the compilation of a roster of ACP 
consultants.
The second area of Community contribution to 
operational capacity highlights the greater 
involvement of the ACP states in the formulation, 
monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects. 
Their increased role in the programming exercise has 
made a significant contribution to ACP operational 
capacity. It has equipped them with a greater 
familiarity with the analysis of the project cycle and 
the acquisition of skills in programme management. 
Once more, a certain ambivalence arises in this area 
for neither side is wholly satisfied with the exercise
15 See Section 5.2.
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of joint management. It is this dissatisfaction, on 
the Community's part, which resulted in its proposals 
for change during the Mid-Term R e v i e w . ^  Those 
proposals focused on the procedures governing 
financial and technical cooperation and, specifically, 
control of the monitoring and evaluation processes.
The Community identified several causes of delays 
and obstacles in the implementation of programmes and 
projects.’-^ In 1991, the two sides had agreed to 
undertake a study of the obstacles to implementation 
of Lomé programmes.The conclusions of the study were 
considered and the ACP Group was keen to follow its 
recommendations. However, the EU has been more 
reluctant to do so. The letter's proposals for change, 
in the Mid-Term Review, owe more to its own analysis. 
As 1 show later, they also seek to respond to the 
criticisms expressed by the Court of Auditors in its 
reports on the workings of the EDF.-° The majority of
16 See Section 4.3.2 above.
1^ See European Commission "Explanatory 
Memorandum" to the Negotiating Directives for the Mid- 
Term Review of Certain Provisions of the Fourth Lomé 
Convention (August, 1993), pp. 35-39.
18 This Joint Study on the Implementation 
Procedures was the "post-Fiji" study. See Report and 
Resolutions of the ACP-EEC Development Finance 
Cooperation Committee (ACP-CEE 2130/1/93 REV 1, May 
1993), pp. 40-68.
19 See Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 below
The Court of Auditors criticised several areas 
of operation of the Convention. See, for example. 
Section 5.4.3 for its views on Trade Promotion; 
Section 5.5.2 for its conclusions on various 
programmes in the ACP states; and Section 5.5.3 for 
some criticisms of the Commission services.
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the EU's proposals were not accepted but their gist 
was to seek a reduction in the joint management which 
characterises the current system.
5.1.2 ACP
Given the distinction which has been drawn 
between the ACP Group and its Secretariat, I will 
initially concentrate on the latter. It is the body 
whose operational capacity is directly related to the 
operations of the Convention. I must digress here to 
return to an earlier argument which I had advanced on 
the role of the Secretariat. My contention was, and 
is, that the ACP states were unwilling or unlikely to 
entrust, to the ACP Secretariat, issues which were 
sensitive domestically.Their unwillingness stemmed 
from their belief that the Secretariat lacked both 
standing and experience in handling such matters. In 
elaboration of the point, I had cited the issues of 
debt, investment and adjustment.
The ACP distinction between global and 
Convention-specific issues appears, at first sight, to 
offer an alternative explanation. All three areas 
cited are global in nature. In this distinction, the 
Secretariat is unlikely to be offered a role to play 
in global issues because the true consideration of 
such issues lies beyond the Lomé relationship. On 
reflection, however, the two explanations are 
complementary rather than conflicting. They both 
suggest that the perception of the ACP states is that 
discussions on such issues in Brussels will have only
See Sections 3.4.2 on External Credibility and 
3.4.3 on Coordination.
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a marginal effect on the debates and outcomes in the 
MFIs. It is, therefore, not worthwhile devoting 
resources to an insignificant exercise in Brussels.
Having laid the apparent discrepancy to rest, I 
will return to the impact, on the operational capacity 
of the Secretariat, of the distinction between global 
and Convention-specific issues. The first effect has 
been on its physical capacity, in the form of 
manpower, to handle the two sets of issues. The trend 
has been to deploy resources to respond to the more 
manageable. Convention-specific areas. In the trade 
sector, the ACP Secretariat has thus identified, and 
employed, experts to service several different 
matters: the Special Protocols; Customs; Stabex;
Commodities; and general trade issues e.g., access. In 
the area of global issues, financial cooperation is 
handled by one permanent officer although the sector 
covers several different elements such as debt; 
investment; structural adjustment; and the manifold 
aspects of programming (monitoring, evaluation, etc). 
The first effect of the global/specific dichotonomy is 
thus on the basic factor of recruitment although it 
does have an obvious effect on technical capacity.
The second effect of the dichotonomy is positive. 
The ACP Secretariat has acquired greater capability 
from the detailed coverage which it can offer on 
Convention-specific issues. In reflection of this, ACP 
states have made significant demands on the
I must, again, express my appreciation to the 
Deputy Secretary-General of the ACP, Carl Greenidge, 
for his insights on the effect of the distinction on 
the recruitment process.
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Secretariat for analysis of trade issues, 
representation in consultations and negotiations with 
the Community, and advice on trade matters.^ A third, 
less noticeable, effect has been a slight but marked 
increase in international outreach in Convention- 
specific areas. I have already drawn attention to the 
fact that the ACP suffers from low esteem in 
multilateral b o d i e s . yet a comparison between its 
treatment in the MFIs and the GATT, or more recently 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), is instructive.
In the MFIs, the ACP has no standing and, worse, 
no presence. The concerns and experiences of the Group 
are largely articulated through the EU. In GATT, the 
ACP had a more nuanced position. The enactment of each 
Lomé Convention has demanded a request for derogation 
from GATT principles. The ACP has enjoyed a vicarious 
representation, on that issue, in the form of the EU's 
defense of the joint relationship. More importantly, 
over time, the ACP Group had forged a working 
arrangement with the representatives of ACP states at 
the GATT. There is a formal consultation process 
currently in effect. A designated representative of an 
ACP state, at the GATT, is entrusted with the 
coordination of a common position in Geneva. It is no 
coincidence that the issues, covered in the GATT and
Over the years, there have been several such 
demands for assistance. The concerns have included 
aflatoxin in groundnuts from West Africa; derogations 
for tuna from Mauritius and Fiji; and barriers against 
the export of green beans from Kenya.
See Section 3.4.1 for a discussion of Group 
Presence and External Prestige.
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the W T O , 2 5  are trade-related and thus in line with 
greater ACP capability in Convention-specific issues.
5.2 GROUP RESPONSIBILITIES
I had earlier alluded to ACP concerns about the 
limitations on the contribution of EU technical 
cooperation to ACP operational capacity. In 
particular, the ACP was concerned about the limited 
use of ACP nationals as consultants and technical 
experts. The ACP sought to meet those concerns by 
drawing up an ACP roster of technical consultants. The 
exercise was begun in 1989 with two principal 
objectives in view. The first was to build a list of 
ACP nationals as a database. It would be a pool from 
which the Community could identify a reliable set of 
consultants to meet the needs of specific Lomé 
programmes and projects. This objective met the stated 
intention, in the Convention, to create more national 
involvement in programme management and to achieve a 
greater transfer of skills.
Secondly, the roster was an attempt to bolster 
the ACP's own capabilities. It was suggested that the 
scheme, if based on the model of the Commonwealth Fund 
for Technical Cooperation (CFTC), would respond to the 
apparent ACP need for technical expertise in various 
sectors. With its roster, the ACP Secretariat would 
serve as the coordinator of a technical cooperation
2^ The most recent example of ACP involvement in 
trade matters, at the WTO, has been on the complaint 
brought by the United States and Latin American states 
against the regime, under the Lomé Convention, 
governing exports of ACP bananas to the Community.
2^ Article 275 of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention.
241
scheme among its members. The scheme would enhance the 
collective technical capacity of the Group and help 
meet the domestic needs of its member states.
The record of achievement on the roster project 
is indicative of an ACP failure to make use of its own 
potential. As late as mid-1995, some six years later, 
the roster had not been implemented as a project. The 
failure to advance with the project might well be a 
function of the limited resources possessed by the ACP 
Division responsible for financial and technical 
cooperation. It is more likely that the ACP's 
inability to achieve discernible progress is 
indicative of a greater malaise. The failure to 
achieve something which is so much in the ACP's own 
interest says more about its lack of initiative than 
it does about the limitations of the Convention.
As pointed out earlier, the Group has developed 
several extensive programmes on intra-ACP cooperation^ 
but has also failed to build on its good professions. 
The two examples of intra-ACP cooperation and the 
roster of consultants indicate that the responsibility 
for failure cannot be readily evaded by the ACP Group. 
It cannot merely point to the inadequacy of the 
Community's efforts to contribute to the generation of 
operational capacity. It must also acknowledge its own 
contribution in failing to utilise existing 
possibilities to strengthen its capacity.
See the treatment of Projection & Association 
in Section 3.4.1. The ACP Group has formulated three 
such programmes in intra-ACP cooperation: the Suva
(Fiji), Harare (Zimbabwe) and Kingston (Jamaica) 
programmes, named after the cities in which the 
meetings were held.
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The EU has made some efforts to respond to 
perceived areas of weakness in ACP operational 
capacity. Those efforts could be divided into three 
groups. The first set conformed to the standard 
technical assistance models, providing external 
support to ACP recipients to help meet an identified 
need. The second set was a deliberate attempt at 
capacity-building by supporting and strengthening 
existing technical skills. The third involved the 
creation of a national unit to which certain tasks, 
required under the Convention, could be transferred. 
What was unique about each set of efforts was that 
they were not project or programme based but emanated 
from isolated Community initiatives. They were 
presumably chosen in the interests of greater 
effectiveness of Lomé assistance.
The technical assistance which the Community 
offered to Suriname is an example of the first type, 
the traditional form of technical assistance. Suriname 
had considered negotiating an adjustment programme 
with the International Monetary Fund but lacked the 
technical skills to formulate and pursue the 
programme. The Commission assumed responsibility for 
the task and helped draw up the programme. The EU 
initiative had two effects. First, it bought Suriname 
time in which to acquire the necessary skills. 
Secondly, by acting as designer and executor of the 
programme, the Community served as a positive 
intermediary in the adjustment process. The experiment 
was later suspended as Suriname appears to have 
reversed its decision to pursue the programme.^ The
European Union and Structural Adjustment 
Eurodad Briefing Paper, May 1994).
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emphasis here is not on the success or failure of the 
assistance. Rather, it is on the fact that it was 
provided at all and on the motivation behind the
effort.
The support which the EU has provided to the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)^^ is
illustrative of the second effort, aimed at overcoming 
ACP deficiencies in operational capacity. Support was
provided to the traditional regional programme,
focusing on sectors such as transport and 
communication, food security and natural resources. 
The EU also participated actively in the enhancement 
of regional economic integration and trade 
facilitation. 30 It has provided technical assistance 
and undertaken some of the analyses required for trade 
growth and the promotion of integration.
One example of its support was the development of 
a statistical system by the Statistical Office of the 
Community. The system was designed to transfer data 
from the national to a regional database in order to 
provide reliable trade and economic s t a t i s t i c s . it 
was combined with several efforts to develop training 
and educational resources specifically aimed at 
furthering the integration process. The Community's 
contributions to SADC thus represent a conscious 
attempt to build institutional capacities supportive
SADC evolved from the earlier body, the 
Southern African Development Cooperation Conference 
(SADCC).
3° See European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 
1994, op. cit., p. 20.
3^ Europe Information, Southern Africa and the 
European Community (September, 1990), p. 19,
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of integration in the region.
The third form of EU contribution is exemplified 
by the creation of a regional implementation unit 
(RIU) in the Caribbean. The accession of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic to Lomé IV meant that the previous 
method of coordinating regional programming would 
prove awkward. It had been coordinated through the 
Caribbean Forum, with the CARICOM Secretariat as the 
lead agency. Neither of the new members belonged to 
the regional body, CARICOM. The EU and the Commission 
had indicated that they wished to encourage a 
sustainable movement towards democracy in Haiti. As 
part of their efforts, they would place an emphasis on 
strengthening relations between the two neighbouring 
states.33 This emphasis required a change in the 
existing regional coordination to permit greater 
involvement of the two non-CARlCOM states.
Cariforum was established as the body entrusted 
with the coordination of the regional programme but 
the Community insisted on it being established as a
33 Suriname was not a member of the regional body 
either. However, Suriname had enjoyed a longer 
association with the rest of the Caribbean, having 
been a participant in Lomé from the inception. 
Suriname also enjoyed observer status with CARICOM and 
served as a full member of the Caribbean Forum which 
met, under CARICOM, to deal with the regional 
programme of Lomé.
33 Haiti and the Dominican Republic are 
neighbours, sharing one island. See Caribbean Forum 
(Cariforum) of ACP states, "Proposal for a Strategic 
Approach to the Programming of the Caribbean Regional 
Indicative Programme (CRIP) under the Second Financial 
Protocol of the Lomé Convention" (CP 95/05/04) (Paper 
submitted to the Fifth Meeting of Ministers of the 
Caribbean Forum of ACP states).
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separate implementation unit. The unit was distinct 
from the CARICOM Secretariat although it was 
responsible to the CARICOM Secretary-General. Two 
further justifications were offered by the Community 
for the creation of a separate unit. It was an attempt 
to overcome the historical problems of tardy programme 
identification and formulation and a slow disbursement 
rate. Secondly, it reflected the need to ensure that 
the regional programme would not be subsumed in the 
routine workings of the integration movement.
The RIU has been extolled by the Commission as an 
example of a successful attempt to overcome 
programming difficulties.^ The officials within the 
RIU, and thus its technical capacity, are drawn from 
the region. The RIU, therefore, represents a 
utilisation of national capacity. On the other hand, 
the RIU is financed by, and accountable to, the 
Commission for its effective functioning.
In all three forms outlined above, the 
Community's contributions stand out for their exercise 
of initiative in the area of institutional capacity. 
Nonetheless, it remains difficult to determine on what 
criteria the Community bases its decisions to provide 
such assistance. The uncertainty helps create an image
Interview with Commission officials in the 
Caribbean Division, DG VIII. While Cariforum is an 
abbreviation of Caribbean Forum, it is necessary to 
note an important difference. The earlier Caribbean 
Forum was operated under the auspices of CARICOM, with 
Suriname participating for the purpose of coordinating 
the regional programme of Lomé. Cariforum was a 
separate unit, set up by the Commission but outside 
the CARICOM services. It did report to the Secretary- 
General of CARICOM but it served, in essence, as the 
Secretariat of all the regional states on the regional 
programme.
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of an approach which is selective in nature.
5.3 INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS
Within the Convention, there are institutional 
arrangements which have been devoted, inter alia, to 
the promotion of ACP capacity in three important 
sectors: industrial development; agriculture and
trade. The fourth sector of importance, financial and 
technical cooperation, will only be introduced in this 
section. It relates most to the day-to-day operations 
of the Convention and its analysis is linked to the 
issue of management which is given separate treatment. 
In the first two cases, there are organisations 
intended to achieve the stated objectives viz., the 
Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI)^  ^and the 
Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation 
(CTA).
5.3.1 Industrial Cooperation
It has been the common assessment that industrial 
cooperation was, from the outset, an area to which the 
two sides attached widely different importance.^® From
Originally titled the Centre for Industrial 
Development, it was renamed the Centre for the 
Development of Industry in 1983.
See John Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism: The 
Lomé Conventions and North-South Relations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985), especially Chapter 
3, for a description of the negotiations on industrial 
cooperation. A similar view is outlined by Marjorie 
Lister, The European Community and the Developing 
World (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1988), pp. 89-95.
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an ACP perspective, it was critical to the task of 
economic development but the Community's commitment 
was lukewarm at best. In this latter line of thought, 
the industrial cooperation chapter in the Convention 
was almost devoid of specific pledges and mechanisms 
through which the aspirations might be realised. In 
short, an assessment of the contribution of the Lomé 
Conventions to ACP industrial cooperation has to 
recognise that industrial development of the ACP was 
never truly envisaged by the Community.
One main reason might have been that such a 
primary task was beyond the scope of the Lomé 
relationship, given its limitations. Those limitations 
included the level of resources required, the low base 
from which the ACP states would have to move, the 
structural obstacles within the economies of those 
states and the role which the private sectors, in both 
the ACP and EC, would have to play.
There were also other impediments, to the 
promotion of industrial growth, built into the 
Convention. One major obstacle lay in the fact that, 
from its inception, the CDI suffered from a lack of 
funds. Its budgetary resources were 10 million ECUs 
for Lomé I (covering five years and 46 ACP states), 25 
million for Lomé II and 60 million ECUs for Lomé IV 
(over five years and 70 states) . The funding for 
industrial cooperation was to be drawn either from the 
general EOF or, in the case of industrial projects, 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB). In the latter 
case, participation would not be considered in 
projects where the capital investment was less than $2
248
million.
The GDI was also limited in its responsibilities. 
It did not have a responsibility for promoting 
investment through the provision of support to 
interested parties. The Centre, in one analyst's 
assessment, had nothing to offer potential investors 
other than assistance in the identification of 
projects.38 The stringent budget and the restrictions 
on its role had a decisive and limiting effect on the 
GDI. In the words of its second Director, it "could 
not hope to act as agents for industrial development 
in toto in any given state so we have chosen 
priorities".39 The 1984 Annual Report of the Centre 
pointed out that its work was almost like that of a 
missionary, dealing with industries which were "too 
small, too poor and too ill-fated to interest normal 
lending institutions.
The initial role of the GDI was described as 
"reactive", responding to requests emanating from the 
AGP states. The potential for such requests was quite 
great as the Centre had three main tasks:
- to gather and disseminate information on
33 Ravenhill, Collective Cllentellsm..., op. cit.,
p. 261.
38 Ibid., p . 261.
39 "Interview with Dr. Isaac Akinrele", The 
Courier, no. 104, July-August, 1987.
3^ Cited in "The Structure of the GDI, Its 
financing and its tasks". The Courier, no. 104, July- 
August, 1987, p. 15.
"Interview with Dr. Isaac Akinrele", The 
Courier, op. cit.
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conditions and opportunities for industrial 
cooperation;
to have studies carried out on 
possibilities for industrial development and 
to organise and facilitate contacts between 
Community and AGP interests;
to provide specific information and 
support services and help identify 
opportunities for industrial training and
applied research.
In the first of a series of measures intended to 
tailor its capacities to meet demand, the Centre, 
during Lomé II, moved away from the "reactive" policy. 
It shifted to a policy in which the Centre established 
country-by-country intervention programmes for AGP
states. The programmes enabled the GDI to make
selections from the various proposals made by the AGP 
states. The country profiles reduced the AGP's scope 
to make proposals as almost all proposals came from 
the private sector. By definition, the proposals were 
uncoordinated and sporadic in nature. The private 
sectors in most AGP states were not mobilised to deal 
with Lomé applications because they lacked familiarity 
with the operations of the Convention.
Over time, the focus within the GDI shifted 
further towards curtailing AGP demand for its 
services. The Centre emphasised policies which were 
governed by its own budgetary limitations. In Lomé IV, 
the GDI established working relationships with 
financial institutions in the Community. It sought to
See Article 36, First AGP-EEG Convention of
Lomé.
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use its own funds in the provision of seed money for 
projects undertaken in association with the 
institutions. In such projects, the Centre would 
concentrate on the execution of pre-feasibility 
studies and on-the-spot assessments. They were the 
areas in which the GDI might have acquired more 
expertise and in which it could serve as the agent of 
the financial institutions.
The final shift in the operating philosophy of 
the GDI took place during the negotiations for the 
Mid-Term Review. The eligibility criteria for 
assistance were altered to enable the GDI to focus on 
those AGP states which had included industrial 
development as a priority of their national 
indicative programmes. It has been argued by the GDI 
and the Community that the shifts in operating 
procedures reflected attempts to ensure that the 
procedures were attuned to the GDI's financial and 
human resources. It was contended that they were 
intended to achieve efficiency and effectiveness of 
operation.
In respect of the GDI, a major criterion of 
operational capacity is how well did the institutional 
arrangement contribute to increased AGP capability in 
industrial development. When measured against that 
criterion, each of the operational shifts merits 
criticism. From a general perspective, and accepting 
the fact that the GDI's task was not to achieve total 
industrial development, the shifts resulted in a
See Article 89.2 of the Lomé IV Gonvention as 
revised by the agreement signed in Mauritius, the 
Courier No. 155, January-February 1996.
251
narrowing of the range of both ACP requests and 
petitioners. It is generally recognised that 
industrial cooperation has been one of the least 
fruitful aspects of Lomé cooperation. Therefore, any 
policy which resulted in further reducing the 
potential for assistance is open to criticism. The 
move from a "reactive" to a "profiling" policy was a 
negative shift. It might have been cost-efficient but 
it did limit the scope for capacity-building in the 
ACP.
Secondly, the move towards a closer association 
with European financial partners was also subject to 
criticism on two grounds. The first arose from an 
analysis of Lomé which contended that co-financing 
arrangements in EOF projects had led to various types 
of delays. Some of the delays were due to bureaucratic 
procedures when donors failed to agree. Others 
occurred when the Community's development philosophy 
could not be readily blended with that of the partner 
a g e n c y . 44 This was a concern which could not be easily 
ignored in the light of the CDl's limited financial 
resources. Under such constraints, the CDl's 
contribution to the association could only be minimal 
and secondary.
The second ground for criticism was derived from 
the type of projects which were to be assisted by the 
CDl. As the "too small and too poor" of the industrial 
sector, they were unlikely to meet easily the criteria 
of the financial bodies with which the CDl sought 
association. More likely, the association would serve
44 See Marjorie Lister, European Community and the 
Developing World, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
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to pick off the more attractive of the ACP proposals 
and leave the "small and poor" rejected once more.
Finally, the most recent shift to an ordering of 
ACP states eligible for CDl assistance gives rise to 
further criticism. The shift is based on the premise 
that CDl assistance should concentrate on those ACP
states which are prepared to make a financial
contribution of their own resources. The policy is 
exclusionary and helps to restrict further possible 
assistance in a sector where all the ACP states need 
help.
The ACP Group is not without blame for the 
ineffectiveness of the sector. The Group had, from the 
outset, resisted proposals by the Community for a
guarantee scheme to cover Community investors in the 
ACP.^ The absence of the guarantee, while not the sole 
obstacle, did not encourage the levels of investment 
necessary for industrial development. In Lomé III, the 
ACP Group accepted investment guarantees but its 
initial objection had sent a strong negative message 
to European investors. The ACP's objection dated back 
to the early phase of the Convention in the mid- 
1970's. It reflected the zealous manner in which
developing countries guarded control of their economic 
sectors against concessions to foreign investment. It 
also demonstrated a failure on the part of the ACP 
states to recognise the changed economic environment 
of the 1980s. They failed to grasp that concessions
It should be noted that John Ravenhill 
contended that the ACP objection was based as much on 
the substance as on the context and the tone of the 
EEC proposals when they were made in negotiations. See 
Collective C l l e n t e l l s m , op. cit., pp. 270-271.
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were necessary to attract foreign investment. The 
ACP's attitude is an early example of its inability to 
adapt to changed conditions in the relationship.
In summary, the measures taken by the GDI have 
all resulted in a reduction of its contribution to ACP 
operational capacity in the sector of small and 
medium-sized industry. In the trade-off between
efficiency (use of limited resources) and
effectiveness (operational impact), the GDI opted for 
the former, subordinating its parallel responsibility 
to meet the needs of the ACP. It has been the 
operational philosophy of the Centre which has
prevailed over its mission.
5.3.2 Agricultural Cooperation
It is rather difficult to measure the
developmental impact which the Lomé provisions on 
agricultural cooperation had on the ACP states. In the 
early days of the relationship, agricultural 
development was given a high degree of priority in 
project consideration. That emphasis was particularly 
noticeable in the areas of food strategies and rural 
development. A ready assessment of the contribution 
made by the sector to the generation of ACP capacity 
is precluded by the range of projects and the 
diversity of ACP states. The task is made more 
difficult by the lack of a meaningful evaluation of 
such projects. As in the industrial sector, a joint 
body, the Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural
The ACP failure to adapt to changed conditions 
is a topic to which I return later in the Chapter. See 
Section 5.6 for Adaptability to Changed Conditions.
254
Cooperation (CTA)^  ^ was established in the field of 
agricultural cooperation. It was created to play a 
role in promoting agricultural development in the ACP. 
It is less difficult to measure the contribution of 
the CTA than it is to measure that of agricultural 
cooperation in general.
The CTA operates on an even lower resource base 
than does the CDl but its mission is also of a more 
modest nature. The operating budget, in 1992, was just 
5 million ECUs or around 25 million for all of Lomé 
IV. Its role has been defined as helping "to provide 
the intellectual input in the transfer of technology 
and find the scientific and technical information 
which agricultural projects or individuals or research 
specialists or target-groups need to develop their 
a g r i c u l t u r e . "48 The Centre is not involved in 
formulating projects. Rather, it focuses on the 
promotion of research and on helping scientists to 
obtain access to information. It also helps to 
establish programmes to facilitate the interchange of 
ACP researchers and to encourage regional cooperation.
The CTA has recognised its limitations, both in 
its role and resources. In appreciation of these 
constraints, it has tried to build working 
arrangements with national bodies in ACP states. It 
has also opened regional offices, e.g., in the 
Pacific, using regional organisations as agents. The 
CTA's work has been well appreciated within certain
4^ The acronym is derived from the French name for 
the Centre.
48 "Interview with Daniel Assoumou Mba, Head of 
the CTA, The Courier, no. 133, May-June, 1992.
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parameters - those of providing technical information 
and assisting in the transfer of technology - if it is 
to be judged by the requests from ACP sources for its 
assistance. In 1991 alone, the CTA responded to over 
36, 000 such requests.49
The ACP Group, nonetheless, has seen the need to 
increase the limited role of the CTA. The Group has 
consistently maintained that the CTA should be 
strengthened to permit it to play a more active role 
in other areas of agricultural development. These 
areas include the pressing problems of 
desertification, water-use and the control and 
elimination of animal and plant-diseases.^ In spite of 
this continuing concern, it could be said that the CTA 
has made a contribution, albeit limited, to building 
ACP capacity within its restricted remit of 
information dissemination and technology transfer.
5.3.3 Trade Regime
The stated objective of the trade regime is to 
promote and diversify trade between the ACP states and 
the EC, and among the ACP states, through the 
promotion of regional cooperation.^^ This goal is 
linked to enhancing ACP export capacity, both at the 
intra-ACP level and between the Group and the EC, as 
well as to the diversification of ACP export trade.
49 Ibid., p.4.
ACP Group, Memorandum on the Position of the 
ACP Group in its Relations with the European Economic 
Commission (ACP/0023/83 Neg. Rev.4), pp. 102-103.
European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 
1994, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
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There are thus two areas which can be usefully 
examined to see how well the relationship has fared in 
helping the ACP meet these twin objectives. They are 
the overall results in ACP export trade and the 
efforts made in export promotion.
The results of ACP trade have been generally 
poor, with the trend being one of decline. In global 
terms, the ACP Group has never been a significant 
force and accounted for 2.98% of world trade in 1970.^ 
The share had increased, by 1975, to 3.16% but has 
since fallen to 1.36% in 1992. In comparison with all 
developing countries, the ACP has also lost ground. In 
exports of all developing countries in world trade, 
the ACP's share fell from 16.24% in 1970 to only 5.84% 
in 1992. Over the same period, the share of all 
developing countries was rising from 18.3% in 1970 to 
22.67% in 1992.
In the case of exports to the Community, ACP 
trade exhibited similar declining trends. Exports from 
the ACP fell from 8.92% in 1970 to slightly more than 
3% in 1993, in spite of the enlargement of both the 
ACP and the Community during that period. The ACP's 
share of the EC's imports from all developing 
countries also declined, bur at a much slower rate, 
from 37.4% in 1970 to just under 30% in 1993.
The level of processed and manufactured goods in
I rely on the Commission publication, EU-ACP 
Cooperation in 1994, op. cit., pp. 52-53 for the trade 
statistics. As the ACP Group was not constituted in 
1970, I have assumed that the figures for that year 
represented a totalling of the trade of the AASM under 
Yaounde and the associables which collectively became 
the ACP.
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ACP export trade to the EC serves as an indicator of 
export diversification. The level has been rising but 
at a modest and irregular rate. It represented 20% of 
ACP exports in 1976, fell to 16% in 1980 and 15% in 
1985 before rising again to 27% in 1992. Only 
Mauritius in the ACP Group has shown a significant 
degree of diversification in its exports, increasing 
the share of processed and manufactured goods in its 
exports from 16.4% in 1976 to 65% in 1992. Some other 
ACP states have also been able to diversify their 
exports: Kenya, Zimbabwe (and Mauritius) into
textiles; Côte d'Ivoire, Seychelles (and Mauritius) 
into canned tuna; Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria into 
processed rubber. However, these are isolated examples 
which have made only a minor impact on the general 
composition of ACP exports.
The overall trends of decline have been noted by 
the ACP as a cause for deepening concern. The Group 
registered its disquiet prior to the negotiations for 
Lomé IV. It stated that the trade regime had not 
resulted in any increase in the ACP's share of markets 
in the developed countries and in a marked decline in 
its share of the EC's.^^ What the figures convey is a 
failure of the trade regime to help build ACP capacity 
in either export volumes or in diversification of the 
trade. The prevailing system of Lomé trade preferences 
has not managed to benefit the ACP Group because the 
Group has seen its share of the EC market decline 
relative to all other groups of developing countries.
ACP Group, Memorandum on ACP Guidelines for the 
Negotiations for a Fourth ACP/EEC Convention 
(ACP/00/012/88 NEG. Rev. 2), p. 121.
European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 
1994, op. cit., p. 55.
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It should be noted that the decline in ACP export
trade could not be attributed solely to the Lomé trade
regime. There have been two main explanations for the
failure. The first was that of the Community which
ascribed the blame primarily to the failings of the
ACP states:
"Trade preferences are a necessary condition 
but never sufficient. They can only help a 
country's export capacities if they are 
accompanied by adequate internal policies 
and an entrepreneurial spirit. Yet most ACP 
countries have not been able to adopt 
monetary and fiscal policies which could 
create a favourable economic environment in 
which, for example, the real exchange rates 
are maintained at levels that allow for 
competitiveness in the international 
markets.
The above conclusion identified several areas in which 
the ACP states could improve their trade capacity by 
helping themselves: creating a climate suitable for
investment and enterprise (i.e., the private sector); 
monetary and fiscal reform; and greater 
competitiveness.
Yet it is precisely in the area of fiscal and 
monetary policy that the Conventions have been notably 
silent. Until Lomé IV, there had been no provision 
which covered the sector. In fairness, neither side 
had devoted much attention to such questions during 
negotiations for the Convention. The Community viewed 
fiscal and monetary issues as falling clearly within 
the ambit of domestic ACP policy. The implementation 
of provisions to address them would unduly burden 
Commission resources and stray beyond the lines of 
demarcation of ACP sovereignty. Only recently has it 
been possible to address these issues. The opportunity
Ibid. , p. 55.
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has arisen with the advent of structural adjustment 
support programmes in Lomé IV and, more recently, with 
overt multiple conditionality.
The ACP Group was, if anything, more at fault in 
dealing with such issues. It had discussed the
creation of a trade financing facility or trade 
investment bank as part of its intra-ACP cooperation 
as early as Lomé II. However, the Group had made 
little progress beyond the commissioning of a study 
and periodic expressions of intent. The project had 
even been raised in ACP preparations for the
negotiations for Lomé IV^  ^ but it remained an 
unrealised intra-ACP ambition.
On the creation of a propitious environment for 
investment, the ACP failed to recognise the importance 
of encouraging investment as a vehicle for improving 
export capacity. That fact was partly demonstrated by 
its failure to advance with its consideration of the 
trade and investment bank. Its early opposition to the 
provision of investment guarantees for Community 
investors was more indicative of its lack of 
commitment to the idea. Lomé III did accord national 
treatment to Community investors in ACP states, 
ensuring fair treatment, stability of initial 
conditions of investment and more transparent 
investment codes. That was a more encouraging
development. However, it led to little discernible 
improvement in the levels of EC investment as the
early damage had already been done. The ACP, basing 
itself on studies completed under the provisions of
ACP Group, Memorandum on ACP Guidelines . . ., 
op. cit., pp. 125-126.
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Lomé III, called for the establishment of an 
investment support facility in Lomé IV. The call was 
rejected by the Community which refused to consider 
the formation of more institutions under the 
Convention.
The second explanation for the decline in ACP 
export trade was more comprehensive. It blamed the 
trend on the design of the preferential scheme. It 
implicated both the EC and inherent policy problems in 
ACP s t a t e s . That explanation came closer to the ACP's 
own judgement of the operation of the preferential 
scheme. One contention of the explanation was that 
Community policy had adversely affected ACP interests. 
The overall value of ACP preferences had deteriorated 
over time because the Community had reduced its most 
favoured nation (MEN) tariffs on primary products as 
a result of trade liberalisation. The criticism of the 
design of the scheme lay in the fact that Lomé 
extended no new preferences for the more important 
exports of the ACP such as copper, phosphate, cotton 
and crude oil. Lomé preferences only applied to an 
average of 35 to 45% of ACP exports.^
In the area of manufactures, the criticism was 
that the ACP states had lost a substantial part of the
5"^ Ibid. , p. 154.
58 This explanation is typified by Grilli's study 
of the Community's development programme. See Enzo 
Grilli, The European Community and the Developing 
Countries op. cit.., pp. 161-174. This study offers an 
extensive assessment of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences under Lomé in terms of their extent and 
effects.
5" Ibid., p. 166.
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value of Lomé preferences. The loss was a consequence 
of GATT-inspired trade liberalisation and the 
Community's extension of the generalised system of 
preferences (GSP) to other developing countries in 
1971. A very large proportion of manufactures were 
entitled to duty-free entry into the EC under GSP or 
MEN treatment, once they satisfied Community rules of 
origin. Some estimates place the figure at more than 
9 0 % . The ACP states were thus vulnerable to a market 
threat from other developing countries and, given the 
ACP's low manufacturing base, were unlikely to be 
effective competitors. The main exception to GSPs was 
textiles but the ACP gained little advantage in that 
sector. The threatened use of Community safeguards 
ensured that "hyper-sensitive" ACP products, such as 
textiles, were subject to quotas. The design of the 
preference scheme had also failed to assist the ACP in 
the task of diversification.
This second explanation coincided with that of 
the Community on an important point. They both noted 
that the global constraints were exacerbated by the 
internal problems in ACP states which hindered their 
competitiveness in the EC market. They both cited 
overvalued exchange rates and disincentives to 
investment as examples of those problems. The second 
explanation also stressed the negative effects of 
inward-looking policies such as export taxes on 
traditional products, controls on producer prices and 
high domestic protection of manufacturing.
The conclusions are readily apparent, whichever 
explanation or combination of the two is used. The
Ibid., p. 166.
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system of non-reciprocal preferences, under Lomé, did 
not result in a discernible increase in either export 
capacity or export diversification in the ACP states. 
As such, the contribution of the trade regime to ACP 
operational capacity was negligible.
5.3.4 Trade Promotion
The other element of the trade regime, which I 
examine, is that of trade promotion. In Lomé II, 
provision was made for financial and technical 
cooperation to be offered to the ACP in a number of 
areas relating to trade promotion.^ The measures 
covered a wide range of activities including the 
training of officials; product research and quality 
control; development of infrastructure (e.g., 
transport and storage) in support of ACP exports; and 
the participation of ACP states in trade fairs and 
exhibitions. These measures were part of a clear 
effort to generate ACP capacity in activities critical 
to export trade. However, trade promotion has remained 
an area in which there has been a marked lack of 
progress.
The ACP Group has long recognised the constraints 
hampering the effective utilisation of the measures. 
It candidly admitted that many of those constraints 
emanated from deficiencies within the ACP states 
themselves.G2 The Group identified several 
shortcomings: the lack of appropriate trade channels
Article 21 of the Second ACP-EEC Convention of
Lomé.
ACP Group, Memorandum on ACP Guidelines..., op. 
cit., p . 132.
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for marketing agricultural and mineral raw materials; 
the critical absence of physical infrastructure, 
transport and communication facilities; and limited 
expertise in marketing both semi-processed and 
processed agricultural raw materials.
Those constraints resulted in an ACP failure to 
profit from trade promotion measures and to discover 
and diversify markets for its products. The solution, 
proposed by the ACP in the negotiations for Lomé IV, 
was the creation of a Centre for the Development of 
Trade and Services. It would provide information on 
products and markets, product development and training 
in marketing and export promotion. Allied to the 
proposal was a call for a programme, with fixed 
targets and deadlines, of processing, marketing, 
distribution and transport (PMDT) in primary 
commodities, the mainstay of ACP exports.
Neither proposal was accepted by the Community. 
The ACP was aware that the proposal for the Trade 
Centre was subject to a rationalisation of its 
proposed role with that of the CDl. Moreover, the 
Community had a basic objection to the establishment 
of additional institutions in the Convention. In the 
case of PMDT, the Community was agreeable to the 
principle but was unwilling to commit itself to the 
programme. Its fear was that the agreement on targets 
might place it under an obligation to accept some 
quantum of the processed exports from the ACP.
However, the ACP Group held a rather disparaging 
view of the Community's overall commitment to trade 
promotion. It considered that its failure to benefit 
from the provisions was not wholly due to its own
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shortcomings as a group of states. The ACP stressed 
that the most beneficial aspects of trade promotion 
were the very areas in which its states had found it 
most difficult to attract Lomé funding. It asserted 
that the Community was very reluctant to provide 
assistance for the important areas of market research, 
product development and infrastructure support. The 
exception to this reluctance was in the area of 
participation in trade fairs and exhibitions, for 
which activity there seemed to be no difficulty in 
obtaining funding. This exception had given rise to an 
ACP charge that trade promotion, for the EC, meant 
little more than invitations to participate in trade 
exhibitions.
There has been little in-depth study of the 
operation of the trade promotion measures. A study, 
done by the Community's Court of Auditors on the first 
two Conventions,^ helps to vindicate the ACP's 
criticism, it does so both in its figures and its 
analysis. It is necessary to distinguish briefly 
between two sets of funds available for trade 
promotion. The first consists of funds set aside in 
the NIP of individual ACP states. The NIP is drawn up 
at the discretion of the state, with trade promotion 
as only one of several priorities from which it can 
choose. As such, an NIP allocation to trade promotion 
cannot be properly ascribed to the Convention and its 
generation of capacity in this sphere. The second set 
of funding comes from the regional cooperation 
allocation under Lomé. I will focus on this second 
allocation because it is managed by the Commission as
Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the 
Financial Year 1986,(OJ 87/C336).
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programmed funds for trade promotion.
The figures in the study reveal that, during Lomé 
I, 9310 million ECUs, out of a total commitment of 
12667 million for trade promotion under regional 
cooperation, were allocated to fairs and exhibitions. 
The allocation represented 73.5% of the total 
c o m m i t m e n t . The actual payments for participation in 
fairs and exhibitions, 9309 million ECUs out of 11346 
million, represented a staggering 82% of all 
disbursements for trade promotion.
In Lomé II, the figures were less startling: 37% 
of actual disbursements, 5576 million ECUs out of 
15059 million, was given for participation in fairs 
and exhibitions. This appears to be a more equitable 
distribution but it needs to be put in its proper 
context. New responsibilities had been added to the 
trade promotion measures in Lomé II. One such area, 
trade information, alone accounted for almost 13% of 
disbursements. Additionally, the second largest 
disbursement (34%) was for a comprehensive category of 
several areas. They included technical assistance, 
short-term consultancies, trade missions, market 
surveys and reports, and the provision of material 
equipment. When allowance is made for the range and 
scale of these other promotion areas, it is clear that 
trade fairs and exhibitions remained the primary focus 
of trade promotion funding.
In its conclusion, the Court of Auditors 
acknowledged that some of the failings in the
Ibid., Tables 4-7, pp. 138-139. I rely on the 
Report of the Court of Auditors for the figures.
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operation of the trade promotion provisions were 
attributable to the ACP countries. Nonetheless, it 
placed a greater emphasis on the deficiencies in the 
Community's approach which contributed to those 
failings. The Report stated that "the different 
treatment accorded to fairs and exhibitions, on the 
one hand, and other types of measures, on the other, 
makes an integrated approach to trade promotion 
programmes impossible. It went on to list several 
steps which were essential for the success of ACP 
participation in fairs and exhibitions but for which 
the Commission had failed to provide the requisite 
assistance. They included careful selection of fairs 
and exhibitions; design and construction of stands; 
and an adequate follow-up to participation.
The contribution of the trade promotion 
provisions to ACP capacity in the trade sector was 
minimal, from the perspectives of both the ACP and the 
Court of Auditors of the Community. Any potential 
contribution was undermined by the manner in which 
support for trade promotion was skewed towards 
participation in fairs and exhibitions. The fact that 
even that bias was not systematically pursued by the 
Commission further reduced the possibility of a 
positive contribution.
5.3.5 Financial and Technical Cooperation
The most important sector of the Convention is 
that of financial and technical cooperation which 
includes the management and implementation of its 
various projects and programmes. Lomé has attracted
Ibid. , p . 140 .
267
much attention for its novel feature of joint 
evaluation whereby the donor and the recipient states 
are jointly responsible for the appraisal of projects 
and programmes. In other cases of development aid, it 
is the donor which carries out the evaluation.
One measurement of operational capacity is to 
determine what use has been made of the potential 
which joint evaluation offers and how has it 
contributed to ACP institutional capacity. The 
difficulty in measuring such capacity, in the absence 
of directly applicable studies, lies in deciding which 
criteria to use as a means of analysis. I have chosen 
two broad dimensions: the nature of the tasks arising 
from the operation of the Conventions and the role of 
the agents responsible for the execution of these 
tasks.
5.4 TASKS OF MANAGEMENT
The tasks of managing the Lomé Conventions have 
varied over time as the nature of the Convention has 
evolved. The Convention has changed in two directions. 
First, as conditionality emerged, the Convention has 
assumed a more rigorous shape. The intent is to ensure 
that projects and programmes satisfy the identified 
sectoral priorities of the recipient ACP states. A 
concomitant objective has been to ensure that they 
accord more with the Community's own preferences on 
policy guidelines and with its desire for consistency
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in all forms of Community aid.^^ The second change was 
a trend away from the multi-sectoral focus of the 
first two Conventions on areas such as agro-industrial 
projects. The new trend was towards a more sectoral 
approach. The emphasis in Lomé III was on rural 
development. Lomé IV saw the emergence of horizontal 
themes - poverty alleviation, women in development, 
promotion of the private sector - which cut across 
sectors.
Each of the two changes had an impact on the 
tasks demanded of the parties to Lomé and on their 
respective operational capacity. The impact of the 
first, the increase in rigour, has been most visible 
in the operation of Stabex and on the project cycle. 
Recipients of Stabex transfers had long been afforded 
considerable latitude as to their use. With the 
implementation of Lomé IV, the transfer of Stabex 
resources were made subject to agreement on, and 
compliance with, the framework of mutual obligations 
(FMO). The objective of the FMOs, as the Commission 
stated, was to tie in with the sectoral policies of 
the NIP of the recipient and, where applicable, with 
structural adjustment undertakings.^^
The FMOs were also indicative of a wider trend of 
linkage between projects and their sectoral policy 
context. That linkage was laid out in both the NIPs
The Commission has noted that project 
identification, especially since Lomé IV, could be 
complicated in cases where the EC's thematic or 
sectoral preferences did not correspond to an ACP 
Government's priorities. See European Commission, 
Financial and Technical Cooperation under the Lomé 
Conventions in 1993: An Overview (VIII/196/94) , p. 33.
Ibid. , p . 25.
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and the financing agreements between the Commission 
and the ACP partner. The Commission referred to this 
trend as a "stiffening" of Community's demands in 
terms of sectoral policy.They also considered it to 
be a coordination of the process begun with policy 
dialogue under Lomé III and continued with structural 
adjustment aid under Lomé IV.
Linked to this "sectoral conditionality"^ is the 
role which the emphasis on increased rigour played in 
the project cycle. The Commission's reports are 
replete with examples of projects and programmes being 
delayed or even halted by the need to satisfy both 
sectoral and macroeconomic objectives.^ A failure by 
an ACP state to do so was an obvious obstacle to 
access to structural adjustment support (SAS). It was 
also pivotal in the granting of aid for traditional 
projects and programmes. The reports identify, as an 
obstacle, a failure to agree major policy measures 
e.g., land reform, fiscal adjustment, liberalisation 
of key prices or clarification of an institutional or 
regulatory arrangement. The Commission cited the 
example of Madagascar as an ACP state which suffered 
from sectoral conditionality. It had a road 
maintenance programme for 75 million ECUs suspended 
because it failed to enact a required reform of oil 
taxation and to put in place an acceptable road 
maintenance policy.
Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 28. The term is the Commission's.
European Commission, EDF Operations in 1994 - 
Financial and Technical Cooperation under the Lomé 
Convention (VIII/128/95), p. 28.
Ibid. , p. 28.
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The two changes in direction - increase in policy 
rigour or "sectoral conditionality" and the trend 
towards sectoral and "horizontal thematic" emphases - 
have altered the capacity needs of the two parties in 
several ways. They have affected capacity needs in 
technical terms; in terms of human and material 
resources; and in terms of operational control i.e., 
who is responsible for evaluation and other procedural 
steps.
5.5 ROLE OF AGENTS
The changing nature of the capacity needs had a 
clear impact on the agents charged with meeting the 
new demands. In the case of Lomé, there were three 
principal agents: the ACP state in the form of the
National Authorising Officer (NAG) and the two 
representatives of the Community, the Commission 
nominally through the Chief Authorising Officer (CAO), 
and the Delegate of the Commission resident in the ACP 
state. I look at each of these in turn to determine 
what evidence can be found of a demonstrated capacity, 
or lack thereof, to meet operational tasks.
5.5.1 ACP: National Authorising Officer
The ACP has not carried out a detailed evaluation 
of the functioning of the office of the NAO. In order 
to draw my conclusions as to the Group's view, I have 
had to glean information from various documents which 
do not directly address the role of the NAO. Two main 
conclusions emerged from my siftings. The ACP Group 
had taken note of the changes in Community assistance, 
with its emphasis on decentralised cooperation and 
promotion of the private sector. It was conscious of
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the need not to obstruct those changes with state 
bureaucratic intervention.
The first conclusion was that the ACP Group was 
determined that, while the changes were to be 
encouraged, their terms of operation should not call 
into question the underlying inter-governmental nature 
of Lomé. Thus, the Group insisted that, in the case of 
agents of decentralised cooperation, the ACP states 
had the responsibility to coordinate their programmes 
to ensure that the latter "dovetailed" with national 
p r i o r i t i e s . similarly, in the case of the promotion 
of the private sector, the ACP stated that the new 
arrangements (for the private sector) should ensure 
that the ACP states could supervise the activities of 
the sector. They promised to do so with the minimum 
possible scope for bureaucratic disruption by the 
public sector.^
The ACP was supportive of the new trends but, 
rather than radical revision, it preferred 
strengthening of the existing, ineffectual provisions 
in Lomé IV. There are two impressions conveyed by the 
ACP position and they are not wholly complementary. 
The first was that the ACP programme management and 
administration were equal to the additional tasks of 
monitoring of enhanced programmes, now involving the 
private sector and decentralised cooperation. At the 
same time, the ACP stressed, particularly in the case 
of decentralised cooperation, that the implementation
ACP Group, The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth 
Lomé Convention : An Explanatory Memorandum
(ACP/27/001/94 Rev.3), p. 34.
Ibid. , p. 38.
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and management of programmes should be carried out by 
the decentralised agent. The roles of the NAO and the 
Delegate, in such cases, should be limited to 
monitoring the projects. The ACP was signalling that 
it did not wish to increase unnecessarily the workload 
of the NAO. Simultaneously, it wished to maintain its 
inter-governmental oversight of the new trends and to 
avoid placing an extra burden on its management 
resources.
It is from the caveat of this second image that 
I draw my second conclusion about the ACP's assessment 
of the capacity of the NAO. The operational tasks 
facing the NAO amounted to an onerous burden on the 
human and material resources available to the office. 
It was a view which was shared by the Community. 
Consequently, the ACP's request for assistance for 
project and programme management met with the 
Community's approval in the Mid-Term Review^^ although, 
as I demonstrate shortly, not without some attempt at 
modification by the latter.
The post-Fiji study also concluded that the 
multi-component programmes under Lomé III would pose 
obvious management problems for the limited ACP human 
and material resources available for contract 
execution. It cited, as one example, the separate 
tasks involved in the management of a project. It 
listed the drawing up of service contracts for the 
feasibility study; the preparation of the project and 
tender dossiers; and the supervision of the execution 
of the project as well as of one or more contracts for
Article 224(1) of the Fourth ACP-EC Convention 
of Lomé as revised.
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the execution of the project. The AGP saw the request 
for project management assistance as merely increasing 
the resources available to the NAO. Conversely, the 
Community saw the need as indicative of a wider AGP 
inability to meet the demands of joint management.
The AGP Group was particularly concerned, as 
noted a b o v e ,  that the award of EOF contracts 
reflected an increasing use of "rather expensive 
European technical assistance, contrary to Article 275 
( c ) a t  the expense of qualified AGP nationals.^ The 
Group argued that one of its objectives was the 
promotion of sustainable growth which could be 
advanced greatly by the full participation of the AGP 
states in their projects and programmes. It was an 
objective, the Group contended, which was in full 
accord with the Community's new "logical framework and 
integrated approach" for project cycle management.^" 
This criticism by the AGP Group represents a further 
admission by the AGP that its operational capacity has 
been limited. In this case, it was by the lack of 
opportunities available for its nationals.
While the AGP offered little evaluation of its
See "Joint Study on the Implementation 
Procedures", pp. 64-65 in Report and Resolutions of 
the ACP-EEC Development Finance Cooperation Committee : 
Report to the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers (AGP/GEE 
2130/1/93 REV 1).
See Section 5.1.1 above.
The reference is to the Lomé IV Convention.
AGP Group, The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth 
Lomé Convention : An Explanatory Memorandum
(AGP/27/001/94 Rev.3), p. 39.
Ibid. , p . 39.
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own operational capacity, the Community had much more 
to say, in its studies, about the ACP's capabilities. 
The Community shared the ACP's concern about the 
inadequacy of the resources available to the NAO. The 
Court of Auditors was specifically charged with the 
evaluation of Community operations. As such, it only 
examined ACP issues as part of its study of the EOF 
and of selected aspects of Lomé. It thus never had to 
comment on ACP capacity, except in assessments of EOF 
operations as they related to Community bodies.®®
Nonetheless, many of those assessments related to Lomé 
operations and, consequently, did cover aspects of ACP 
capacity.
However, its analyses of the ACP were governed by 
an early appreciation which it had formed of the 
operations of the EOF. The Court stated that EOF
operations assumed, erroneously, that ACP recipients 
were capable of both managing the projects with due 
professional competence and of financing the costs of 
management and upkeep. As this was often not the case,
the Court concluded that EOF projects were in danger
of rapid collapse.®^ That view of the ACP's lack of 
capacity constantly reappeared in Court Reports. In 
dealing with multi-annual training, the Court noted
®° The Court of Auditors reported on Community aid 
to 7 African countries {OJ 82/C344); on Projects and 
Mini-projects in 8 African and Pacific countries (OJ 
85/C326); on Multi-annual Funding (OJ 87/C336); on 
Projects in 4 countries of Equatorial West Africa (OJ 
90/C313); a Special Report on Import Programmes 
carried out under the Sixth EOF (OJ 94/C97/02) and on 
Proposals for the Effective Management of the EOF (OJ 
24/0327).
®^ Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the 
Financial Year 1981 (OJ 82/C344) pp. 118-119.
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"the lack of real planning by the ACP States of their 
own training activities."^ a similar point was made 
in its treatment of import programmes. The Court noted 
that "providing technical assistance for National 
Authorizing Officers would seem to be a good way of 
ensuring that programmes are implemented."®^
The Commission was even more explicit than the 
Court of Auditors. It believed that the exercise of 
managing the project cycle placed an intolerable 
burden on the ACP states. The Commission emphasised 
the human and material constraints facing the NAGS. It 
also highlighted a series of problems which, it 
claimed, were directly attributable to the role of the 
ACP states in project implementation and management.^ 
They consisted of bureaucratic delays and a lack of 
local technical and administrative organisation and 
skills. The bureaucratic delays were the result of the 
presence of the NAOs which represented another 
decision-making layer on top of the supervisory 
Ministry. The lack of organisation and skills was such 
that it could not readily be overcome by the provision 
of technical assistance.
The Commission's position, on the provision of 
assistance for project/programme management, reflected 
its low estimation of the ACP's capacities. It
Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the Year 
1986 (OJ 87/C336j, p. 134.
Court of Auditors, Special Report on Import 
Programmes..., op. cit., p. 30.
European Commission, Annex to the Explanatory 
Memorandum of Negotiating Directions for the Mid-Term 
Review (unnumbered), pp. 7-9.
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proposed that the duties of the office of the NAO be 
decentralised and delegated to a technical management 
unit responsible for implementation. The unit would be 
established at the request of the CAO (i.e., the 
Commission) and be run by an official appointed by the 
NAO, with staff seconded from the national 
administration. However, the Commission would identify 
and appoint technical assistance personnel whom the 
ACP state would be obliged to accept.^
There was an extreme divergence between the two 
positions on the role and capacity of the NAO. The ACP 
had sought increased technical resources for the NAO 
to help carry out the required tasks while the 
Commission wished to remove the tasks from the NAO 
altogether. In the end, the ACP won the debate but the 
Commission's proposal reflected its deep antipathy to 
the office of the NAO and its very low estimation of 
its capacity.
5.5.2 Community: The Commission
When the Commission proposed changes in the 
instruments and procedures of the Convention, it had 
two considerations in mind, its own services and those 
of the ACP. Its proposals were intended to "speed up 
and rationalize implementation by taking account of 
problems and situations" which had come to light in 
the day-to-day functioning of cooperation.^ The 
Commission admitted that some of its own procedures
Ibid. , pp. 9-11.
European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to 
Negotiating Directives for the Mid-Term Review 
(unnumbered), p. 35.
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were ponderous and served as an obstacle to effective 
and rapid decision-making. It also conceded that its 
information and monitoring systems were not as 
efficient as they ought to be for the purpose of 
implementation.
However, the primary concern of the Commission 
was the structural difficulties faced by ACP 
administrations in fulfilling their responsibilities. 
It was to meet this last problem that the Commission 
sought reforms aimed at more rapid and streamlined 
procedures.The Commission first sought the authority 
to make its own decisions on technical assistance. It 
stated that the authority was necessary for drawing up 
the contracts for services relating to the 
preparation, appraisal and evaluation of projects and 
programmes. The first effect of this proposal would 
have been to remove, from the ACP states, their 
existing control over proposed financing for 
activities. Under current provisions, no study or 
expert evaluation could be carried out by the 
Commission, except at the request of the ACP.
Secondly, the Commission had often been faced 
with the need to assume responsibilities of ACP 
national authorities in the preparation and appraisal 
phases of projects. The need arose on numerous 
occasions when the ACP states found it difficult to 
carry out those responsibilities. Accordingly, the 
Commission proposed that it should carry out the task 
of appraisal (thereby excluding the ACP) and be 
provided with the resources to fund any necessary 
studies without reference to the ACP. Third, the
Ibid. , pp. 35-36.
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Commission proposed that its services in Brussels be 
given explicit responsibility for preparing the 
financing proposal for projects and programmes. That 
was a task which had been previously assigned to the 
Commission Delegate. Finally, the implementation 
process would be made smoother by the establishment of 
technical management units, thus circumventing the 
over-concentration of control in the hands of the 
NAOs.
None of the above proposals was agreed in the 
negotiations for the Mid-Term Review but they, 
collectively and individually, revealed a great deal 
of the Commission's thinking on operational capacity. 
The post-Fiji study had pointed to the problems posed 
by some of the internal procedures of the Commission. 
The Court of Auditors had consistently criticised its 
information and monitoring systems.®® Those indications 
of its own deficiencies did not much affect the 
Commission's assessments. It was clearly of the view 
that its operational capacity contributed to greater 
efficiency while the ACP's led to obstacles and delay. 
The ultimate intent of the proposals was to centralise 
a greater control of the project management, 
ostensibly in the name of increased efficiency and 
more speedy implementation.
The proposals had the additional effect of either 
ignoring or belittling the ACP's criticism of the 
Community's increasing monopolisation of technical
®® It is a criticism which occurs in more than one 
of the Reports of the Court of Auditors. See, for 
example, its Special Report on the Coordination of 
Community aid to Third Countries (OJ 84/C224/04) and 
Special Report on the Import Programmes..., op. cit.
279
assistance services. The ACP were not at all confident 
that the criteria used by the Commission to select 
consultants offered a fair opportunity to ACP 
nationals. The Commission's proposals only compounded 
that fear. They sought both to concentrate greater 
technical assistance control in the Commission and to 
remove the ACP states' right to agree to the need for 
such services.
A less overt but important effect was to bring 
into the open an internal difficulty within the 
Commission. It concerned relations between the 
services in Brussels and the Commission Delegations in 
the ACP states. The proposal to remove, from the 
Delegate, the responsibility for the preparation of 
financing proposals for projects was justified by the 
following admission. The existing arrangements could 
give rise to divergences between the positions of 
different Commission representatives. The initial 
draft of the financing proposal was drawn up by the 
Delegate but it could potentially be at odds with the 
final draft drawn up by other Commission officials at 
headquarters.89 The Commission argued that such a state 
of affairs might be tolerable where internal procedure 
was concerned but decidedly not where a third party, 
the relevant ACP state, was involved. It was best, in 
such circumstances, to centralise the process in the 
services in Brussels.
The Court of Auditors had noted and addressed the 
problem of internal coordination, within the
8^ European Commission, Annex to the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Negotiating D i r e c t i v e s , op. cit., 
pp. 6-7.
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Commission, on more than one occasion. In a study on 
the coordination of Community aid,*° it stated that the 
Court had occasionally found coordination problems 
among administrative units supposedly carrying out the 
same policy under a single authority. The Auditors 
acknowledged that the system of overlapping 
responsibilities within the Commission often led to a 
working-level coordination. However, it drew 
attention, in particular, to poor coordination among 
Commission officials working in different countries.
The Court was far more explicit in its study of 
import programmes. It highlighted the poor flow of 
information from Delegates to the central services^! in 
Brussels and the low profile which the central desk 
officers assumed once the financing proposal had been 
s i g n e d . 9 2  The Court also identified differences which 
prevailed between the Delegations and central services 
in their approach to import programmes. The Delegates 
often adopted a "minimalist" approach to the use of 
counterpart funds generated by the programmes. They 
sought to avoid disagreements with the Governments on 
the matter. On the contrary, the central services 
firmly believed that the Commission should not abandon 
the idea of channelling the counterpart funds towards 
the chosen priority sectors.^
9° Court of Auditors, Special Report on the 
Coordination of Community aid to Third Countries op. 
cit.
9^ Court of Auditors, Special Report on the Import 
Programmes, op. cit., p. 21.
9’ Ibid. , p . 23.
99 Ibid. , p. 33.
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There were other aspects of the Community's 
operational capacity which emerged from the various 
studies of the Court. A brief note should be taken of 
the conclusion which the Court had drawn from its 
assessment of the information and monitoring systems. 
The inadequacy of the systems meant that the 
Commission was not in a position to learn, for future 
projects, the appropriate lessons from ongoing 
experiences. The Court had also commented on the 
failure of the Commission to undertake meaningful 
evaluations of its projects and programmes. It was not 
until 1992 that the Evaluation Unit of the Commission 
was strengthened and given an enhanced role.^^ Since 
then, the Unit has assumed a pivotal role in drawing 
up and helping implement the Community's new approach 
to the management of projects, the "logical framework 
and integrated approach". In the case of evaluation, 
the Commission has taken note of the shortcomings in 
its services and has certainly increased its internal 
capacity.
The final aspect of operational capacity within 
the Commission takes me back to the nature of the 
changes which have been occurring in Lomé 
c o o p e r a t i o n . also takes me back to the ACP's
Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the 
Financial Year 1992 (OJ 93/C309) , p. 24.
The formulation and development of the approach 
has been well covered in European Commission, 
Financial and Technical Cooperation under the Lomé 
Conventions in 1993, op.cit., pp. 27-28 and European 
Commission, EOF Operations in 1994 - Financial and 
Technical Cooperation under the Lomé Convention 
(VIII/128/95), p. 30.
See Section 5.4 above.
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operational capacity. The shift to "horizontal- 
thematic" and sectoral approaches generated demands 
for new aspects of capacity. They varied considerably 
from the areas in which the Community had built up its
strength. The new demands were both qualitative and
quantitative in type.
The qualitative demands affected both the 
Commission and the ACP in two distinct forms. The 
first form concerned the new tasks which the managers 
had to meet. Those tasks were readily visible, even in 
programmed aid e.g., the general and sectoral import 
programmes. The sectoral policy guidelines and the 
increased rigour governing implementation required the 
Commission to focus on the economic management of 
recipients. It became involved in a number of such 
areas: the negotiation of a recipient country's
macroeconomic and financial targets; the formulation 
of coherent sectoral policies; monitoring its 
adherence to sectoral conditionalities and 
coordination with other aid donors. The ACP states 
found themselves in the position of respondents,
having to satisfy yet another donor on sectoral and
macroeconomic targets. This demand applied not only to 
structural adjustment support but often to Stabex 
reform and the use of counterpart funds. The tasks of 
managing Lomé aid have been widely diversified on both 
sides.
Not only have the tasks been diversified but so 
too have been the agents required to meet those tasks.
The Commission itself identified most of these 
new tasks. See European Commission, EDF Operations in 
1994..., op. cit., p. 25.
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With the emphasis on decentralised cooperation and 
horizontal themes, the new agents include non­
governmental organisations, youth groups, women's 
organisations, cooperatives, farming bodies and the 
private sector. Neither the ACP nor the EC has had 
much experience in handling such a diversified 
portfolio of aid. Nor have they interacted with so 
wide a variety of possible beneficiaries and managers. 
The first half of Lomé IV had contained provisions for 
decentralised cooperation and the private sector but 
the analysis suggested that the application of the 
provisions had been less than satisfactory.^®
Both sides agreed that the results in the two 
areas had been poor. The respective explanations for 
the poor performance differed but the conclusions were 
identical. The experience of Lomé had offered no 
lessons as to how to handle the new areas. The 
provisions agreed in the Mid-Term Review represent 
unchartered territory in the management of Lomé 
cooperation. The Commission itself raised some of the 
problems which were posed by decentralised 
cooperation. It also raised those problems which 
resulted from handling a wide variety of partners. It 
further alluded to additional problems likely to 
result from decentralised cooperation. The sources of 
problems included increased private sector
For a brief assessment of decentralised 
cooperation and the promotion of the private sector, 
see ACP Group, The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Lomé 
Convention..., op. cit., p. 34 and pp. 37-38 
respectively. The Commission looked at the issues in 
more detail. See European Commission, Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Negotiating Directives..., op. cit., 
pp. 15-16 and pp. 25-26 for treatment of decentralised 
cooperation and the promotion of the private sector 
respectively.
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involvement; the choice of partner for a specific 
project; what type of contract to use with 
decentralised agents; and how best to monitor on-going 
work.
The quantitative aspects of the new capacity 
demands undoubtedly affect the ACP states because, by 
their own admission, they do require human and 
material assistance for programme management. However, 
my concern, at this point, is with the Community. 
Commission reports have been forthright in their 
analysis. The Commission faced a growing problem of 
management constraints at the institutional level and, 
in particular, of staffing levels in its Development 
Directorate, DG VIII. One main cause of the 
constraints has been the fact that the Commission has 
been beset by pressures which reinforce each other. 
It has had to face budgetary limitations on 
recruitment while seeking to meet an increased set of 
responsibilities e.g., undertaking programmes in 
Eastern Europe. The increasingly complex tasks of Lomé 
project/programme management were met by frozen staff 
levels or, in effect, reduced levels due to 
redeployment to other divisions.
The Commission identified some measures taken to 
deal with the problem: redeployment and reorganisation 
within the Commission, decentralisation, training and
European Commission, EDF Operations in 1994..., 
op. cit., p . 29.
100 European Commission, Financial and Technical 
Cooperation in 1993..., op. cit., pp. 29-30. The issue 
was clearly of great import for concerns about 
staffing were repeated in the next year's report. See 
European Commission, EDF Operations in 1994..., op. 
cit., p. 33.
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computerisation. It contended that those measures 
could only have a limited effect and that limit was 
close to being met. The problem has only been 
compounded in the specific case of its Lomé policy. In 
view of the staffing problems which it faces, it has 
had to resort to a greater use of technical assistance 
in the management of Lomé. This tendency has 
accentuated the difficulties which the ACP Group has 
with the Community bias in the selection of 
consultants.
The dilemma, within the Commission, poses a 
further problem for the ACP Group which is very 
conscious of the attrition affecting the Commission. 
The problem stems from the fact that the staffing 
problem in the central services of the Commission has 
been mirrored by a number of closures of Commission 
Delegations in ACP states. The Delegations are vital 
in the joint appraisal process and in the preparation 
of financing proposals for projects. Thus, the closure 
of an office is unlikely to contribute to a smooth 
management of the cooperation programme in the ACP 
state affected.
5.5.3 Community: The Delegate
By the Mid-Term Review, the ACP and the
101 This problem is covered in Section 5.5.1.
102 This point was made in my interview with Carl 
Greenidge, Deputy Secretary-General of the ACP. He 
expressed the concern of the ACP at the implications, 
for the implementation of the Convention, of a 
possible rundown in Commission services.
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Commission had come to hold diametrically opposed 
views on the role of the Commission Delegate. The 
Commission's opinion was that the existing provisions 
gave some undesirable responsibilities to the 
Delegate. They were responsibilities which could place 
the Delegation in potential conflict with the central 
services of the Commission. The latter wished to alter 
those which called for the Delegate to be involved in 
matters which were either the ultimate responsibility 
of the NAO (preparation and execution of projects) or 
subject to joint responsibility (evaluation) .
The changes were intended to give the Commission 
joint responsibility, with the NAO, for preparation 
and execution. Evaluation would be the sole 
responsibility of the C o m m i s s i o n .  The Commission 
contended that the relevant powers were only delegated 
to its representatives in the ACP states. They thus 
represented no real transfer or decentralisation of 
authority. In any event, if the Commission acquired an 
enhanced role in the project or programme financing 
cycle, the existing provisions would have to be 
deleted or amended, as appropriate.
The ACP Group, on the contrary, argued for 
greater decentralisation of decision-making powers to 
both the NAO and the Delegate. In the latter case, the 
Group specifically proposed that the Delegate be given 
sufficient authority to overcome delays in the 
decision-making process e.g., in tender and contract
The responsibilities under discussion are 
covered in Article 317 (a), (b), (c) and (k) of the
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé.
European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Negotiating Directives..., op. cit.,p. 21.
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p r o c e d u r e s . The ACP Group was deeply opposed to the 
Community's intention to transfer authority from the 
Delegate back to Brussels. In the Group's view, it 
would complicate, rather than facilitate, the more 
rapid implementation of projects.
It is difficult to say whether the two sets of 
proposals were based on an appreciation of the
operational capacity of the Commission Delegations. In 
other words, it is uncertain that the Commission had 
a low estimation of the functioning of its
representatives or that the ACP held the work of the 
Delegates in high regard. What was unquestionable was 
the desire of the Commission to deal directly with
what it saw as factors contributing to inefficient 
procedures. It felt that it was unnecessary to have to 
do so through an intermediary, be it its own
representative or not. For its part, the ACP saw the 
Delegate as a more accessible presence of the
Community, thus allowing for more ready contact and a 
less time-consuming process of implementation.
The operational capacity of the Delegates and 
their offices have been examined, to varying degrees, 
by the Court of Auditors. I have already raised some 
of its conclusions. The Court had concluded that 
coordination between the Delegates and the central 
services of the Commission did not always function 
s m o o t h l y .  jt went on to indicate that, in such 
instances, the breakdown often led to the Delegate
ACP Group, The Mid-Term Review of the Fourth 
Lomé Convention..., op.cit., pp. 41-42.
Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 2 on the 
Import Programmes, op. cit., p. 22.
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lacking a clear idea of his duties.
In an earlier evaluation of multi-annual training 
programmes, the Court had highlighted the lack of 
suitable expertise.It was referring, in this case, 
to training experts within the Commission Delegations. 
At that time, in 1986, there were only two such posts 
in all the Delegations. The Court was convinced that 
the shortage severely limited the ability of the 
Delegations to help the ACP states overcome their 
resource deficiencies in that area.
The Court devoted most attention to the 
Delegations in its study of import programmes where it 
identified a number of failings on the part of the 
o f f i c e s . I t  cited ineffective dialogue with the 
NAOs; overdependence on technical assistance 
consultants for the preparation of reports; ill- 
defined terms of reference for these consultants; 
inadequate preparation and monitoring of programmes; 
and poor feedback to the central services of the 
Commission. Not all of these shortcomings were wholly 
attributable to the Delegate. The Court did stress 
that the import programmes did not have a clear 
operational framework delineated in Brussels. 
Additionally, the structure of the central departments 
in Brussels were poorly suited to the effective 
monitoring of import programmes.
The Court also highlighted the lack of resources
Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the 
Financial Year 1986, op.cit.
Court of Auditors, Special Report on Import 
Programmes..., op.cit.
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at the Delegate's command. The Delegations were unable 
to oversee the implementation of import programme on 
a routine basis. They were usually inadequately 
equipped to deal with the demands of preparing and 
monitoring such a comprehensive programme. The 
programmes required, for example, an adequate 
knowledge of prevailing banking and trading procedures 
so as to manage the generation and use of counterpart 
funds derived from a number of o p e r a t i o n s .  one
sense, the Report of the Court castigated the 
Commission almost as much as it did the Delegations. 
In mitigation, it should be said that the import 
programmes were a novel feature of Lomé III and 
represented a set of complex, large-scale programmes. 
They presented unfamiliar and difficult problems for 
both Delegations and Commission services.
It is apparent that the Delegations are not as 
well equipped as they should be and often have to 
resort to the use of consultants. However, it would 
seem chat the Delegate, given the limited resources 
available, is best suited to handling the more 
traditional duties within the project cycle. The 
additional tasks which fall to the office, as the 
Report on the import programmes suggests, require more 
specialised skills and expertise. These skills do not 
routinely form part of the roster of an average 
Delegation. One impression gained from the analyses is 
that the role of the Delegate is a fluid one, 
constantly evolving as clearer images emerge of the 
demands which might be placed on the office. It 
remains to be seen in what ways the staffing and 
administrative constraints of the Commission will
Ibid. , p . 30.
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affect its ability to equip the Delegations to meet 
future demands.
5.6 ADAPTABILITY TO CHANGED CONDITIONS
The concept of sustainability has been 
increasingly mentioned by the ACP Group. I have 
earlier alluded to the concern of the Group, in the 
Mid-Term Review, to promote sustainable growth by 
encouraging the use of ACP human resources.A former 
ACP Secretary-General offered a more reflective view 
of ACP objectives in Lomé cooperation. He suggested 
that ACP states could be said to have failed if the 
cooperation had not resulted in an increase of their 
own capacities to handle the tasks of development.
It is an appreciation which the Convention itself 
enunciated in the provisions of Lomé III. It stated 
that the aim of financial and technical cooperation 
was "to do away progressively with the need it 
fulfils.
The Court of Auditors, on the Community's side, 
echoed that commitment to the goal of sustainability 
in its evaluation of the import programmes. It noted 
that "the import programmes of the sixth EDF (Lomé 
III) were supposed to aid the recovery of the 
manufacturing sectors of the ACP states and thus
no See Sections 4.3.1 and 5.1 above.
Ill Interview with Edwin Carrington, Secretary- 
General of CARICOM. He formerly served as Deputy 
Secretary-General of the ACP during Lomé I & II and as 
Secretary-General for the duration of Lomé III.
112 Article 188(1) of the Third ACP-EEC Convention 
of Lomé.
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eliminate the needs they were supposed to satisfy.
The struggle to achieve this objective of 
sustainable development is still underway. My research 
is just one attempt to assess how well it has fared in 
the area of capacity building. A major component of 
the struggle for sustainability is the generation of 
capabilities which can be utilised in the changing 
conditions which are the essence of the process of 
development. In the light of the foregoing treatment 
of operational capacity, an effort can be made to 
determine what this capacity augurs for adaptability.
I focus on just a few issues as examples of 
changed conditions: one internal to the relationship, 
the FMOs in the Stabex programme; one external to 
the relationship, the changes in the global trade 
regime under GATT; and an amalgam of internal and 
external conditions, the introduction of sectoral 
emphases and rigour^^ in the Seventh EDF. The first 
and third have already been discussed so I need not 
dwell on their details. The second is discussed more 
extensively.
At a general level, I must note that the initial 
advantage of adaptation lay with the Community as all 
three examples of changed conditions were inspired and
Court of Auditors, Special Report on Import 
Programmes..., op. cit., p. 28.
See Sections 2.1.4 and 5.4 for a treatment of 
the FMOs.
The issue is raised in Section 5.4 and 
developed in Section 5.5.2.
The Seventh EDF covered Lomé IV.
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implemented by the donor grouping. It was thus better 
able to anticipate the likely impact of the changes on 
Lomé and to organise its own reaction. The ACP coped 
much less competently.
In the case of the FMOs, my earlier examination 
revealed that some ACP states were wary of the tighter 
controls which the FMOs heralded.They were also 
concerned by the potential of the FMOs for intrusion 
into the domain of domestic economic policy. The 
Commission has admitted that the application of the 
FMOs placed a heavy burden on both sides and caused 
delays of months in the transfer of Stabex f u n d s .  
Except in the case of Stabex funds used for structural 
adjustment, ACP efforts to comply with FMO 
requirements led to long delays in gaining access to 
foreign exchange or counterpart funds. The conclusion 
drawn from this first example is that the ACP's 
capacity to adapt to the FMOs was even lower than 
normal. This conclusion might have been expected, 
given the additional demands which the FMO agreements 
posed. They required the ACP states involved to supply 
more comprehensive economic details and satisfy 
additional criteria.
The new sectoral emphases in EDF aid, and the 
stricter conditions which they entailed, also revealed 
severe constraints on the ACP's capacity to respond. 
The Commission established a linkage between the 
implementation of Governmental reforms and the 
granting of Community aid. The initiation and
117 See Section 2.1.4.
European Commission, EDF Operations in 
1994..., op. cit., p. 16.
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implementation of projects and programmes, even of the 
traditional type, were made subject to prior changes 
in economic policies in the sector in question. The 
changes were especially demanded in policies which 
affected the long-term viability of the planned 
operation.
The efforts at sectoral rigour have resulted in 
a more complicated process of project implementation. 
On average, about 20-30 months elapse between project 
identification and the corresponding primary 
commitment i.e., the financing decision.The time- 
lags occur in the process of satisfying the new 
emphases. These emphases have placed greater burdens 
on ACP capacity, thus generating the delays which 
correspond to roughly one-half the life of the 
Convention.
The time-lags represent a major obstacle to 
project management when put into the context of the 
Convention. The ratification process of the Convention 
suffers from customary delays and most ACP states take 
about one year to agree on programming.The time-lags 
average about two years in the initial phase of 
implementation. By 1993, with more than half of Lomé 
IV expired, some 41 countries (out of 69 ACP states) 
had obtained primary commitment on 50% or less of
European Commission, Financial and Technical 
Cooperation under the Lomé Conventions in 1993, 
op.cit., p. 23. The financing of an EDF project 
follows three stages: the primary commitment or
decision to finance; secondary commitment with the 
signing of a contract or acceptance of an estimate; 
and the payment or disbursement of funds.
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their projects. The figures speak for themselves: 
the ACP states are failing to adapt effectively to the 
new conditions posed by sectoral rigour.
The third example relates to the impact which the 
changes in the global trade regime, agreed in the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT, had on the trading 
positions of the two Groups. The GATT changes impacted 
directly on commodity exports from the ACP, most 
notably on bananas. ACP banana producers account for 
only a small portion of the Group. However, their 
responsiveness can be taken as only one example of the 
general ACP capacity to adapt to changed conditions.
The impending changes to the conditions governing 
the Banana Protocol were apparent, well in advance of 
the negotiations for Lomé IV. The changes had been a 
main item of discussion at a Conference, on the 
implications of 1992, hosted by the West India 
Committee in London in 1988. It discussed the concerns 
of the banana producers in the context of both the 
Single Market and the Uruguay Round. The main strategy 
of the ACP producers has been to seek special 
protection within the Community market. It was an 
approach which has placed both them and the Community 
at odds with other participants in the WTO (World 
Trading Organisation), the successor to the GATT. The 
matter of EC protection for ACP bananas is currently 
under adjudication in the WTO.
The response of the ACP banana producers to the 
problem is symptomatic of a wider ACP malaise: its
Ibid., Annexe 3. It has to be noted, however, 
that the list included 7 countries with which aid had 
been suspended.
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failure or incapacity to diversify its production and 
destinations of its exports. In the face of the 
threats posed by the Uruguay Round to its commodity 
trade with the EC, the general ACP position was to 
insist that the Community preserve ACP preferences. 
Where any loss of preference ensued, they insisted 
that the Community offset it by "clear quantifiable 
compensation". The ACP was adamant that the 
provisions of trade cooperation, in the Lomé 
Convention, specifically addressed ACP-EEC trade. The 
Group was not prepared to accept the "vague promises 
by the Community to assist the ACP to find alternative 
markets.
It was a painful trade-off which the ACP states 
faced. On one hand, they faced persuading the 
Community to help design and underwrite a policy of 
trade and export diversification. Such a policy could 
lead to trade diversion which would impact negatively 
on their preferences. On the other hand, an ACP 
failure to adapt its policies increased the likelihood 
of having to accept changes which affected ACP 
preferences but were decided in an international 
forum.
This trade-off was the basis of the dilemma 
confronting the banana producers. It helps to 
demonstrate why their issue exemplifies the wider ACP 
stance. The ACP Group has chosen to ignore the 
fundamental importance of the trade-off to its own
ACP Group, Memorandum on the Guidelines for 
the Negotiations for a Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, op. 
cit., pp. 123-124.
Ibid. , p . 124 .
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trade development for both capacity and tactical 
reasons. In the latter regard, it considered the 
Community's encouragement and support for 
diversification as a ploy designed to deflect ACP 
demands for continued preferential access. The major 
constraint, for the ACP, was its capacity. It was 
unable to formulate viable alternatives to the threats 
which trade liberalisation, under the Uruguay Round, 
posed to its exports. In that sense, changed 
conditions in trade found the ACP unable to mobilise 
the requisite capacity to compete in the liberalised 
global market.
5.7 CONCLUSION
The examination of Lomé's contribution to 
operational capacity reveals that the Community, in 
the guise of the Commission, has been better able to 
gain from the experience. Its operations have come 
under greater scrutiny and evaluation, with the areas 
for improvement being emphasised. Efforts have 
specifically been made in evaluation and monitoring to 
respond to the need for improved performance. There 
still remain other areas of challenge e.g., the level 
of staffing and range of skills. On the evidence, 
however, the Community's operational capacity has 
increased, not deteriorated.
The report on the ACP is much less positive. I 
distinguish between issues and agents. Focusing on the 
former first, I conclude that the ACP Group has 
managed to increase its capacity in certain aspects 
closely linked to Lomé operations, particularly trade. 
The Group has fared worse on the "global issues" which 
have a wider resonance as part of international
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economic policy e.g., debt and structural adjustment.
From a more general perspective, the ACP Group 
has failed to acquire the capacity to carry out fully 
its responsibilities to help manage the implementation 
of the Convention. This failure has contributed, in no 
small part, to the multiplicity of problems which they 
face in project and programme management. The overall 
effect is that the ACP Group has not gained sufficient 
operational capacity to make their task of development 
any less burdensome. After twenty years of cooperation 
covering all sectors of their economies, the ACP 
states have failed to demonstrate the expected 
progress in development. It is a disappointing 
conclusion for both parties but it is useful to gauge 
the differences in reaction between the two parties to 
the Convention.
The ACP states, as might be expected, have 
persevered in their efforts. They cling to the hope 
that the cooperation will still contribute to an 
increase of their capabilities and skills. This 
position reflects both impotence and desperation in 
the Group. Its desperation stems from the apparent 
inevitability of events. Changes in Stabex, increased 
rigour in project management and the insertion of 
political considerations into the Convention were all 
new developments which culminated in multiple 
conditionality. The ACP was either oblivious to the 
looming dangers or unable to stave them off. The 
Group's impotence is closely linked to its operational 
capacity. Some dangers were recognised. However, the 
capability to fashion alternatives in a technically 
competent manner appeared beyond the ACP. It could not 
do so in the case of trade reforms or in the case of
conditionality. Its sole recourse has been to ignore 
the implications of the changes for the relationship 
and blithely accept each lower level of satisfaction 
which the changes introduce.
The Community has adopted a less optimistic 
approach to operational difficulties. The choice in 
such circumstances is between two options: greater
efforts at strengthening AGP capabilities and assuming 
a greater responsibility for the tasks. The 
experiences have been viewed as so unproductive that 
the Community has chosen to turn away from efforts at 
building AC? capacity. It has moved increasingly 
towards a centralisation of powers in its own 
services. Its first inclination has been to choose the 
easier option in dealing with the structural problem 
of effective management of cooperation.
The Community has chosen to set up implementation 
units rather than pursue sustainable capacity-building 
in the AGP states. The latter is seen as too costly, 
both in time and in political accountability. This 
choice of the more facile option was demonstrated in 
the Community's advocacy of a regional implementation 
unit for the Caribbean. It was also demonstrated by 
its unsuccessful championing of more widely applicable 
technical management units for the implementation of 
the NIPs.
A second feature is that many of the Commission's 
proposals for change in the management of cooperation 
emanated from its own agenda. They were not 
necessarily based on the lessons of the Lomé 
experience. They owed more to the need for internal 
accountability to the Community's political masters.
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Above all, they were based on the need to heed the 
criticisms by the Court of Auditors of the 
Commission's role in the operations of the EOF.
The examination of operational capacity 
substantiates the conclusion reached in the previous 
Chapter. The Community exercised a pervasive 
operational control and sought to extend and formalise 
that control. It tried to do so through the 
centralisation of responsibilities in its Brussels 
services. It was even prepared to divest its 
Delegations of authority to enhance its central 
control. This focus was also illustrated by its 
attempts to rationalise programme management in ACP 
states through the establishment of technical 
management units, the staff of which would be chosen 
by the Commission.
The most common characteristic of the Community's 
reaction on operational matters and problems has been 
retrenchment. This tendency is evident in most of the 
proposals, made by the Commission in the Mid-Term 
Review, on procedures, evaluation and implementation. 
The tendency has a readily apparent implication for 
multiple conditionality. It bespeaks a fatalistic 
conclusion by the Community that the ACP states are 
unlikely to succeed in overcoming their constraints. 
It further suggests that the demands of conditional 
cooperation will have to be increasingly met by the 
Community's own resources, with less reliance on 
shared management with the ACP. It raises the 
intriguing question of how, and with what measures, 
the two sides have prepared for these new demands. The 
next Chapter, on instrumental capacity, attempts to 
answer this question.
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CHAPTER 6 
INSTRUMENTAL CAPACITY
In this Chapter, I deal with instrumental 
capacity, the final aspect of institutional capacity. 
1 focus, first, on the nature of the tasks which are 
posed by the introduction of multiple conditionality. 
Secondly, 1 examine the measures which have been 
identified to meet these tasks. 1 then seek to 
determine how well the measures envisaged match the 
tasks. Finally, 1 draw some conclusions as to possible 
ways in which the effect of instrumental capacity 
might be enhanced.
6.1 SOME CONSIDERATIONS
6.1.1 Nature of Tasks
Before dealing with the four sections, 1 need to 
address some considerations which affect the first 
three issues to be covered in the Chapter. At first 
sight, the nature of the tasks appears to be simple 
and obvious: the promotion of economic and
sociopolitical reforms within ACP states. Instrumental 
capacity, in such a context, consists of the measures 
required to achieve the stated goals of economic and 
political liberalisation and good governance. These 
measures include the démocratisation of the political 
process, promotion of the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and economic reform. However, a deeper 
consideration suggests that the tasks go beyond the 
agreement and introduction of these provisions. It 
also includes their long-term acceptance and
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application by the ACP states.
One assessment of the macroeconomic reforms of 
structural adjustment concluded that the success of 
reform measures depends, primarily, on two factors. 
The first is the scope and content of the measures. 
The second is their consolidation i.e., their 
institutionalisation within the policy system.^ In 
short, instrumental capacity needs to address both the 
immediate task of attaining the objectives sought and 
the means of ensuring their entrenchment. In the 
latter regard, there is no set of measures which has 
been tried and proven as a reliable method of 
institutionalising reform. However, there does appear 
to be a common and growing accord as to what is 
necessary, if not sufficient, for encouraging the 
process.
Within the traditional approach to development 
projects and programmes,^ three such contributory 
factors have been identified. The first is a 
recognition that the maintenance and operation i.e..
 ^ See Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman, 
"Introduction: Institutions and Economic Adjustment", 
pp. 6-7 in Haggard & Kaufman eds. , The Politics of 
Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992).
 ^ I use the work of three such officials as 
illustrative of the trend in thinking among World Bank 
officials that close attention should be paid to 
institutional factors in development management. See, 
for example, Arturo Israel, Institutional Development : 
Incentives to Performance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987); Samuel Paul, Institutional 
Development in World Bank Projects: A Cross-Sectoral 
Review (World Bank, April 1990: WPS 392); and Lawrence 
Salmen, Institutional Dimensions of Poverty Reduction 
(World Bank, May 1990: WPS 411).
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the long-term aspects, of development projects are as 
important as their design and i n i t i a t i o n .  ^The second 
factor is that the sustainability of projects demands 
a greater focus on the needs of beneficiaries.^ The 
third is that a primary goal of project design should 
be to allow interplay between formal organisations - 
public, private and voluntary - and the informal, non- 
organisational institutions of the less affluent.^
These latter institutions include legal and 
religious practices, the role of the family and forms 
of hierarchical authority e.g., local elites. They 
often determine the prevailing patterns of behaviour 
of the poor who are the most likely targets of the 
projects. However, these institutions are social in 
nature and prove subtle and elusive to define. It is 
thus very difficult to cater for them in operational 
terms. Nonetheless, several forms of informal bodies 
do exist and they offer operational forms of voice for 
the poor. A small list of such bodies is given in my 
treatment of the "greenhouse approach" which 
immediately follows this section. They include 
informal sector entrepreneurs, women's groups and 
community-based associations.
The "greenhouse approach"^ to projects and
 ^Israel, Institutional Development..., op. cit.,
p . 4 .
Paul, Institutional Development in World Bank 
Projects..., op. cit., passim.
 ^ Salmen, Institutional Dimensions of Poverty 
Reduction, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
 ^For a description of the "greenhouse approach", 
see Goran Hyden, "Creating an Enabling Environment" in 
The Long-Term Study of Sub-Saharan Africa: Background
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programmes is one example of alternative thinking on 
projects and programmes. This approach rejects the 
notion that human and institutional capacity can be 
built in a mechanistic fashion. It stresses, 
conversely, the need to create the conditions, the 
"enabling environment", under which capacities which 
already exist in recipient countries can be nurtured. 
Existing local know-how and efforts - community-based 
organisations, informal sector entrepreneurs, women's 
groups, etc. - constitute anchor points to which 
higher levels of societal action - Governments, 
businesses, NGOs and donors - should be connected for 
the basis of development.^
Both the traditional and the alternative 
approaches lay emphasis on the inclusion of social and 
political elements at the outset of efforts to build 
institutional capacity. This emphasis has also 
characterised the perceptions of Commission officials 
in their approach to Lomé reforms. Attention has 
already been drawn to the specific support which had 
been given to sociopolitical measures in programming 
and to the role of sectoral programming in the SAS of 
the Community.G
Papers, Vol.3:Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990).
 ^ Ibid., p. 74. Hyden's category of local efforts 
and know-how is one set of the informal, social 
institutions identified by Salmen (see footnote 5 
above). They represent a group of associations of the 
beneficiaries of projects and are thus not difficult 
to include operationally in design and implementation.
® Interview with Bernard Petit, Head of the 
Adjustment and Planning Division, DG VIII of the 
Commission in Brussels in September,1995. The measures 
mentioned have been covered earlier in Chapter 5. See
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Commission officials have also expressed the need 
for more sectoral and social science expertise to 
enable it to handle areas such as women in 
development, transport and the agrarian sector.  ^More 
specifically, the Commission, in its contribution to 
the coordination of donor efforts, stressed the 
importance of supporting Governments in the management 
of the political process of policy reform. This 
support was to be given through "a closer and 
permanent cooperation between the public sector, 
business associations, trade unions and associations 
representing those lacking voice, such as farmers' 
associations".^
The position of the Commission was that such 
cooperation should be institutionalised with the 
involvement of the private sector and civic groups in 
the implementation of economic reforms. This 
institutionalisation would help in several ways. It 
would help to improve the content of policies, 
ameliorate the implementation of reforms, increase the 
credibility of the programme and develop the technical 
capacity and knowledge of the administration.
Section 5.4 above.
 ^ Interview with Peter Pooley, Deputy Director- 
General of DG VIII of the Commission in September, 
1995.
European Commission, The Design of Economic 
Reform in the Context of Political Liberalization: 
Findings and Conclusions from Case Studies (December, 
1994: Paper prepared for the Meeting of the Special
Programme for Africa in January, 1995), p. 21.
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6.1.2 Identification of Measures
The consensus of all three perspectives - the 
traditional, the alternative and the Commission's - is 
that there has to be a collective approach 
encompassing the public, private, voluntary and 
informal sectors. They need to be involved in both the 
initial stage of programme design and the process of 
implementation. This recognition suggests that the 
examination of the measures, in the Lomé relationship, 
identified to meet the tasks of multiple 
conditionality should cover two sets of provisions. 
These are the specific provisions proposed in the 
revised Convention and in Lomé IV itself as well as 
those covering sociopolitical issues e.g., 
decentralised cooperation, youth and women. It is 
through consideration of the latter that a judgement 
can be made on what steps have been taken to build an 
enabling environment for the consolidation of reform.
I must, however, expand on an element raised 
above i.e., that the measures identified to meet 
multiple conditionality do include some already agreed 
in Lomé IV. Some explanation is required here lest it 
be seen as contradictory that some aspects of 
instrumental capacity, designed to help implement 
multiple conditionality, pre-date the application of 
the conditionality programme. The explanation lies in 
an intellectual sleight-of-hand perpetuated by the 
Community. Prior to the negotiation of the Mid-Term 
Review, the Community had never explicitly stated its 
desire to impose conditions on the granting of aid to 
the ACP. The SAS programme under Lomé IV was depicted 
as bolstering the efforts of ACP states in adjustment 
programmes to meet the largely neglected social
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consequences of such adjustment. 11
During the preparations for the negotiation, the 
Community engaged in a retrospective interpretation of 
the SAS, casting it as the first pillar of 
conditionality in the economic sector. The Commission 
stated that a linkage had been established between the 
implementation of Government measures and the granting 
of Community aid.^ It further indicated that, on the 
macroeconomic level, the release of funds under the 
SAS was directly linked to the proper implementation 
of the economic measures agreed with donors. I have 
already dealt with the increasing rigour attached to 
Stabex allocations through the FMOs.
The most graphic example of the retrospective 
interpretation of provisions of Lomé as conditionality 
occurred in the political arena. It was that of 
Article 5 which was used as a basis for sanctions, 
first, against Haiti and later against several other 
ACP states.^ i have earlier dealt with the application 
of Article 5 to Haiti. ^  It will be recalled that
See Sections 2.1.3 and 2.3.2 where the 
interpretations of the SAS are discussed.
European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 1994 
(Special Edition of the ACP-EU Courier, June 1995), 
pp. 36-37.
Ibid. , pp. 38-39.
See Chapter 5.
During 1994, Haiti had been restored to the 
list of eligible countries but eight others had been 
excluded: Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Zaire.
See Section 2.5.2.
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Article 5 of the Fourth Lomé Convention had expressed 
a commitment of the two parties to the observance of 
basic principles on human rights. While it linked 
respect for human rights to cooperation, it did not 
contain provisions for sanction. Although they were 
not so identified at their conception, some provisions 
of Lomé IV were reinterpreted, by the Community, as 
instrumental measures with conditional effect.
6.1.3 Match of Tasks and Measures
In the third substantive section of this Chapter, 
I will assess how well the measures proposed as 
instrumental capacity match the tasks identified. 
There already exists a type of operational record, in 
the form of the Convention programmes dealing with 
structural adjustment and the sociopolitical issues. 
On a different level, the match of the measures to the 
tasks can also be gauged by reference to a study 
carried out, at the behest of the Commission. This 
study examined the experiences of ACP states under 
structural adjustment i.e., in MFI programmes. The 
study drew certain conclusions about ACP states in 
adjustment. These conclusions represented an 
indicative list of probable concerns for a 
conditionality programme which contains macroeconomic 
adjustment as an integral element. My assessment, 
therefore, looks at the ways in which the instrumental 
measures take account of the conclusions of the study.
See Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont eds.. 
Adjustment and Development : The experience of the ACP 
States (Africa^ Caribbean^ Pacific) (Paris: Economica, 
1994).
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6.2 NATURE OF TASKS
6.2.1 Provisions for Reform
The basic elements of multiple conditionality 
were readily visible in Annex Ilia of the revised Lomé 
IV. In this Annex which consisted of a Community 
declaration, the EC outlined the parameters of its 
policy dialogue with the ACP on the programming of 
aid. It had been agreed in Article 4 of the revised 
Convention that account would be taken of the 
objectives and priorities of the EC's cooperation 
policy in the dialogue. The objectives and priorities 
were identified succinctly in the Annexe:
the sustainable economic and social 
development of developing countries;
- their smooth and gradual integration into 
the world economy;
- emphasis on the revitalisation of their 
economies through the promotion of the 
private sector;
the development and consolidation of 
democracy and the rule of law;
- adherence to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
Article 281.2 of the revised Convention 
established a complementary approach, combining the 
development strategy of each ACP state with the 
cooperation objectives of the EC. The flexibility 
built, by the programming procedures, into the use of
See Lomé IV Convention as revised by the 
agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995, the 
Courier No.155, January-February, 1996.
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resources was intended to ensure greater efficiency in 
resource use and to provide an incentive for good ACP 
performance in implementation.^^ The EC further sought 
to ensure good performance by stressing the need for 
consistency among the various aid instruments of the 
Convention e.g., Stabex, the SAS and the sectoral 
policies of the NIP. The instruments should be so 
applied that they all lent support to the same
obj ectives.
More concretely, the revised Convention expanded 
the general commitment of the two parties to respect 
for human rights. It stressed the fact that 
"development policy and cooperation shall be closely 
linked to respect for and enjoyment of fundamental 
human rights...".^ In the macroeconomic arena, the 
basis for structural adjustment reforms had been laid 
in Lomé IV. However, previously innocuous provisions 
took on added meaning, assuming greater and more
rigorous significance in the context of an explicit 
conditionality programme.
1 will focus on two such examples. The first
identifies an objective of the SAS as being to assist
the ACP states to "create an economic environment 
favourable to a resumption of, or an acceleration in, 
the growth of GDP and employment. The second lists 
another goal of the SAS, which is to "improve public
I have dealt elsewhere with the phasing of 
programme resources through tranches. See Sections 
2.2.4 and 4.4.
Article 5.1 of the Fourth Lomé Convention as
revised.
Ibid., Article 243.1(a).
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sector management and provide appropriate private 
sector initiatives".^ In the context of 
conditionality, the provisions serve, respectively, as 
the basis for overall macroeconomic reform and the 
rationalisation of the public sector in favour of the 
private. The parties also specifically recognised the 
importance of promoting, in ACP states, an environment 
favourable to the development of a market economy.
6.2.2 Consolidation of Reform
With regard to the second type of task, the 
consolidation or institutionalisation of reforms, the 
revised Convention took account of the importance of 
popular participation. It stated that "the role and 
potential of initiatives taken by individuals and 
groups shall be recognised in order to achieve in 
practice real participation of the population in the 
development p r o c e s s . T h e  revised Convention went 
on to stipulate that "cooperation shall also encourage 
participation by the population in the design and 
execution of development operations. Moreover, in 
appreciation of their heightened role, the provisions 
in support of decentralised cooperation were assigned 
a separate section, within the Chapter on Financial 
Cooperation, in the revised text.^s
It could be said that the nature of the tasks
Ibid., Article 243.1(c). 
Ibid., Article 6.2. 
Ibid., Article 5.1. 
Ibid., Article 13.
Ibid., Section 4(a).
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demanded by multiple conditionality was adequately 
recognised by the ACP and EC, as reflected by the 
emphases placed in the revised Convention. It is thus 
apposite to turn to the measures which were identified 
to see what practical steps were considered by the two 
sides to meet these tasks.
6.3 MEASURES IDENTIFIED
The measures identified could be divided into 
three sets: those relating to macroeconomic reform;
those covering sociopolitical conditionality; and 
those concerned with institutionalisation of the 
reform. in the first two cases, the applicable 
measures consisted of both support in the form of 
positive encouragement and punitive sanctions.
6.3.1 Sociopolitical Conditionality
The measures which were identified to promote 
human rights and démocratisation and strengthen the 
rule of law were three-fold in nature. First, they 
offered support for active steps by the parties to the 
Convention. Secondly, they promised support for public 
and private initiatives by organisations with 
internationally-recognised expertise. Finally, they 
provided financial resources, in accordance with the 
rules in the Convention governing development finance 
cooperation.27 Some 80 million ECUs have been 
allocated, within the allocated funds, to enable the 
EC to lend support to institutional and administrative 
reform measures in the context of démocratisation and
27 See Article 224 (a) of the revised Fourth Lomé
Convention.
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the rule of law.^® The three main tenets of 
sociopolitical reform - adherence to the principles of 
human rights, respect for democracy and for the rule 
of law - were classified as "essential elements" of 
the revised Convention. Any violation of these 
elements would trigger a series of remedial 
procedures, escalating from consultations with the 
offending state to partial or full suspension of the 
state from the Convention.
The provisions affecting sociopolitical 
conditionality built on earlier measures within Lomé 
IV. They drew on the general commitment to fundamental 
human rights in Article 5 of Lomé IV. They also 
expanded on specific measures, within that Convention, 
to support the growth of the democratic process in ACP 
states. Under the provisions of Article 5, there had 
been an earlier commitment to provide financial 
resources in support of human rights and 
démocratisation. In 1992, the Community had used this 
commitment as the basis for providing support to a 
number of countries in sub-Saharan A f r i c a . Support 
took the form of the supply of material and technical 
assistance for the preparation, organisation or 
conduct of elections. The list of countries so 
assisted included Angola, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique and
Gérard Vernier, "The Lomé IV Mid-Term Review: 
Main Innovations", the Courier No.155, January- 
February, 1996, p. 8.
Article 366(a) of the revised Fourth
Convention.
Hans Smida, "Community support for setting up 
and strengthening democracies". The Courier No. 138, 
March-April, 1993.
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Senegal.
6.3.2 Macroeconomic Reform
In the area of economic reform, the measures 
agreed were a combination of new provisions designed 
to address conditionality and, principally, of a 
recasting of prior steps already contained in Lomé IV. 
One set of new measures introduced the possibility of 
using Stabex transfers in line with structural 
adjustment programmes and in support of coherent 
reform policies. A second set of new provisions 
covered the decision to stagger financial allocations 
to ACP states. It made the issue of each subsequent 
tranche dependent upon the ACP state concerned 
completing satisfactorily a series of objectives laid 
out in its draft NIP.^
The intent of the objectives was, inter alia, to 
ensure that the ACP identified priority development 
objectives (both at the national and regional level), 
the focal sectors to be supported and proposals for 
private and/or industrial sector development.^ The aim 
was in keeping with the Community's goal to have the 
ACP states commit themselves to clear policies aimed 
at achieving the objectives agreed in the joint 
programming exercise and to do so within a fixed time­
frame. Underlying the phased financial allocations was 
a fundamental desire of the Community. This desire was 
to subject the ACP to increased discipline and
Article 209.4 of the revised Fourth Convention. 
Ibid., Articles 281 & 282.
Ibid., Article 281.2.
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scrutiny in implementation under penalty of sanction. 
The sanction would be the withholding of subsequent 
tranches in the case of a state's failure to meet 
agreed objectives.
The provisions covering structural adjustment and 
the SAS in the revised Convention contained only one 
significant element which differed from those in Lomé 
IV. That element was included at the urging of the 
ACP. It allowed the provisions to be extended to give 
specific encouragement to reform measures at the 
regional level. What was new about the SAS was not its 
content but the context in which it was placed in the 
Mid-Term Review. As mentioned earlier, the SAS was 
characterised as contributing to the alleviation of 
the social consequences of MFI adjustment. During the 
negotiations for Lomé IV, the initial insistence of 
the Community was that it was in no position to mount 
its own full-fledged adjustment programme. However, it 
was able to make a contribution, particularly in the 
social sectors. After the Mid-Term Review, the largely 
unmodified SAS of Lomé IV emerged as a central plank 
of the conditionality programme, providing the 
macroeconomic complement to the sociopolitical 
element. Its original incarnation as support to the 
social sector, neglected in MFI adjustment programmes, 
has been discarded.
It should be noted that the Community has always 
emphasised the qualitative differences between its 
approach to adjustment and that of the MFIs. The 
Community's, in its own view, was better 
differentiated, more pragmatic and added a more human 
face to adjustment. Six primary concerns were 
highlighted in the Community's support for structural
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adjustment during Lomé IV. They were the 
internalisation of programmes; priority for long-term 
development aims; differentiated programmes geared to 
local situations; a realistic, modulated rate of 
implementation attuned to local potential; 
incorporation of the social dimension from the outset; 
and full consideration of the regional dimension of 
adjustment. In articulating these differences between 
the two models, the Community was thereby conceding 
that the original SAS was an adjustment programme, 
with all the attendant conditionalities which that 
reality entails.
It is also important to reiterate that the 
adjustment programme described pre-dates the 
introduction of conditionality but was clearly 
considered by the Community as complementary to those 
of the MFIs. It is this reinterpretation of Lomé IV 
provisions which 1 have portrayed as retrospective. 
Both the Court of Auditors and the Commission draw 
attention to the conditions in the SAS and to the 
inability of some ACP countries to meet those 
conditions and the reform programmes being pursued. 
These failings were demonstrated in the application of 
the SAS. In the first allocation in 1990, 24 out of 38 
eligible ACP states reached the first stage of the 
allocation process and only 20 actually benefitted; in 
the second phase, at the end of 1992, only 17 ACP
See Bernard Petit, "Democracy and structural 
adjustment in Africa", The Courier No.138, March- 
April, 1993, pp. 74-75.
See Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the 
Year 1993 ( 0J 94/0327), p. 280 and European
Commission, Financial and Technical Cooperation under 
the Lomé Convention in 1993..., op. cit., p. 13.
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States qualified. 36
The final set of measures affecting economic 
reform has been mentioned earlier but a brief note 
here is necessary. It concerns the increased sectoral 
rigour and consistency which the Commission sought 
across the instruments of the Convention. This 
sectoral conditionality also pre-dated the Mid-Term 
Review and the introduction of conditionality. It is 
further testimony to the fact that the introduction of 
conditionality did not necessarily give rise to a host 
of new elements designed to give it effect. It often 
relied on a varied and more rigid application of 
existing provisions.
This reorientation of existing provisions is 
reminiscent of the Commission's use of policy dialogue 
during the programming exercise for Lomé III.^ it 
suggests that the Community wished to insert, during 
the implementation process of Lomé IV, a policy 
orientation which the timing of the initial 
negotiations had allowed the ACP states to escape. 
Commissioner Marin had often warned the ACP that the 
Group had been fortunate to have negotiated Lomé IV 
before the end of the Cold War.^ it had thus avoided
European Commission, Financial and Technical 
Cooperation under the Lomé Convention in 1993..., op. 
cit., p . 13.
See Section 2.1.2 where the Community's efforts 
to introduce policy dialogue during the programming 
exercise is discussed.
See, for example, European Commission, The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Negotiating Directives 
for the Mid-Term Review (unnumbered), pp. 7-9. This 
document, which was submitted by Commissioner Marin,
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the resulting repercussions and the stricter terms 
governing development assistance. In recasting the 
existing provisions, the Community was acting in 
strict accord with the letter of the provisions agreed 
but not, the ACP would claim, with the spirit of the 
agreements.
The Community offered a very different series of 
explanations for the emergence of conditionality 
within the SAS. In response to requests for assistance 
from ACP states undergoing structural adjustment, it 
had taken a major political decision to agree to 
provide support in Lomé IV. The Community was 
responding to the views of some ACP states that it 
(the Community) could help bridge lending gaps in 
adjustment programmes. Those ACP states believed that 
the Community, given its history of cooperation with 
the ACP, would have a more empathetic approach to ACP 
problems.39 In the Community's explanation, the 
provisions agreed in the Convention have served as 
objectives, guidelines and implementation methods. 
What has followed has been the enactment of a range of 
measures to give full effect to the decision.
In this sense, the Community was operating within
stated explicitly the need to take stock of the
economic and political changes which had taken place, 
both globally and between the ACP and the Community,
since the signing of Lomé IV.
3^ See "European Union and Structural Adjustment", 
Briefing Paper of European Network on Debt and
Development (Eurodad), May 1995.
See European Commission, Community support for 
structural adjustment in the ACP countries : towards
the consolidation and strengthening of a realistic and 
concerted approach (COM (94) 447 final).
318
the obvious parameters that there could be only one 
adjustment programme in any given country. The
Community could not fashion an alternative or parallel 
programme. Its primary concern was that its
distinctive approach, as expressed in the text of Lomé 
IV, be taken fully into consideration by other donors 
when reform programmes were being drawn up.^ It was in 
the practical application of the provisions that
conditionality emerged as an intrinsic feature of 
adjustment programmes. I will return to the
implications of this Community interpretation shortly.
6.3.3 Institutionalisation of Reform
The measures identified in support of the 
consolidation of the reforms centred on the more 
direct inclusion of civic groups in the implementation 
of the revised Convention. Those measures were 
contained in the provisions relating to decentralised 
cooperation. Both sides readily accepted that the 
process of démocratisation and sociopolitical reform 
could be considerably enhanced by the involvement of 
such groups. It was to this end that the entirely new 
Title of Chapter 2 on Financial Cooperation, in the 
revised Convention, was devoted to decentralised 
cooperation. It replaced the three rather general 
articles, in Lomé IV, on widening participation in 
cooperation.
The agents engaged in decentralised cooperation 
had been accorded direct access to Convention funds in 
Lomé IV. It is apparent from the new articles that 
considerable attention was given to the role of such
Ibid. , p . 4.
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agents. The new provisions, while more expansive than 
those in Lomé IV, added little of a substantive nature 
to the original text. One new element which it did add 
was a much clearer articulation of the authority of 
the ACP states over the decentralised agents. It 
stated that projects and programmes undertaken within 
the framework of decentralised cooperation "shall be 
subject to the approval of the ACP States".
The provisions included cooperation activities 
which combined the efforts and resources of both ACP 
and Community organisations. Annex LXXX of the revised 
Convention called on the ACP states to take account of 
the initiatives of decentralised agents in the 
formulation and implementation of NIPs. It urged them 
to organise regular consultations with such agents. 
These measures are formalistic in that they seek to 
strengthen the role of the agents and their 
organisation.
As was illustrated by the early example of Haiti 
and démocratisation,^* the institutionalisation of 
reform is the result of a process which involves the 
inculcation of regular practices over time. The 
inclusion of a sociopolitical dimension in multiple 
conditionalj.ty argued in favour of a wider range of 
instrumental measures. The Community did not lack 
prior insight of the need for such a range. The 
original source of conditionality, the Pisani 
Memorandum, highlighted the importance of building a 
network of institutional relations across all sectors:
Article 251 (d) of the revised Fourth Convention 
of Lomé.
This example is covered in Section 1.1.2.
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the economic, social, cultural, political and the 
intellectual.44 This concept of capacity encompassed 
more than administrative or technical capacity. It 
recognised the need to build a genuinely institutional 
capacity. However, the concept was not greatly 
reflected in the instrumental measures which were 
proposed.
6.3.4 Practical Measures
I can now return to the implications of the 
Community's alternative explanation of the 
introduction of conditionality through the SAS. 4^ One 
implication is that the examination of instrumental 
capacity has to go beyond the assessment of the formal 
provisions of the Convention. It also has to look at 
the practical steps taken and identified to meet the 
tasks of conditionality.
First, I need to examine the practical measures 
employed thus far in the pursuit of conditionality. In 
the area of sociopolitical conditionality, there have 
been the various suspensions, under Article 5, dating 
from that of Haiti. ^  The other steps taken in the 
social and political sectors were aimed at the 
promotion of decentralised cooperation. The analysis 
of these measures revealed that they made very little 
contribution towards the achievement of their
44 This issue is dealt with in Section 2.1.1, 
pp.10-12 above.
4^ See Section 6.3.2.
4^ See Section 6.1.2, footnote 15.
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objectives/*^ Accordingly, the identification and use 
of practical measures in pursuit of sociopolitical 
conditionality offer limited scope for study.
My focus, therefore, has to be restricted and 
concentrate on the practical measures taken in support 
of structural adjustment as one component of multiple 
conditionality. Structural adjustment support is the 
area in which Lomé had a concrete and visible 
experience. The main instrument of Community action in 
the SAS has been the general import programmes which 
were considered to be best suited to the needs of 
economic liberalisation.^ The funds for the programmes 
were provided to the Central Banks of the recipient 
countries to help finance the purchase of imports. The 
counterpart funds generated from the sale of the 
imports have been employed as part of a single, 
coordinated budget policy to cover public operating 
and capital expenditure.
This coordinated budget policy enabled the 
Commission to act in support of essential social 
services and the maintenance of economic and social 
infrastructure, as the Convention dictated. The 
Commission not only allocated resources to national 
budgets but also encouraged spending on health, 
education and the maintenance of infrastructure. The 
Commission has admitted that the focus on budgetary 
matters entailed an ever-closer involvement in public 
expenditure reviews in ACP states, often in
47 See Chapter 5 above.
European Community, Community support for 
structural adjustment..., op. cit., p. 8.
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collaboration with the World Bank. 49
The practical measures taken in support of the 
SAS carried certain implications for the various 
actors participating in their implementation and for 
their respective capacities to carry out their tasks. 
The priority in the SAS is for the rapid disbursement 
of resources while maintaining administrative rigour 
of the programme. At the level of the Commission, it 
was recognised that the internal procedures and 
modalities for decision-making and payment were poorly 
suited to these requirements.A determined effort has 
been made by the Commission to remedy this deficiency 
by rationalising its monitoring and decision-making 
procedures. The Commission has also sought to develop 
its expertise in the horizontal themes which are the 
subject of the SAS e.g., in food security and 
nutrition, health, education, training and 
employment.
In the area of coordination, the Commission has 
been building its instrumental capacity at both the 
Community and international levels. At the Community 
level, instruments and implementation procedures were
Ibid. , p . 9 .
These shortcomings were stressed in the Reports 
of the Court of Auditors. See Court of Auditors, 
Annual Report for the Financial Year 1993, op. cit., 
pp. 278-280 for some critical comments on the 
management of the appropriations for the SAS. See also 
Court of Auditors, Special Report on Import 
Programmes, op. cit., for more specific comments, also 
very critical, on the import programmes, the main 
instrument of the SAS.
European Community, Community support for 
structural adjustment..., op. cit., p. 10.
323
brought into line with the requirements of the member 
states. Common Community approaches and strategies 
were developed in priority sectors e.g., health and 
agricultural exports. However, the Commission has 
warned that there has only been limited achievement at 
this level of coordination.^
At the international level, the Commission, 
through its participation in the Special Programme of 
Assistance for Africa (SPA), has sought to influence 
other donors on several key issues. These include the 
following :
- the link between democracy and adjustment;
the importance of the internalisation of 
reforms by striking a correct balance between the 
social and political consequences of changes 
caused by economic reforms and the popular 
expectations raised by the reforms;
the regional repercussions of national 
adjustment policies.
The Commission has thus served as a catalyst, within 
the wider donor group, for the consideration of a more 
comprehensive set of issues in the process of 
adjustment. It has also help bring about a greater 
appreciation of the capacities which are needed to 
deal with these issues.
In the case of the ACP recipients, instrumental 
capacity has come mainly from the results of practical 
measures taken by the Commission to assist them. Such 
measures include its participation, wherever possible, 
in the preparation of reform programmes and
Ibid. , p. 11.
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particularly in sectoral policies. The assistance 
provided by the Community to Suriname, which was 
described earlier,^ is one example of such 
participation. The Commission has also helped build 
ACP capacity at the regional level with an active 
involvement in three programmes. These were a 
programme to facilitate intra-regional payments, trade 
and investment in East and Southern Africa and the 
Indian Ocean; a reform programme to establish the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union; and a regional 
reform programme for the Central African Customs and 
Economic U n i o n .
6.4 MATCHING OF MEASURES TO TASKS
The measures taken by the Community, through the 
Commission, in pursuit of adjustment have been 
principally based on its own experience and 
programmes. However, it has also been deeply 
influenced by the wider examples of structural 
adjustment undertaken by the ACP states with the MFIs. 
It has accordingly attempted to draw upon this wider 
experience to identify potential shortfalls and the 
remedial measures needed to overcome them. The study 
of ACP adjustment programmes, undertaken on behalf of
53 See Section 5.2, pp. 225-226.
European Commission, Community support for 
structural adjustment...", op. cit., p. 14. These are 
recent programmes which are intended to help with 
adjustment at the regional level. They are thus 
examined as aspects of instrumental, rather than 
operational, capacity.
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the C o m m i s s i o n ,  55 identified four major characteristics 
which helped explain the unsatisfactory results of 
such programmes. Adjustment was informal and 
"borrowed" while policy was thwarted and myopic.^
6.4.1 Informal Adjustment
The informal sector in most ACP economies has 
grown under adjustment. The sector is subject to 
little control by official regulations and is not 
capital-intensive. It therefore demonstrates a high 
flexibility in production costs and can respond 
rapidly to developments in the market. The study 
underscored the serious problems which African states 
face from the relative, and sometimes absolute, 
shrinkage in the modern sector resulting from 
adjustment. It is the modern sector which provides the 
main source of revenue for the state. It is the growth 
in this sector which underwrites the provision of 
basic services and infrastructure required for overall 
economic development. 5^ Consequently, the expansion of 
the informal sector, at its expense, has had a 
detrimental effect on the results of adjustment 
programmes.
6.4.2 Thwarted Adjustment Policy
The policies of structural adjustment were 
designed to address different economic situations in
55 Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont eds. 
Adjustment and Development : The experience of ACP
countries, op. cit.
55 Ibid., especially Chapter 2.
5^ Ibid. , p . 58 .
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ACP states which were due, in part, to exogenous 
factors. The ACP countries were affected in the 1980s, 
the period under study, by both internal and external 
shocks. The internal shocks, the study indicated, 
included important climatic changes affecting 
agriculture. They also included the early stages of 
démocratisation which adversely affected the 
implementation of economic policy.^® The main external 
shocks to ACP states consisted of deteriorating terms 
of trade; the impact of volatile exchange rates in 
major currencies resulting from the opening up of 
their economies; and a fall in net remittances from 
abroad.59 Adjustment policy was thwarted because these 
adverse factors persisted, despite the implementation 
of the corrective policies.
6.4.3 Myopic Adjustment Policy
The main drawback in adjustment was an over­
emphasis on short-term policy to the detriment of more 
long-term measures. The three main features of 
standard adjustment programmes are complementary. The 
features are macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
correction of relative prices and the improvement of 
productivity.GO Priority has customarily been given, 
first, to stabilisation, then to the correction of 
price distortions and, only then, to productivity. The 
last feature has remained a minor concern relative to 
the other two.
50 Ibid. , pp. 58-59.
5^ Ibid. , pp. 62-64 .
GO Ibid. , pp. 68-69.
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The bias in emphasis, on the correction of 
relative prices over increased productivity, has posed 
fundamental problems for ACP economies which are 
typically small and poor. One example of the problems 
stems from the ritual recommendation of devaluation as 
a contribution to price correction. The smaller the 
economy, the higher is its ratio of imports and the 
more price-sensitive are general prices to nominal 
increases in import prices. Devaluation, as a step 
towards price correction, can thus prove inflationary. 
The study contended that the three basic components of 
adjustment policies are usually affected, and often in 
conflicting ways, by policy choices. In order to avoid 
such conflicts, authorities have to make policy trade­
offs between the components. The choices result in the 
ranking of stabilisation over price corrections and of 
both over productivity increases.
One primary reason for the ranking is to be found 
in the initial conditions facing the countries in 
adjustment. The severity of the economic situation 
determines the sequence of policies while the slowness 
of the implementation of reforms is related to their 
administrative complexities. Reductions in certain 
expenditures or change in a tax, customs duty or even 
currency rate is relatively easy to carry out. It is 
much more difficult and time-consuming to restructure 
a state-owned company or change trade regulations. The 
time involved in accomplishing the latter is not just 
the time to implement the reform but also the time it 
takes to produce results.^ The choice in such a
Ibid. , p. 70.
Ibid. , p. 82.
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situation is for the short-term policy measure.
This dilemma is compounded by the nature of donor 
conditionality in which adjustment aid is used for 
rapid disbursement aid. The demand is that recipients 
take immediate measures and meet macroeconomic 
performance criteria before they can benefit from 
subsequent disbursements. There has been an implied 
preference of the donors and a clear policy choice for 
the recipient state. It is for measures producing 
quick results and for those most likely to impact 
rapidly on the macroeconomic situation.^
6.4.4 "Borrowed" Adjustment
Adjustment programmes are not sufficiently 
managed by ACP countries as their own programmes. They 
are perceived by the ACP countries as imported and are 
not internalised by the recipient states. There are 
three principal reasons for the unwillingness of the 
recipients to adopt the programmes as their own. The 
first is due to the technical uncertainties of the 
recommended policies, some of which have been 
mentioned above. The second is the difficulties faced 
in overcoming vested interests opposed to measures 
which reduce their economic benefits. The third is 
based on the relations between the recipients and 
donors.
In the last respect, the study contended that 
conditionality has often been used as an exercise in 
"make-believe". In this image, the recipients, and
Ibid. , pp. 82-83 .
Ibid. , pp. 84-85.
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often the donors, know that the agreed conditions 
cannot, or will not, be met. Alternatively, the 
conditions are only agreed to secure the first tranche 
when it is apparent that the conditions for a second 
will not be fulfilled. One such example was the case 
of Côte d'Ivoire where the authorities agreed 
conditions merely to obtain the first instalment of 
its sectoral adjustment loan from the World Bank.^s
Another variant of the "make-believe" exercise 
occurs when a programme is only partially pursued in 
its easiest or most visible areas, thus compromising 
the overall coherence of the programme and leading to 
failure. An example of this type was Senegal's new 
industrial policy, the coherence of which was ruined 
by partial implementation. The policy required reforms 
in both trade and labour regulations. The removal of 
trade protection was achieved but the labour 
regulations proved more difficult to change. 
Businesses, finding themselves unable to retrench 
staff, had to close. The industrial policy 
subsequently failed.
6.4.5 Implications of Critique
The Community has thus been made aware of the 
difficulties in implementation of ACP adjustment 
programmes, an unavoidable element of the reforms 
sought by multiple conditionality. The Commission has 
accordingly outlined further measures, in three areas, 
aimed at meeting these difficulties: the consolidation
Ibid. , pp. 85-86.
Ibid. , p. 87.
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of Community action;the deepening of such action; 
and its broadening.
Consolidation of Community action: The Community, 
in reaction to the critigue of the traditional 
approach to adjustment, attempted to consolidate its 
own approach. It reaffirmed its key policy emphases: 
the social dimension; the pace of reform; the regional 
dimension; adapting reforms to the specific 
requirements of individual countries; internalisation 
of the programme in the recipient country; and
realistic conditions.
The Commission has sought to ensure, at donor 
level, that recommendations made in the context of the 
SPA would focus on the on the pace and sequence of 
reforms. It has also insisted that conditionality be 
structured in line with the particular requirements of 
the individual countries. At the level, of the
recipients, the Commission has tried to promote 
internalisation of the adjustment process through 
analyses of national planning, decision-making and 
implementation capacities. In other words, the
Community has identified, as one priority, the
development of some aspects of institutional capacity.
Deepening of the Adjustment Process: The
A distinction has to made here between this 
"consolidation" of Community action and the 
"consolidation" or institutionalisation of reform as 
described earlier. In this instance, the Community is 
attempting to ensure that the main priorities of its 
approach are generally accepted, by the other donors, 
as the basis of adjustment programmes.
European Commission, Community support for 
structural adjustment..., op. cit., p. 19.
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deepening of the process is designed to achieve some 
long-term objectives. These objectives are the 
development of human resources, rebuilding the supply 
side and regenerating healthy social and economic 
environments. It concentrates on two main actions. The 
first is to strike a correct balance between spending 
in support of investment reform and that in support of 
financial restructuring and economic reform. This 
balance in spending priorities is an attempt to avoid 
another example of the trade-offs illustrative of 
myopic adjustment policy.^ The second action is to 
improve the structure of public finance and integrate 
national planning into the regional framework.
The objective in public finance is to help 
develop the priority social sectors. It hopes to 
achieve this objective by placing emphasis on the 
sectoral approach and using counterpart funds in 
national budgets to that end. A complementary policy 
of assessing and monitoring public expenditure would 
also be pursued. The overall policy is expected to 
encourage supply and production through better 
management of a state's relations with its suppliers 
and the restoration of the confidence of the business 
sector.
The integration of national adjustment programmes 
into a regional framework is intended, first, to 
circumvent the limitations of small national markets. 
The second objective is to build a wider economic base 
against the adverse impact of pressures on the 
national economy. A third aim is to create a regional
Such policy trade-offs are discussed above in 
Section 6.4.3
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dynamic which might help the re-integration of ACP 
states into the global economy. An additional expected 
benefit is the use of adjustment as an incentive to 
the regional integration process.
Broadening of Community action: The broadening of 
Community measures will consist of adapting existing 
instruments and procedures, che identification of new 
types of cooperation and a re-orientation of the 
approach to conditionality. The adaptation of 
instruments includes the provision of targeted budget 
support for those countries with liberalised foreign 
trade and freely convertible and transferable 
currency. It also involves a less restrictive use of 
counterpart funds as an incentive. The extension of 
this incentive is dependent on a favourable outcome of 
the public expenditure reviews used to check programme 
and budget implementation. The third aspect of 
adaptation is the decentralisation of implementation 
monitoring. The general objective of adaptation is to 
create greater consistency in the operational 
integration of all Community instruments including 
NIPs, the SAS, Stabex and food aid. The increased 
integration of the instruments also aims to build a 
critical mass of conditionality and financial 
activities in the Convention.
One potentially new type of cooperation which is 
being considered is in monetary arrangements at the 
regional level. There, regional integration could be 
undertaken in pursuit of stable exchange rates and 
greater convertibility. The goal is not monetary
Ibid. , p . 20 .
Ibid., p. 21.
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integration but the provision of EC expertise in an 
area which could make a meaningful contribution to 
stability and growth.
The new approach to conditionality is based on a 
desire to add an increased sense of realism to the 
definition of conditionality. The emphasis would be on 
replacing the current model based on specific 
instruments with one based on programmes.^ Specific 
measures would be only one component of general 
economic policy agreements centred around a medium- 
term programme. "Adjustable" factors would be 
introduced. They would allow economic policy to be 
fashioned in response to developments in the national 
or international environment. The new approach would 
mean assessing the real aptitude of recipients to 
undertake reforms in light of the social, political 
and other constraints on economic policy-making.
Finally, the Community has called for an 
increased coordination effort among Community members, 
recipient countries and European members of the boards 
of the Bretton Woods institutions (MFIs) . It makes 
this call not with the intention to question the 
leadership of the MFIs but rather to increase the 
Community's influence in efforts to improve the
adjustment p r o c e s s .
Ibid. , p . 21. 
Ibid. , p . 22 . 
Ibid. , p . 22.
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6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The distinct impression gained from the 
examination of the practical and proposed measures in 
instrumental capacity is that the sole impetus has 
come from the Community, with little positive 
contribution from the ACP. This conclusion is 
justified by the fact that there is very little which 
can be traced to an ACP intervention. However, there 
are suggestions for potential improvements to be had, 
by drawing on other approaches to development 
programming.
These suggestions reflect the fact that the 
instrumental measures proposed are mainly 
administrative and technical. They lack an 
appreciation of the need, and the task, of generating 
capacity to meet sociopolitical conditionality. There 
is no accurate science available to apply to this task 
which requires an intuitive approach. It is in 
appreciation of the uncertain nature of the task that 
I propose suggestions which, by themselves, cannot 
guarantee success. What they can do is to help 
encourage the process of reform and the involvement of 
sociopolitical agents. They will thus contribute to 
the creation of an enabling environment.
First, I return to Israel's study on 
institutional development in World Bank p r o j e c t s .  
postulated that the successful implementation of 
projects depended, to a significant extent, on their 
levels of specificity. Specificity, in Israel's terms.
Arturo Israel, Institutional Development : 
Incentives to Performance, op. cit.
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consists of two main elements. The first element is 
the degree to which it is possible to specify the 
objectives of a particular activity, the methods for 
achieving the objectives and the ways of controlling 
their achievement. The second element is the manner in 
which the activity affects the participating actors. 
High-specificity activities display more intense, 
immediate, identifiable and focused effects. Such 
activities include those in finance, industry and high 
technology. Low-specificity activities demonstrate 
weaker, more delayed and more diffuse effects. They 
include activities involving human behaviour i.e. 
social or "people-oriented" activities such as 
agricultural extension, educational counselling or 
personnel management.
The ready applicability of the concept of 
specificity to multiple conditionality is soon 
apparent. As matters of high specificity, Israel 
identifies activities such the enactment of trade 
measures and some financial reforms e.g., exchange 
rate changes. The objectives of the reforms, the 
methods to be employed and the manner of their control 
can be listed with precision. Performance in their 
implementation can be directly attributable to those 
involved. Cases of low-specificity include those 
dependent on human behaviour related to agriculture, 
education, health and social and political activities.
This distinction between high and low specificity 
is not foreign to Community thinking. The study, 
undertaken on behalf of the Commission, alluded to
Ibid. , pp. 48-49.
Ibid. , pp. 49-52.
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it.^ G It placed emphasis on the policy choices or 
trade-offs made between stabilisation measures in 
trade and finance and the delayed effects of those 
aimed at increased productivity. The example, cited 
earlier, of the failure of Senegal's new industrial 
policy is a graphic example.^ The easier task was the 
achievement of the high-specificity activities, the 
removal of quantitative restrictions and lowering of 
customs duties. The socially and politically-oriented 
activity, the low-specificity change in labour 
regulations, proved to be the insuperable obstacle.
The contribution which the concept of specificity 
makes to the implementation of multiple conditionality 
is the recognition that the linkage of sociopolitical 
and economic conditions involves two sets of 
activities, with differing levels of specificity. The 
sociopolitical conditionalities of démocratisation and 
good governance are low-specificity activities. 
Equally important is the fact that there is a further 
distinction within the economic programme. This 
secondary distinction is between high-specificity 
stabilisation measures and the low-specificity 
activities such as the restructuring of trade and 
financial agencies.
The specificity concept further suggests that the 
dimension of time assumes a critical importance in two 
senses. In the first sense, it relates to planning and 
the length of time for which an objective can be 
specified. Those activities which depend on human and
See Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont, 
Adjustment and Development., op. cit., p. 82.
See Section 6.4.4.
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political behaviour or climatic conditions (e.g., 
agriculture) are not readily amenable to long-term 
planning. Secondly, the implementation of activities 
which are more diffuse in their objectives and spread 
across several sectors will demand a longer time-frame 
in which to gauge their impact. The measurement of the 
effectiveness of reforms arising from sociopolitical 
conditionality can only be made after a longer period 
of time than is set for certain economic activities. 
The overall process of multiple conditionality will 
have to be disaggregated into separate elements to 
allow for the reaction lag between economic and 
sociopolitical reforms.
A second set of suggestions is derived from this 
need for disaggregated responses. They are based on 
the traditional and alternative approaches.^ They also 
reflect a stated concern of the Commission. All three 
approaches emphasise the need for the combined efforts 
of public, private and voluntary agencies in the 
implementation of reform. Israel's traditional 
approach identified "surrogate" agents of 
competitiveness. These competition surrogates 
political authorities, non-governmental agencies and 
private sector interests - can be used i:o exert 
varying but complementary forms of influence on those 
involved in the implementation of projects.®^
The alternative approach advocates the use of 
community-based expertise and organisations as a base
The different approaches are discussed at the 
beginning of this Chapter. See Section 6.1.1.
Israel, Institutional Development..., op. cit., 
pp. 89-92.
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for implementation, before adding the contributions of 
formal agencies of government, the private sector and 
NGOs.82 It concedes that sociopolitical 
institutionalisation is not a predictable process, the 
success of which can be guaranteed in advance. It is, 
therefore, based on the creation of an enabling 
environment which generates the conditions supportive 
of the process. The Commission itself called for the 
institutionalisation of cooperation between the public 
sector, business associations, trade unions and more 
informal associations such as farmer groups.^
In spite of the apparent consensus on the value 
of collective action, I still need to underline the 
importance of involving sociopolitical agents in the 
implementation of conditionality. The lessons of 
decentralised cooperation and private sector 
programmes in Lomé III strongly indicate that the 
performance of such agents needs to be drastically 
improved. 84 Their involvement has to be directly and 
actively encouraged. A further consideration stems 
from the criticism, in the context of the SAS, that 
there is an overwhelming emphasis on the statal 
approach to ACP-EU r e l a t i o n s . This emphasis has 
resulted in the marginalisation of non-state actors 
and the alienation of SAS target groups. It is an
8^ See Hyden, "Creating an Enabling Environment", 
op. cit., p. 75.
88 European Commission, The Design of Economic 
Reform in the Context of Political Liberalization., 
op. cit. , p . 21.
84 See Section 5.5.2 above.
85 "European Union and Structural Adjustment", op. 
cit., p . 8.
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emphasis which further obstructs the involvement of 
sociopolitical agents and lends credence to the need 
for measures of active support for such agents.
6.6 CONCLUSION
Instrumental capacity, as fashioned by the 
Community, has taken account of nearly all the 
possible considerations: the seguencing of
conditionalities; the internalisation of reforms; and 
the political process of policy reform. In its 
approach to multiple conditionality, the Community 
tried to bring a wider appreciation of the balances to 
be struck. It was particularly conscious of that 
between the needs for economic and political reforms 
and the constraints posed by the social and political 
liberalisation process.
Nonetheless, the Community’s attempts to build up 
instrumental capacity do suffer from two inherent 
contradictions. The first contradiction lies in the 
imposition of increased conditionalities by adding 
sociopolitical to the economic elements. The 
Commission has acknowledged the limitations of 
conditionality. Conditionality and pressure from 
donors have been fairly successful in initiating 
reform programmes. They have been far less so in 
deepening economic reforms or in helping with complex 
political and administrative reforms.^
The Commission also cautions against excessive 
reliance on conditionality. The risk it poses is that
European Commission, The Design of Economic 
Reforms..., op. cit., pp. 17-18.
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of creating a bias against the more complicated 
institutional reforms in favour of "one-shot" 
stabilisation measures. Too many conditions in 
adjustment programmes help to cast doubt on the 
ability of countries with weaker capacity to manage 
the process. The number of conditions brings into 
question the capacity of donors and the MFIs to manage 
conditionality and its follow-up. The desire for 
short-term measures is also encouraged by the fact 
that the disbursement of subsequent tranches of 
assistance are often dependent on the demonstration of 
quick results. These are all concerns expressed by the 
Commission about the sheer weight of conditions in 
adjustment. In the light of its concerns, the decision 
by the Community to introduce additional 
conditionalities, beyond the economic, would appear to 
fly in the face of its own reasoning. It would seem 
also to compound the ACP problems of managing the 
demands which the additions pose.
The second, and more fundamental, contradiction 
stems from the centrality of adjustment in multiple 
conditionality. The Commission has insisted that there 
can only be only one adjustment programme, that of the 
MFIs. It is thus erecting multiple conditionality on 
the base of existing MFI adjustment programmes. The 
first contradictory element is the fact that the 
Community recognises the shortcomings of MFI programme 
but, nonetheless, uses those flawed programmes as the 
centrepiece of its reforms.
The other element is drawn from the fact that the 
Community has campaigned for several initiatives
Ibid. , pp. 18-19.
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intended to improve the effectiveness of MFI 
programmes. However, the success of its initiatives 
are not dependent on its own efforts. The Community 
may well be aware of the improvements required in 
adjustment programmes but its approach is based on 
effecting those improvements through the policy debate 
among the donors. The success of its initiatives, 
therefore, depends on whether the Commission, as the 
representative of the Community, will be able to exert 
a persuasive influence on other donors. The ability of 
the Commission to do so successfully remains an open 
question.
The instrumental measures of the Commission also 
suffer from a basic defect. Their intent is to further 
multiple conditionality but their scope primarily 
covers economic adjustment. Lost in the approach is 
the appreciation of how to build capacity to deal with 
the sociopolitical elements of conditionality. The 
consequence has been that the instrumental measures do 
not effectively address the need to meet the demands 
of sociopolitical reform. The suggestions which 1 have 
made represent one possible base upon which to build 
such an effort.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: A TALE OF TWO LEGACIES
My research, in Chapter 2 of this thesis, has 
shown that the origin of multiple conditionality lay 
in the Pisani Memorandum. The path from the initial 
proposal to multiple conditionality was certainly 
assisted by several influences. Some of these 
influences emanated from global trends external to the 
Lomé relationship but the decisive factors were 
developments within the relationship. The roots of 
conditionality unquestionably lay in the Memorandum 
and its advocacy of policy dialogue. This thesis is 
thus a tale of the legacy bequeathed by the Pisani 
Memorandum. This legacy was its prescription of 
"inverted conditionality" through the dialogue.^ It is 
also an analysis of the application of the 
prescription through the history of the emergence of 
multiple conditionality.
The examination of this history reveals that the 
two sides, to differing degrees, failed to generate 
the capabilities necessary to execute the policy. This 
recognition underlines a largely obscured fact: there 
were two legacies of the Pisani Memorandum. The 
Memorandum had identified the policy objective, the 
instrument and the means for pursuing its 
implementation.’
 ^ See Section 2.1.1 above for a discussion of the 
conceptual origins of conditionality.
- These three aspects of the Memorandum are 
discussed in Section 2.1.1.
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The instrument identified by the Memorandum was 
the establishment of a policy dialogue to ensure 
sectoral coherence programmes. The means was the 
building of institutional capacity to help overcome 
the problems of development.' This concept of capacity 
included three aspects: the administrative element; a 
"multiple network of economic, social, cultural, 
political and intellectual relations"; and its 
adaptability to the local conditions of the recipient 
state.
The second legacy of the Memorandum needs to be 
taken in conjunction with the first. If conditionality 
was to lead to effective development, it had to be 
accompanied by an effort to generate the requisite 
institutional capacity. The tale has thus come full 
circle. The Pisani Memorandum did contain the germ of 
multiple conditionality. It also identified the 
conditions needed to achieve the objective behind 
conditionality, i.e., development. The Memorandum thus 
bequeathed policy objective, instrument and means. 
This thesis has revealed that the legacy which was 
claimed by the two parties consisted of the objective 
and the instrument in the form of the policy dialogue. 
Together, they constitute the legacy of multiple 
conditionality. The second legacy of institutional 
capacity, the means, was ignored by them both.
 ^See Section 2.1.1 for an outline of the message 
of the Pisani Memorandum where I draw the distinction 
between the policy objective and the means proposed in 
the document. I also elaborate on the forms of 
capacity which Pisani identified as essential.
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7.1 LEGACY INHERITED
I will focus first on the visible history. The 
analysis of the origins of conditionality generated a 
set of conclusions which had an overall significance 
on the relationship.4 They also had a direct impact on 
the areas of capacity which were examined. The ACP 
Group failed repeatedly to perceive, accurately and in 
a timely fashion, the developments which signalled the 
introduction of multiple conditionality. It was a 
failure which cost the Group dearly. The Group was 
made captive of changing conditions, both unable to 
anticipate and to react to them. Secondly, the ACP's 
failure helped to convince the Community that it could 
readily ignore the objections of the ACP to its plans.
In the analysis of bargaining capacity in Chapter 
3, the effect of the ACP's inadequate reaction was 
noticeable in two principal forms. Its lack of 
anticipation forced it into a reactive posture whereby 
it ceded the negotiating initiative and the agenda to 
the Community. The ACP also failed to build a 
countervailing power to the EU's strength as part of 
its negotiating strategy. It was not able to fashion 
durable alliances, on Lomé matters, with the European 
Parliamentarians, to cite just one example. Nor did 
the Group manage to establish an external projection 
as a means of building strengths outside the 
relationship.
The assessment of bargaining capacity 
demonstrated the clear superiority of the EU over the
See Section 2.6.
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ACP in the critical area of negotiation. It suggested 
that the ACP would be unable to negotiate effectively 
the basic guidelines of a conditionality programme. 
This point was exemplified by the case study, in 
Chapter 4, of the negotiations on multiple 
conditionality in the Mid-Term Review. The study 
illustrated the inherent weakness of ACP bargaining 
capacity. It also helped to highlight the fact that 
the capacity of the Group was further weakened by 
internal disagreement. In the case of conditionality, 
as in that of Stabex, there were ACP states which saw 
the Community's position offering them greater benefit 
than did that of their own Group.^ These states served 
as an internal pressure against a unified ACP 
negotiating stance.
The study of the origins of conditionality 
offered two additional conclusions which were relevant 
to the examination of operational capacity. The first 
was that the EU exercised almost total operational 
control of the Convention. Above all, it did so 
through its interpretation of the provisions governing 
the Convention. The analysis of operational capacity, 
in Chapter 5, indicated that control was augmented by 
the Commission's greater command of resources. Its 
control was further consolidated by its responsibility 
for the financial and overall management of Lomé.
The second relevant conclusion was that the ACP 
Group suffered from an organisational gap. The gap was 
reflected in differences in perception between ACP
" This point is dealt with in Chapter 2. See 
Section 2.1.4 for the treatment of Stabex while the 
case of conditionality is covered in Section 2.4.2.
347
decision-makers in the capitals and the 
representatives in Brussels. It was often visible in 
the context of negotiations® but it also had a wide 
impact on the operational capacity of the Group. The 
examples which give evidence of the gap in a 
bargaining context were primarily areas of operational 
capacity. This was true of the regional programme in 
the Caribbean^ as it was of the FMOs governing the use 
of Stabex resources.®
My study indicated that the ACP had enhanced its 
operational capacity in some areas. However, the 
improvement was limited to a few areas which were 
Convention-related and mainly confined to the trade 
sector. This improvement was certainly not observed in 
other sectors of the Convention, such as those in 
finance cooperation, which were more closely related 
to the areas covered by conditionality. Moreover, the 
ACP Croup demonstrated a lack of the necessary 
flexibility to meet changing conditions in the 
relationship. This deficiency was reflected in the 
reaction of the Croup to changes, emanating from both 
internal and external factors.^
There were indications that the operational
® See Section 3.2.1 for a discussion of the 
problems which arise from this gap and its impact on 
continuity. It is also covered in Section 3.2.3 where 
its impact on suasion is examined.
 ^ See Section 2.1.2.
® See Sections 2.1.4 and 2.4.3.
® See Section 5.6 for a discussion of the 
adaptability of the ACP Croup to three changes in the 
relationship: the FMOs in Stabex; the global trade
regime; and sectoral emphases and rigour in Lomé IV.
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capacity of the EU, despite its clear superiority, 
also suffered from limitations. The Commission faced 
constraints on staffing levels and a rationalisation 
of its Delegation offices. The record of 
implementation of decentralised cooperation i.e., the 
sociopolitical aspects of the Convention, was 
acknowledged to be poor.^° The record reflected the 
complexity of those forms of cooperation as well as 
the lack of EU experience in dealing with them. They 
are, it should be noted, some of the areas directly 
related to multiple conditionality: they include
support of the private sector and programmes dealing 
with civil society.
The examination of operational capacity drew 
attention to a critical feature. The procedures of 
implementation followed by the EU did not include a 
strong emphasis on capacity-building in the ACP 
states. The concept of strengthening ACP capacity was 
not identified as a major objective. Where there was 
provision for capacity, it normally took the form of 
technical assistance supplied by Community experts. 
The Commission did make some efforts to help 
strengthen ACP capacity but those efforts were 
selective and not consciously designed. Its efforts 
corresponded to only one aspect of capacity, as 
identified by the Pisani Memorandum, in that they 
sought to strengthen administrative capacity. They 
took no account of the wider dimensions of capacity
Decentralised cooperation is covered in Section
5.5.2.
See Section 5.2 where I discuss the efforts of 
the Community at institution-building in its 
cooperation with the ACP.
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which the Memorandum advanced in its multiple network 
of relations.
More importantly, there was an increasing 
tendency, on the part of the Commission, to assume 
more and more responsibility for implementation. By 
the time of the Mid-Term Review, the Community was 
reconsidering the effectiveness of even its sporadic 
earlier efforts. A major plank of the Community's 
negotiating position for the Review was based on the 
need to overcome ACP ineffectiveness in 
implementation. The way to achieve that goal, for the 
Community, was to increase the authority of the 
Commission. The ACP's lack of capacity, in the view 
of the Community, was a major obstacle to effective 
joint management of the Convention. The letter's 
selective responses at capacity-building were not 
sufficient to overcome the obstacle. The recourse 
chosen was to reduce future obstacles by reducing ACP 
control and involvement. The Community's proposals 
might not have been agreed in the negotiations but 
their intent was unmistakable.
There was a more general conclusion to be drawn 
from the issue of ACP capacity-building. Neither party 
had seen the strengthening of ACP capacity as a 
priority during the implementation of the Conventions. 
The ACP had never consciously catered for capacity- 
building in its approach to Lomé while the Community 
lacked a systematic approach in its efforts. Thus, 
when obstacles were perceived in the process, the 
Community faced two choices. The first was to assume 
greater responsibility by providing more technical
See Section 5.5.2.
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assistance. The alternative was to help build the 
capabilities of the ACP states to carry out their 
tasks more efficiently.
It was here that experience and customary 
practice prevailed. There had never been an explicit 
focus in the Conventions on building institutional 
capacity. It was, therefore, not to be expected that 
such a focus would arise at that point. The only 
viable option, for the Community, was retrenchment 
i.e., a retreat from joint management. Rather than 
help to build ACP operational capacity, the EU has 
devoted its recent efforts to reducing the Group's 
role in the management of the Convention.
The contribution of the ACP Group to instrumental 
capacity was negligible. The measures intended to give 
effect to multiple conditionality were entirely the 
work of the Community. Instrumental capacity relates 
to plans, projections and future actions to be taken. 
Its examination in Chapter 6 showed that the proposals 
of the Commission reflected an awareness of the need 
to build ACP capacity in areas related to the 
objectives of conditionality. The proposals in its 
differentiated approach also stressed the importance 
of adapting conditions to take account of local 
realities in the country affected.
This emphasis in the proposals begs the question 
of whether the Community had, albeit belatedly, come 
to recognise the importance of capacity-building. In 
one sense, it had done so but that was in a restricted 
context. The Community was subscribing to what was a 
common feature of all conditionality programmes under 
adjustment. The logic was that, if the developing
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country was to benefit from adjustment, then it had to 
acquire greater capabilities in the areas affected by 
adjustment. Administrative reform and enhanced 
managerial skills were standard objectives of 
structural adjustment. The Community was, in effect, 
doing no more than adhering to the traditional 
programme prescriptions. The emphases thus need to be 
viewed in the specific context of adjustment, if their 
promotion was to be properly evaluated.
One achievement of this explicit emphasis on 
capacity-building was to highlight the fact that it 
had not been a commonly espoused feature of regular 
ACP-EU cooperation. The restriction of its use to the 
traditional adjustment context also underlined an 
additional fact. It was that the Commission had much 
less to propose in the more complex area of socio­
political conditionality. The Commission's approach to 
the building of institutional capacity remained rooted 
in the functional areas of public sector reform and 
the strengthening of organisations.^^ The approach made 
allowance for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights and the establishment of the rule of law. It 
was, however, largely silent on ways of attaining 
those objectives. It was in that latter respect that 
the concepts of specificity and an enabling 
environment were suggested as possible avenues for 
exploration.
The consideration of instrumental measures 
brought forth some inherent contradictions. They
This point is stressed in the two previous 
Chapters. See, for example. Section 5.2.
] 4 See Section 6.5 on Suggestions for Improvement.
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centred on two main features. The first was that the 
Commission had often cited the negative effect of 
placing too many conditions on developing countries in 
adjustment.Notwithstanding that recognition, the 
essence of multiple conditionality was a further 
addition to the conditionalities of adjustment. The 
addition was, of course, the political and social 
conditions of good governance. The second basic 
feature lay in the admission by the Community that its 
own conditionality programme was interlinked with 
efforts of other donors. The admission meant that the 
success of the Community's quest for a differentiated 
approach was not solely the function of its own
efforts. It was dependent on a debate with the other 
donors to obtain their approval and cooperation. The 
outcome of that debate remains uncertain.
7.2 LEGACY IGNORED
The second legacy of the Pisani Memorandum 
provides the missing element in this tale. My
research, thus far, has mainly been of the experience 
of conditionality as the more perceptible legacy of 
the Memorandum. The examination has to be completed by 
a treatment of the other legacy, its focus on 
capacity. I will thus return to the origins of
conditionality to seek to explain why the emphasis on 
capacity was lost.
I need to recall the context in which the
original Community proposal for policy dialogue in the 
Pisani Memorandum was made. It occurred at the time of
5^ Section 6.7 outlines the Commission's concerns 
about the use of excessive conditionalities.
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the negotiations for Lomé III and was seen as a 
defining moment for the future direction of ACP-EU 
cooperation. The question of the acquis and the 
control of the ACP states over their development were 
major concerns. What the ensuing struggle managed to 
do was to focus the attentions of both sides on the 
policy implications of the proposal and thus on the 
policy element of the Memorandum.
The fact that the Community was initially 
unsuccessful only served to broaden its attention to 
policy in two ways. The Community saw the loss as a 
defeat on a fundamental principle and concentrated its 
efforts on reversing it. Its subsequent efforts were, 
as detailed in Chapter 2, devoted to wresting control, 
from the ACP, of the policy initiative in their 
cooperation. The importance of policy dialogue was 
mainly due to this focus on policy control. It was an 
instrument of both effective development and 
operational control. The Community's vision on the 
wider message of the Pisani Memorandum - the stress on 
the critical import of capacity to development - was 
obscured by the policy focus. The Community was 
literally unable to see the forest of development for 
the trees of policy control.
The attention of the Community to policy control 
was sharpened in another way. The struggle over policy 
dialogue was, as noted, a battle for policy control. 
It was, in short, a determination of where the power 
in the relationship lay. The Community wished to
See the Chapeau to Chapter 2 and Section 2.1 
for a wider discussion of the implications of the 
proposal.
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ensure that it set the operating parameters for the 
Convention. Thus, as the study of bargaining capacity 
showed, it sought to control the negotiating agenda 
and the rules of the relationship.^^ Against that 
background, the building of the institutional 
capacities of its adversary was likely to be a very 
low priority for the Community. That was, indeed, the 
conclusion drawn from the analysis of operational 
c a p a c i t y . The second message of the Memorandum was 
thus further submerged under the consequences of the 
first message.
Another ramification of the emphasis on policy 
control was to be seen in the Community's operational 
control of the Convention. The trail from policy 
dialogue to multiple conditionality has been stressed. 
There was also another parallel trail towards the 
centralisation of operational control in the 
Commission services in Brussels. This was a principal 
aim of the various changes in procedures and 
programming proposed, in the Mid-Term Review, by the 
Community.
The Community's commitment to centralisation in 
Brussels was so strong that it sought to remove 
responsibilities from the Commission Delegations in 
ACP states. Its determination was particularly evident 
in its attempt to withdraw the authority of the
See Section 3.2.2 above.
See Section 5.2.
These changes and some implications are 
discussed at several points above. See Sections 2.2.4; 
4.5; 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.
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Delegate to draw up financing proposals for projects. 
The quest for centralisation was most visible in the 
growing Community tendency to assume wider 
responsibility for project implementation.^^. Policy 
control, to the Community, signified total control, 
both of the policy and of the operations of the 
Convention.
The ACP states, for their part, had managed to 
see off policy dialogue and, with it, the Community's 
attempts at undermining their sovereign control of 
their development. They were totally unwilling to hear 
any other message from the source of their concern, 
the Pisani Memorandum. The ACP states paid little or 
no attention to the second legacy of the Memorandum. 
Any message about capacity was, therefore, lost on 
them as a Group.
The subsequent developments leading to the 
emergence of conditionality took very little account 
of capacity. The attention of both sides had turned 
away from the second message of the Memorandum. Where 
the enhancement of ACP management capabilities was 
espoused in the cooperation, it was primarily for the 
purpose of carrying out a specific programme. The 
first choice of the Commission, in such circumstances, 
was for the use of technical assistance. It was a 
policy which gave rise to complications: the ACP had 
grave reservations about the bias towards European
20 This issue is treated in Section 5.5.2.
See, especially, the Conclusions of Chapter 5 
in Section 5.7
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expertise in the provision of technical assistance. 22
The examination of operational capacity reflected 
the reality that capacity was a largely ignored 
element in the relationship. It also drew attention to 
an aspect which was important for both operational and 
instrumental capacity. The second message of the 
Pisani Memorandum underlined the centrality of 
capacity to development per se, not merely to 
conditionality. It therefore dealt with a broad 
definition of capacity, spanning both administrative 
and sociopolitical aspects. Not only was the general 
message on the importance of capacity lost, so too 
were rhe nuances of capacity in the Memorandum.The 
contribution of capacity to the overall task of ACP 
development was not explored in building operational 
areas. The appreciation of capacity-building, from a 
sociopolitical perspective, was also missing in the 
measures covering instrumental capacity. The failure 
to claim the second legacy of the Pisani Memorandum 
thus impacted directly on the present task before the 
Lomé partners, that of implementing multiple 
conditionality.
7.3 QUESTIONS RAISED
At the outset of this thesis, I noted that I 
would need to respond to a series of questions. These 
questions can now be addressed in the light of the 
full tale of institutional capacity and multiple 
conditionality. 1 propose to respond to each of these
The issue of technical assistance is treated in 
Section 5.5.1.
See Section 2.1.1.
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questions before turning to the central concern of the 
thesis.
7.3.1 Conditionality: Abrupt Change or
Evolution?
The first set of questions related to the 
introduction of multiple conditionality, in terms of 
its nature and the process of introduction. The 
examination of the origins of multiple conditionality 
revealed that the process began much earlier than has 
been commonly believed. It began, in an unobtrusive 
manner, with the unsuccessful Pisani proposal for a 
policy dialogue during the negotiations for Lomé III. 
From a Community perspective, this initial effort 
evolved naturally in stages to conditionality. The 
introduction of structural adjustment support (SAS) in 
Lomé IV and the frameworks of mutual obligations of 
Stabex were stages based on the internal workings of 
the Convention. The three building blocks of multiple 
conditionality^^ represented, simultaneously, a 
response to tighter aid accountability globally and 
greater Community rigour within the Convention.
The ACP perceived the developments as a less 
natural evolution. Its perception was unduly coloured 
by two shortcomings of its own. The first was the 
Group's failure to assess accurately the nature and 
implication of each stage of the evolutionary process. 
The second was its own willingness to extend the scope
The three blocks - the Marin-Matutes paper; the 
Commission's overview of Development to the Year 2000; 
and the Pons Grau Report to the Joint Assembly - are 
examined in Sections 2.2.1; 2.2.2; and 2.2.3
respectively.
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of Lomé to encompass social and political dimensions. 
This flawed ACP perception also prevented the Group 
from presenting a coherent and effective response to 
the Community's progress to multiple conditionality.
The examination of the two messages of the Pisani 
Memorandum allows me to add to the conclusions of 
Chapter 1. The legacy claimed from the Memorandum was 
that of the policy prescription which led to multiple 
conditionality. This focus, along with the failure to 
grasp the second message, resulted in an orientation 
in Lomé towards the control of policy. The Community 
enjoyed an asymmetrically greater capacity which 
enabled it to exercise much more influence on policy. 
This control allowed it to direct the evolution to, 
and the shape of, multiple conditionality. The failure 
to heed adequately the second legacy of capacity also 
set the stage for a subsequent failure: that of either 
side to promote capacity-building as a component of 
cooperation.
7.3.2 Imposition or Scope for Manoeuvre?
A second series of questions concerned the 
demands of multiple conditionality. Was the 
introduction a mere imposition by the Community or did 
the ACP retain some scope for manoeuvre in the face of 
multiple conditionality? The response to this set of 
questions is more complex. The Community was conscious 
of its greater bargaining and operational capacity in 
the relationship. However, it also recognised that the 
success of multiple conditionality required ACP 
participation in its implementation. There was thus a 
need to involve the ACP states in a form of dialogue 
or bargaining on conditionality, if it was to be
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effective.
The ACP Group, for its part, was also conscious 
of the constraints on its own bargaining capacity. 
However, it sought to resist any unilateral decision 
by the Community to change the basic nature of the 
Lomé relationship. The introduction of a multiple 
conditionality programme was seen, by the ACP, as one 
such fundamental change but it was also an unavoidable 
change. The Group recognised that fact and felt that 
its sole recourse was to seek some input into the 
governing conditions of the programme. The conclusion 
was that both sides were prepared to come to a common 
understanding on conditionality.
The reality was, of course, very different as the 
previous Chapters have shown. There were factors and 
perceptions, on both sides, which reveal the initial 
conclusion as limited and the facts as more 
complicated. The Community held a low perception of 
the ACP's capacity to resist its introduction of 
multiple conditionality. It was a perception based on 
its appreciation of the ACP's capacity i.e., the 
letter's willingness to resist, its bargaining 
capacity and its internal cohesion. The compliance of 
the ACP with the various Community initiatives on the 
path to conditionality convinced the Community that it 
could readily disregard ACP objections. The Community 
was all too aware of the disproportionate bargaining 
power which it possessed, relative to the ACP.
The Community was equally cognisant of the 
internal array of forces within the ACP Group. There 
was a significant number of states which saw no
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disadvantage in the introduction of conditionality.^ 
Underlying these perceptions was the implied threat 
that the access of ACP states to Convention funding in 
the second half of Lomé IV was dependent on their not 
breaching the conditional measures. The Community's 
position was thus a blend of imposition and a 
willingness to engage in dialogue to ensure the ACP's 
participation in implementation.
Some of the perceptions attributed to the 
Community were also applicable to the ACP. The 
letter's lack of internal unity and its negotiating 
weakness meant that the ACP Group was bargaining from 
a position of inherent weakness. The Group did not 
improve its bargaining strength by its failure to 
negotiate the operating provisions of multiple 
conditionality during the Mid-Term Review. The 
important task of negotiating, with the Community, the 
terms of conditionality would be met on a case-by-case 
basis. It has been left by default to the individual 
state facing sanction.^
The ACP states were not wholly captive of the 
Community's programme of conditionality. They retained 
some ultimate scope for manoeuvre because the success 
or failure of multiple conditionality depended on the 
support which it was given by the implementing state. 
However, the usefulness of that option had been 
counterbalanced by two factors. The first stemmed from
This minority consisted of those which had, 
themselves, recently benefitted from political reform 
and the "pragmatists" which saw conditionality as an 
affordable cost for continued access to Lomé 
resources. See Sections 2.5.2 and 4.3.
See Section 4.5.
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the very nature of the option: it was the recourse of 
an individual state, not of the Group. A failure to 
provide the necessary support for the programme was 
likely to place the state in a "no-win" situation. It 
would surely expose the state to sanction and cost it 
access to Lomé resources. The second factor arose from 
the nature of multiple conditionality. Its 
construction, with its amalgam of economic and socio­
political measures, was specifically designed to 
reduce the ACP scope to manoeuvre in the domestic 
environment.
7.3.3 Forms of Capacity Generated and Lessons 
for Conditionality?
This thesis has concentrated on the three 
principal forms of institutional capacity which are 
relevant to the issue of multiple conditionality: 
bargaining, operational and instrumental. There are 
implications for the application of multiple 
conditionality to be gained from the examination of 
each form. I am dealing with the implications in the 
light of the insights provided by the two messages of 
the Pisani Memorandum. I have already looked at 
several of the implications in the earlier sections of 
this Chapter. To a large extent, those relating to 
bargaining and instrumental capacity have been 
covered. I do not plan to retread that ground. This 
section concentrates mainly on operational capacity.
The examination of operational capacity brought 
up a series of considerations. It underlined the ACP's
See Section 3.4.4 above for a discussion of the 
limitations on the scope for embedded liberalism.
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failure to augment its technical and administrative 
capacity during the life of the Conventions. It also 
stressed the fact that the Community did not accord a 
high priority to the strengthening of ACP capacity to 
manage the Conventions. The insights from the second 
message of Pisani provided the explanation for both 
positions. It demonstrated that the ACP's failure was 
due, in large part, to its inability or unwillingness 
to listen to the message. The Group never came to 
appreciate the import of building its own capacity in 
Lomé. The Community's disregard of the second Pisani 
message also explained its treatment of capacity. The 
insights revealed a second explanation. The quest by 
the Community for policy control of the Convention 
meant that it was unlikely to build, simultaneously, 
the capacity of its opponents.
Generally speaking, the study of operational 
capacity substantiated the fact that the Community 
commanded resources which were asymmetrically superior 
to those of the ACP. It was also able to exercise its 
functions more effectively. That point conceded, there 
are several implications of operational capacity which 
are worthy of note. The first implication has already 
been noted. It is sufficient merely to restate its 
essentials here. For a number of reasons, the 
experience of implementation provided a limited and 
ineffective contribution to the building of ACP 
c a p a c i t y . T h e s e  included the consequences of the 
second Pisani legacy and the view of the Community 
that ACP incompetence was a major obstacle to 
effective implementation. The Community had formed an
This point is made generally in Chapter 5, in 
Section 5.5 and the Conclusions in Section 5.7
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opinion that the ACP involvement in joint management 
was more hindrance than help. This perception was a 
partial explanation of the Community's proposals, in 
the Mid-Term Review, for more Commission control over 
implementation.29 The proposals were also in keeping 
with the desire to establish a firm policy control. 
The response to the perceived obstacles pointedly paid 
scant attention to the alternative option of helping 
to strengthen indigenous ACP capacity.
The second point to note is also general in 
nature. The implementation procedures followed by the 
Community were closely related to the traditional 
methods of international donors. The increased 
emphasis on rigour in programmes encouraged the resort 
to more familiar methods of implementation. The 
growing complexity of management of the Convention 
also discouraged innovation in procedures. There has 
been little evidence of the development of an 
operational model of implementation especially adapted 
to the ACP reality. The use of traditional methods had 
an important implication for multiple conditionality. 
It suggested that the Community might similarly resort 
to the orthodox programmes pursued by other 
international donors and which were derived from 
structural adjustment. It was, therefore, uncertain 
that the EU would be willing to design or market a 
model specifically geared to the ACP.
The examination of operational capacity 
illustrated the relative limitations of ACP capacity. 
It also indicated that there were shortcomings in
2- See Section 5.5.2 for a discussion of the 
Community's proposals.
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Community capacity to meet the demands of 
implementation. The examination showed that the 
Commission suffered from constraints on its human 
resources, both in Brussels and in the overseas 
Delegations in the ACP states. It highlighted problems 
of internal coordination existing within the 
Commission services although these problems have been 
recognised and are in the process of being addressed. 
The poor implementation record of the sociopolitical 
programmes further suggested that there remained a 
great deal to be done if such programmes were to be 
made effective. Their relevance to a programme of 
multiple conditionality had impressed itself on the 
consciousness of the Commission as evidenced in its 
instrumental measures. There was little indication 
that the Commission was similarly seized of the need 
to help provide the conditions in the ACP required to 
build the necessary capacity.
7.3.4 Central Concern of Study
The above analysis helps to make the task of 
responding to the central concern of this thesis less 
difficult. After dealing with the supplementary 
questions, I can now turn to the central concern: do 
the two sides possess the requisite institutional 
capacity to meet the additional demands of cooperation 
as posed by multiple conditionality?
These demands differ insofar as they affect each 
side. The greater incidence falls on the ACP which has 
to satisfy the conditions through its performance; the 
Community's task is more akin to that of evaluator cum 
judge. One conclusion of this thesis is that the 
relative capacities of the two are inversely
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proportionate to the level of demand which they face. 
The ACP faces the more demanding task with limited 
resources. The EU, in command of superior capacity, 
has much less to do.
The ACP Group has gained little technical or 
administrative capacity from the Lomé experience. It 
has failed to influence, to any significant extent, 
the emergence of multiple conditionality. The limits 
of its bargaining capacity were exemplified by its 
failure, or inability, to negotiate on the design of 
the programme. It did not bring the relevant 
experience of its members of structural adjustment to 
bear on the conditionality debate. Multiple 
conditionality poses new challenges for Lomé 
cooperation and represents a qualitative change in the 
relationship. The Group has not demonstrated the 
flexibility necessary to respond to changed conditions 
in Lomé. It is unlikely to handle, more effectively, 
the demands of multiple conditionality. Finally, its 
lack of technical capacity has resulted in the total 
absence of an ACP contribution to the instrumental 
provisions.
The Community has a superior command of 
resources, both human and technical. It exercised an 
overwhelming control of the operations of the 
Convention and it set the conditionality agenda. It 
also serves, in a real sense, as the final arbiter of 
the ACP's compliance with the demands of 
conditionality.
The ability of the ACP to adapt to changed 
conditions in the Lomé relationship has been discussed 
in Section 5.6.
366
However, there are caveats to the asymmetry 
described above. I have shown that the Community does 
not have total command of the requisite capacity. I 
have identified various shortcomings affecting its 
human and technical resources. The poor record of 
implementation of decentralised cooperation calls into 
question the Community's capabilities in managing such 
complex, non-traditional programmes. Above all, the 
implementation of a programme of multiple 
conditionality represents management at the frontiers 
of development cooperation where there are no proven 
methods to guide the donors. My initial response was 
that the Community was more capable of managing the 
demands of the conditionality programme although it 
too faced limits on its capacity.
This initial response must be amplified in the 
light of the message of the second Pisani legacy which 
signalled the importance of institutional capacity. 
The expanded response makes almost no further 
amendment to the initial judgement on the ACP Group. 
It merely notes that the Group's incapacity was to be 
expected as it never truly acknowledged the need to 
build any form of capacity in the relationship. Having 
rejected policy dialogue and any other message of the 
Pisani Memorandum, the ACP did not perceive a need to 
build a capacity which might be applied to 
conditionality.
The amplification affects the position of the 
Community much more. The Memorandum had identified 
both the policy objectives and the means to help 
achieve it. The second message was ignored but it did 
not mean that the Community did not seek to build its 
own capacity. It built capacity in the pursuit of both
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its normal integration affairs and the management of 
the Convention. What the Community did not do was to 
build the capacity of the ACP or its own capacity 
relative to conditionality. On occasion, the Community 
did contribute to improved ACP operational capacity.^ 
However, it was done in a selective manner which was 
not systematic or consciously designed.
Having missed the link between the two messages, 
the Community failed to perceive the link between a 
successful conditionality programme and the 
strengthening of ACP capacity. Thus, the limited ACP 
capacity which the Community generated in the course
of its management of the Convention lacked a full
appreciation of what was required for conditionality. 
It captured the forms of administrative and technical 
capacity required by the traditional programmes of
adjustment. It missed the full import of the second
message with its nuances of sociopolitical aspects of 
capacity and its networks of relations for 
development.
The capacity generated by the Community was 
superior to that of the ACP in some matters relating 
to conditionality but it was almost as deficient in 
the sociopolitical dimension. This fact was amply 
demonstrated by the dearth of instrumental provisions 
aimed at furthering popular participation and good 
governance. The EU recognised the value of
1 have shown that some Community efforts did
result in a limited strengthening of capacity in the
recipient ACP state. See Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
This critique is developed in Section 5.1.2.
See Section 6.3.3.
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adaptability and capacity in the context of 
adjustment. However, it revealed little more 
appreciation, than did the ACP, of how to deal with 
the wider demands of multiple conditionality.
7.4 Challenges and Opportunities
The onset of multiple conditionality poses many 
challenges for both sides in the Lomé relationship. 
The outlook is not entirely pessimistic for almost 
every challenge also offers an opportunity for 
overcoming the problem posed by the challenge. The 
challenges for the ACP states are fewer in number and, 
therefore, simpler to assess. The first is the task of 
recognising the value of institutional capacity in 
development. It is a fundamental problem which goes 
beyond the Lomé relationship and affects overall ACP 
development policy. The opportunity comes from the 
fact that it is a problem common to the EU as well. 
They can both, if so disposed, use the shared 
endeavour of Lomé as a base for building such 
capacity.
The second challenge for the ACP is peculiar to 
the individual state. The analysis of adjustment threw 
up the problem of states indulging in "make-believe" 
attempts at satisfying reform.The challenge for the 
ACP is the choice between partial attempts at 
satisfaction of conditionality and a genuine, though 
painful, effort at reform. Most of the ACP states face 
some form of conditionality in its aid programmes.
See Section 6.4.4. The problem is treated in 
more detail in Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont eds., 
Adjustment and Development., op. cit., pp. 84-87.
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Lomé, as an exercise in conditionality, is not unique. 
Reforms, through conditionality, are now inescapable. 
They are a common feature of development assistance. 
The positive note is that Lomé offers the prospect of 
dealing with a familiar donor which is prepared to 
adopt a programme which is less formalistic and more 
adaptable to local realities.
The ACP states face challenges which are basic in 
nature but those facing the EU are more diverse. The 
first has been raised in the context of instrumental 
capacity. It concerns the final disposition of the 
conditionality programmes of the Community when they 
are taken to the other donors. In the jargon of 
European integration, the question is whether the EU 
will go native or hold out for its own differentiated 
models. The opportunity offered is that of helping 
change the mould of conditionality programming and 
overcome the problems identified in the traditional 
formula.
The second challenge for the EU is how to take 
account of the sociopolitical dimensions of 
institutional capacity, as bequeathed by Pisani. Its 
importance to the task of effecting multiple 
conditionality is established. The difficulty is in 
the effective generation of that capacity. I will 
readily admit that there exists no proven method for 
so doing. However, I will posit that the nucleus for 
creating an enabling environment already exists in the 
operation of the Convention. Therein lies the 
opportunity within the challenge. The rudiments are 
there in the components of decentralised cooperation, 
with its focus on women, the young, the private and 
informal sectors. The current provisions need to be
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improved and extended beyond their operational 
involvement in programmes. They have to encompass 
support for the building of the general capacity of 
these social groups and of their roles as agents of 
development.
The last challenge for the Community is essential 
to both the Lomé relationship and the success of 
multiple conditionality. The EU has to decide whether 
it is more important to establish policy control or 
help build the capacity of the ACP. The two are not 
mutually exclusive as, together, they comprise the two 
legacies of the Pisani Memorandum. The approach of the 
EU has been to concentrate on policy control. It now 
needs to take cognisance of the role and value of 
institutional capacity.
The building of ACP capacity is vital to better 
management of cooperation and to an effective response 
to conditionality. The stimulus for a change in 
Community approach lies in the fact that it is in the 
interests of the Commission to effect that change. It 
is the services of the Commission which will face the 
ultimate test of effectiveness.^ This test will come 
when the efforts of those services at building 
multiple conditionality are judged by their political 
masters, the policy-makers. They need to do all they 
can to help ensure the success of the conditionality 
programme. Helping to strengthen the institutional 
capacity of the ACP is of critical import to that 
success.
The criterion of effectiveness has been 
described as the motivating force behind the proposal 
for policy dialogue. See Section 2.1.1.
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Finally, there is a joint opportunity which 
emerges from the second challenge which the EU faces. 
The tasks of multiple conditionality demand forms of 
capacity, particularly in the sociopolitical areas, 
which are patently beyond the power of the state. They 
require novel interactions between the state and 
bodies in the civil society. These interactions pose 
management problems which do not lend themselves to 
fixed formulae and proven responses. Neither the ACP 
states, as recipients, nor the EU, as donor, can claim 
either familiarity or demonstrable success in dealing 
with such forms of institutional capacity. Success or 
failure cannot, therefore, be easily attributed to the 
sole efforts of either side. It is a learning process 
for them both.
The opportunity, arising out of this challenge, 
stems from this fact. The fashioning of effective 
capacity in the social and political sectors - the 
enabling environment - will be a function of trial and 
error for both sides. It thus offers the ACP and the 
EU the opportunity to undertake a complementary effort 
in which they are mutually supportive. This would be 
the most positive approach to the demands of 
institutional capacity posed by multiple 
conditionality.
This point has been made at several points in 
the thesis and is central to the suitability of the 
proposed instrumental measures. See, in particular. 
Section 6.5 on Suggestions for Improvement.
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APPENDIX 1
ACP MEMBER STATES: REGIONAL GROUPINGS
Africa M7) Caribbean Pacific
m
Central MO) East (12) South (9) West M6)
Burundi Comoros Angola Benin Antigua and 
Barbuda
Fiji
Cameroon □iibouti Botswana Burkina Faso Bahamas Kiribati
Central
African
Republic
Eritrea Lesotho Cape Verde Barbados Papua New  
Guinea
Chad Ethiopia Malawi Côte d'Ivoire Belize Solomon
Islands
Congo Kenya Mozambique Gambia Dominica Western
Samoa
Equatorial
Guinea
Madagascar Namibia Ghana Dominican
Republic
Tonga
Gabon Mauritius Swaziland Guinea Grenada Tuvalu
Rwanda Seychelles Zambia Guinea
Bissau
Guyana Vanuatu
Sâo Tomé è 
Principe
Somalia Zimbabwe Liberia Haiti
Zaire Sudan Mali Jamaica
Tanzania Mauritania St.
Christopher 
and Nevis
Uganda Niger St. Lucia
Nigeria St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines
Senegal Suriname
Sierra Leone Trinidad and 
Tobago
Togo
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APPENDIX 2
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Austria Italy
Belgium Luxembourg
Denmark The Netherlands
Finland Portugal
France Spain
Germany Sweden
Greece United Kingdom
Ireland
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